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Abstract of  the Thesis 
 
Forensic Identification and Detection of Hidden and Obfuscated Malware 
 
Mamoun Alazab 
Doctor of Philosophy in Information Technology 
School of Science, Information Technology and Engineering 
University of Ballarat, 
Ballarat, Victoria 
Australia 
 
The revolution in online criminal activities and malicious software (malware) has posed a 
serious challenge in malware forensics. Malicious attacks have become more organized 
and purposefully directed. With cybercrimes escalating to great heights in quantity as 
well as in sophistication and stealth, the main challenge is to detect hidden and 
obfuscated malware. Malware authors use a variety of obfuscation methods and 
specialized stealth techniques of information hiding to embed malicious code, to infect 
systems and to thwart any attempt to detect them, specifically with the use of 
commercially available anti-malware engines. This has led to the situation of zero-day 
attacks, where malware inflict systems even with existing security measures. The aim of 
this thesis is to address this situation by proposing a variety of novel digital forensic and 
data mining techniques to automatically detect hidden and obfuscated malware.   
Anti-malware engines use signature matching to detect malware where signatures are 
generated by human experts by disassembling the file and selecting pieces of unique 
code.  Such signature based detection works effectively with known malware but 
performs poorly with hidden or unknown malware. Code obfuscation techniques, such as 
  
xv 
packers, polymorphism and metamorphism, are able to fool current detection techniques 
by modifying the parent code to produce offspring copies resulting in malware that has 
the same functionality, but with a different structure. These evasion techniques exploit 
the drawbacks of traditional malware detection methods, which take current malware 
structure and create a signature for detecting this malware in the future. However, 
obfuscation techniques aim to reduce vulnerability to any kind of static analysis to the 
determent of any reverse engineering process. Furthermore, malware can be hidden in file 
system slack space, inherent in NTFS file system based partitions, resulting in malware 
detection that even more difficult. 
Security researchers and the anti-malware industry are facing a herculean task in 
extracting the payload, the de-obfuscated malware, and maliciousness hidden by these 
techniques. For effective and efficient solutions, this thesis moves away from the 
signature based detection to anomaly based detection. This thesis aims to provide 
solutions to the problem of detecting hidden and obfuscated malware through the 
following major contributions to the literature: 
One – Propose a method for detecting malicious software that is hidden in NTFS slack 
space partitions. NTFS file system provides useful information leading towards 
identifying hidden malware and presentation of digital evidence for the court of law.  
Chapter 3 of thesis provides knowledge, methodology and discusses the analysis 
techniques used to successfully detect maliciousness in hidden data and hidden space, by 
investigating the NTFS file system boot sector. 
  
xvi 
Two – Extracting features from the obfuscated executables for reverse obfuscation is 
labor intensive and requires deep understanding of kernel and assembly programming. 
Develops fully automated system to extract two independent features, namely OP code 
and API function call features for finding the fingerprint of executable programs and for 
detection and differentiation of different files that are either malicious or benign.  
Three – Propose anomaly based detection that focuses on the extended x86 IA-32 binary 
assembly instructions' frequency statistics, using i) Maximum Relevance (MR) filter 
heuristic, ii) Artificial Neural Net Input Gain Measurement Approximation (ANNIGMA), 
and iii) combination of MR and ANNIGMA (MR-ANNIGMA). Experimental results 
show that our frequency-statistics based approach achieves high accuracy ~96%.  
Four – Propose similarity based detection of unknown malware using API function calls 
features, using various distance measures of vector models. Experimental analysis claims 
that our proposed method is an effective method to accurately differentiate malware from 
benign files and, more importantly, to detect obfuscated malware families. 
Five – Investigate the employment of various robust supervised machine learning 
algorithms on API function call features. Experimental results achieved high true positive 
rate of ~ 99%, and low false positive rate of less than 2%, which has not been achieved in 
literature so far. This is much higher than the required commercial acceptance level 
indicating that our novel technique is a major leap forward in detecting zero-day 
malware.  
In this thesis, we have demonstrated the robustness of our proposed techniques and 
automated system by testing it on a large dataset of 66,703 executable files in total, 
  
xvii 
consisting of 51,223 recent Malware samples collected over the period 2008-2011, with 
the remaining executables forming benign samples. Together, these contributions enable 
an effective and efficient forensic identification and detection of hidden and obfuscated 
malware.  
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Chapter 1 : Introduction  
              
Sherlock Holmes: “It is of the highest importance in the art of detection to be 
able to recognize out of a number of facts which are incidental and which vital. 
Otherwise your energy and attention must be dissipated instead of being 
concentrated.”  
                       —Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, “The Adventure of the Reigate Squire,‖ 
        The Strand Magazine (1893) 
1.1   Background  
The field of computer crime has matured possessing rich history (Casey 2004; Maria 
2011). The growth of the Internet has resulted in the increasing computer attacks and 
intrusions. Among these attacks, Malware (malicious software) is one of the biggest 
threats facing the digital world (Alperovitch 2011; RSA 2011). With more and more use 
of computers, portable devices and the Internet in everyday life, identification of new or 
unknown malware has become the biggest challenge in digital forensics (Vassil 2009). Of 
late, malware are being designed more for financial gain leading to a huge impact against 
individuals, organisations and business assets. Recent trends in malware designed for 
such financial fraud purposes indicate their increasing complexity and they are evolving 
rapidly as Internet provides more opportunities for automated financial activities. As a 
result, the financial damages caused by malware to individuals and businesses have 
dramatically increased in the past few years (RSA 2011). 
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In many ways, cybercrime is no different than traditional crime (Jahankhani & 
Al-Nemrat 2008). Both crimes involve in identifying targets, using surveillance and 
psychological profiling. The major difference is that the perpetrators of cybercrime are 
increasingly remote to the scene of the crime (Jahankhani & Al-Nemrat 2010). The 
traditional idea of a 'criminal gang' loses its meaning as members can now reside on 
different continents without ever having to actually meet.  
Data has become more valuable than money. Hence, accessing bank data gives 
cyber criminals repeated access to the money.  Researches into credit card fraud detection 
have steadily increased over the recent years (Aycock 2006; Ghosh & Turrini 2010; 
James 2007; Komisarczuk 2010). Intruders, who achieve unauthorized access to financial 
system for financial gain, cause losses for financial sectors and there is no single 
technique that can deter them. However, a threat that was once focused on single 
criminals is now focused on major organised crime crossing international boundaries and 
jurisdictions. Recent white paper (RSA 2011) to review the current state of cybercrime by 
the RSA Anti-Fraud Command Center warns that attacks will become more prevalent as 
more persistent techniques are adopted based on what they witnessed in the year of 2010 
and 2011. Moreover, use of botnets, VOIP and mobile SMS in attacks are expected to 
rise. Globally, 30,000 phishing attacks are reported each month and at least three percent 
of phishing attempts are successful (RSA 2011). Although phishing alone is not directly 
responsible for all online banking fraud, Singh‘s statistical work in cyber security 
indicates that 900 online bank accounts get compromised each month from phishing 
alone (Singh 2007). Therefore, online banking fraud, in our case, includes all 
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unauthorized transactions conducted without the legitimate account holder‘s knowledge 
and (usually) resulting in loss of funds from the account. 
Malware detection usually occurs in online systems and the anti-virus software 
forms the primary tool for the defense against malware.  Though the quality of such 
malware detectors is improving in the techniques being adopted, namely ‗virus signature‘ 
based detection or heuristic based detection, the malware attackers are always one step 
ahead of the anti-virus tools (Stolfo et al. 2007). The present malware detection systems 
usually rely on existing malware signatures with limited heuristics  and are unable to 
detect those malware that can hide themselves during the scanning process in online 
systems (Alazab, Venkatraman, et al. 2009; Venkatraman 2009). According to a recent 
report (RSA 2011) new malware goes undetected by the commercially available anti-
virus tools, and the literature survey conducted in this study indicates the need for new 
techniques to identify such hidden malware. Therefore, in order to address this 
requirement, this research study concentrates, first to developing a robust digital forensic 
process for NTFS file system, and then to design and apply innovative techniques for 
fulfilling the main objective of detecting hidden malware, which was still an unsolved 
challenge for malware detectors.  Thus, the research project presented in this document 
attempts to fill the gap in both literature and practice.   
As a first step to address the challenge, Chapter 3 investigates offline NTFS file 
systems and propose effective digital forensic techniques that could be used to analyse 
and acquire evidences of hidden malware in NTFS disk images. In the same chapter, the 
research focuses on achieving the main goal of this research in proposing and evaluating 
an innovative methodology to effectively detect hidden malware. Since NTFS is 
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predominantly used in most computer systems, and malware attackers take advantage of 
its weaknesses to hide malware, this research investigates and identifies the main areas of 
hidden malware growth.  With this in view, the research aims i) to explore the NTFS disk 
structure and its vulnerabilities (Alazab, Venkataraman, et al. 2009), ii) to investigate 
weaknesses of existing commonly used digital forensic techniques (Alazab 2009) such as 
signature-based (Preda et al. 2008), anomaly-based (Patcha & Park 2007), and iii) to 
propose and evaluate improved methods in static analysis of NTFS for identifying hidden 
malware by investigating the disk image (physical), and for detecting unknown malware 
through file content (logical) analysis.  Preliminary investigations conducted in this 
research study to identify hidden malware using function call analysis have been reported 
(Alazab, Layton, et al. 2010; Alazab, Venkataraman, et al. 2010) and subsequently using 
file content analysis.  
Sophistication in malware through code obfuscation has created another challenge 
for digital forensic examiners and reverse engineering, namely the detection rate of new 
and unknown malware is low rate (Passerini et al. 2009; Stang 2010) and identifying 
benign code as malicious, which is termed as false alarm rate,  is high (Patcha & Park 
2007). The second challenge is extracting features from the obfuscated executables for 
reverse obfuscation is labor intensive and requires deep understanding of kernel and 
assembly programming. This thesis aim to develops fully automated system to extract 
two independent features, namely OP code and API function call features for finding the 
fingerprint of executable programs and for detection and differentiation of different files 
that are either malicious or benign. Obfuscation techniques aim to reduce vulnerability to 
any kind of static analysis for the determent of any reverse engineering process. 
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Extracting the payload, the de-obfuscated malware, and maliciousness hidden is a 
challenging task. This thesis aims to provide solutions to the automatic extracting of 
features out of binaries.  
The Third challenge is unknown or obfuscated malware detection. Literature 
studies on malware detection as illustrated in Chapter 2 have shown that there is no single 
technique that could detect all types of malware (Chouchane & Lakhotia 2006; Dinaburg 
et al. 2008; Lawton 2002; Sharif et al. 2008; TreadwellZhou & Zhou 2009 ). Two 
techniques are commonly used for malware detection: signature-based detection and 
anomaly-based detection. Anti-malware engines use malware signatures to detect known 
malware. However, these countermeasures cannot detect unknown malware or unknown 
signatures which uniquely identify a specific malware. Therefore, signature based 
approaches fail to detect unknown malware. On the other hand, anomaly-based detection 
uses the knowledge of normal behaviour patterns to decide the maliciousness of a 
program code. It has the key advantage and ability to detect zero day attacks.  However, 
it is very difficult to accurately specify the system or program‘s behaviour and thus these 
approaches usually result in a high false positive rate. For the second challenge in this 
dissertation; signature-free detection methods are proposed in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 to cope with polymorphic transformations and metamorphic obfuscations of 
malware, and use supervised machine learning algorithms for building better anomaly 
detection: 
1) OP-code Features based Malware Detection:  detailed in Chapter 4, using the 
knowledge of normal behaviour patterns of the x86 IA-32 operation codes (op-codes), this 
research work has proposed a novel algorithm that combines op-code frequency statistics 
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and hybrid wrapper-filter based feature selection technique for constructing a classifier for 
malware detection. Also, hybridized op-code statistics with novel wrapper-filter based feature 
selection technique to optimise the process has resulted in achieving the desired efficiency 
for large datasets.  
2) API Features based Malware Detection: detailed in Chapter 5, using the 
knowledge of normal behaviour patterns of the Application Programming Interface (API) 
function calls. While some research has been conducted in arriving at file birthmarks 
using API call features and the like, there is a scarcity of work that analyses deeply with 
respect to the use of such features in malcodes.  To address this gap, an attempt for the 
first time has been made to automatically classify the behavior of the API function calls 
based on the malicious intent present in any packed program. This approach also provides 
scope for deeper understanding of code obfuscation and to reverse it automatically with 
least human effort as explained in Chapter 5. Also, Chapter 5 proposes a five-step 
methodology for developing a fully automated system to arrive at six main categories of 
suspicious behavior of API call features to optimise the process and to achieve the desired 
efficiency for large datasets by using support vector machine algorithm with n-gram 
statistical analysis of API calls by varying n-values from 1 to 5. The main aim is to 
increase the true positive rate, reduce the false alarm rate, and to improve the overall 
accuracy.  
3) Malware Detection and similarity detection based on Data Mining of API calls, 
as detailed in Chapter 6, a machine learning framework is proposed and evaluated with 
large datasets to investigate further on the preliminary observed patterns and to analyse 
using a variety of data mining techniques for detecting malware from benign files 
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effectively, based on the frequency of occurrence of each Windows Application 
Programming Interface (API) calls found in the datasets. Also, different distance 
measures have been implemented and similarity analysis performed by using eight 
commonly used distance measures in vector models, namely  Cosine, Bray-Curtis, 
Canberra, Chebyshev, Manhattan, Correlation, Euclidean, and Hamming distance 
similarity measure for Nearest Neighbor (NN). As well as this, a supervised learning 
approach has been adopted that uses a dataset to train, validate and test, an array of 
classifiers. Robust classifiers have been selected, namely Naive Bayes (NB) Algorithm, 
k−Nearest Neighbor (kNN) Algorithm, Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) 
Algorithm with 4 different kernels (SMO - Normalized PolyKernel, SMO – PolyKernel, 
SMO – Puk, and SMO- Radial Basis Function (RBF)), Backpropagation Neural 
Networks Algorithm, Logistic Regression, and J48 decision tree. The chapter also 
provides details of how data will be collected to conduct the experimental analysis and 
the data mining algorithms adopted for the study will be evaluated.   
In creating new malware, malware authors use obfuscation techniques and 
behavior modification in order to thwart malware detectors. Obfuscation attempts to hide 
the true intentions of existing malicious code without changing the behaviours exhibited 
by the malware. Behaviour modification creates new malware by making changes to the 
existing malware, although the same behaviour of the malware stills the same. 
Sophisticated tools are available for malware writers to create new malware very quickly 
suiting their needs based on these techniques. Reuse and recycle code is a major 
component in the development of new malware effortlessly.  
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1.2   Information Security 
Free from danger is the simplest definition for security, and information security is the 
protection of information from any kind of harm.  Protection of information from 
malware authors (who are called under a variety of names such as black hats, hackers, 
and crackers) is of utmost importance in today‘s information society with high level of 
cybercrime. Currently the internet offers the biggest buyer and seller of goods and 
services through electronic medium. Hence, as today‘s society becomes more electronic 
in terms of smart cards, electronic money, electronic purse, electronic checks, digital 
cash, stored value cards and online banking, more opportunities for serious threats to e-
security have been created. This threat evolution has escalated to a great extent as society 
has moved towards online as the preferred method for Identity theft, financial 
transactions and payments  (Turville et al. 2010). Today‘s information security is being 
breached by such threats posed to individuals and organizations as cybercrimes continue 
to aggressively develop techniques to steal money and financial credentials or personal 
information for financial gains. 
1.3  Computer Forensic  
More than quarter century ago, in 1984, the FBI Laboratory and many other law agencies 
had commenced developing structures to examine computer evidence, in order to address 
the growing demands of computer crimes (Vacca 2005), and the FBI had established the 
Computer Analysis and Response Team (CART). In 1991 the term ‗Computer Forensics‘ 
was coined by the International Association of Computer Investigation Specialists 
(IACIS) in Portland, Oregon (Vacca 2005). Computer forensics is the science of 
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preserving, identifying, extracting, analysing and documenting computer evidence found 
at crime scenes so that this evidence may be used in a court of law (Rogers & Seigfried 
2004). It also answers questions and attempts to provide full descriptions of a digital 
crime scene (Reith et al. 2002). In computer systems, the primary goals of digital forensic 
analysis are fivefold: i) to identify all the unwanted events that took place, ii) to ascertain 
their effect on the system, iii) to acquire the necessary evidence to confirm malicious 
activity that may have occurred on computer systems, iv) to prevent future incidents by 
detecting the malicious techniques used, and v) to recognize the incitement reasons and 
intendance of the attacker for future predictions.  The focus of this research is on goal iii) 
as this goal has become a major challenge with the recent increase in hidden malware 
whose malicious activities go unnoticed by current detection tools and techniques. 
Computer forensics is a new science that deals with both law and electronic 
devices (Reed 1990-91). The number of criminal justice agencies and organisations is 
being constantly increased and they share responsibility for detecting and stopping digital 
crime. The Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), in their annual report (RCFL 2008) stated that 1,756 TBs of data was 
processed in 2008 alone. The year before (RCFL 2007) the RCFL announced that the 
amount of data examined per criminal case was increasing by 35% annually from 83 
Giga bytes in 2003 to 277 Giga bytes in 2007.  
Digital electronic evidence can be described as the information and data of 
investigative value that are stored by an electronic device (Casey 2004; Kruse & Heiser 
2001). There is no single universal procedure to conduct the investigation of a digital 
crime scene (Carrier 2005). Furthermore, there is no standard process, framework or 
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model for conducting forensic investigation in Windows NT File Systems (NTFS), which 
is the prime motivation of this research.  Many situations have adopted three major 
phases for investigative process, which are; acquisition, preservation, and analysis 
(Andrew 2007). However, recent trends of hidden malware warrant new techniques for 
digital forensics.  Hence, this research work aims to investigate and improve the digital 
forensic techniques that could be used to analyse and acquire evidences of cybercrimes 
and attacks from the most commonly used file system on computers, namely, Windows 
NT File System (NTFS).  
Digital investigation is a process to answer questions about the compromised 
digital data and this involves using either static or live analysis techniques (Kruse & 
Heiser 2001). Even though live analysis techniques could help in capturing evidence 
during forensic investigations to a certain extent, they are far from infallible and lead to 
false negatives of hidden malware.  In live analysis, malware such as rootkits can hide 
and change itself without being seen.  Moreover the attackers target a hidden area on the 
system structure to hide the malware.  Hence, this research focuses on static analysis 
technique as all the hidden information can be captured and cannot be modified to 
produce false data as in case of live analysis techniques.  An image copy of the NTFS 
hard disk would capture even hidden data and hence this study entails developing 
efficient techniques to analyse the data in a confined lab environment for the 
identification of hidden malware. This research work formed a major initial step towards 
addressing the open problem of identifying unseen or new malware that could evade 
detection in the form of hidden or obfuscated malicious code.  
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Forensic investigation was conducted on NTFS with existing forensic tools by 
running the disk image in a trusted operating system to search for evidence, as shown in 
Chapter 3. It was observed that since the NTFS disk image records every event in the 
system, the data required to be analysed is huge and this has led to imperfect forensic 
tools that are practical for real-time implementation but not comprehensive and effective 
as they were unable to detect all malware, in particular hidden malware. Therefore, this 
preliminary investigation confirms that a comprehensive methodology with an improved 
technique is warranted for an effective forensic analysis that is capable of detecting 
hidden malware. 
1.4  Definitions  
Malware: has numerous synonyms such as; malicious software, malicious code 
(MC) and malcode. Malware contains code designed to perform illegal activities that 
cause damage and affect the integrity and functionality of digital electronic devices. 
McGraw and Morrisett (McGraw & Morrisett 2000) define such malicious code as ―any 
code added, changed, or removed from a software system in order to intentionally cause 
harm or subvert the intended function of the system‖. For the purpose of this research, the 
description given by (Vasudevan & Yerraballi 2006) has been adopted for malware  as a 
generic term that encompasses viruses, worms, Trojans, exploits, backdoors, keystroke 
loggers, rootkits, spyware, and spam. These terms are coined based on the functionality 
and behaviour of the malware.  
Viruses:  The father of computer viruses Dr. Frederick Cohen defined the term 
computer virus as ‗A virus is a program that is able to infect other programs by 
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modifying them to include a possibly evolved copy of itself‘ (Cohen 1987). The term 
computer virus comes from the similarities with biological virus since it infects a healthy 
subject and destroys it. In order for the virus to function and cause damage, it needs an 
existing host program. For instance, a virus has been reported and noted to modify the 
program code to take control of operating system, make copies of themselves to spread to 
new targets, and usually it attaches itself to commonly used software such as Adobe 
Acrobat, spread sheets or word processors. The most important part to note here is the 
new copies of the virus do not have the exact clone of the initial instance, this called 
‗metamorphic‘ viruses, sample functionality of the main one but with different byte 
sequence or the signature for each copy to be completely different (Szor 2005).  
Worms: Computer worms have grown to become the fastest spreading and most 
costly malicious code threats (Holz et al. 2006). A worm replicates itself by executing its 
own code independently, and spreads to the other computers using network resource 
connections such as e-mail, TCP/IP, IRC, etc. with the goal of infecting as many 
computer systems connected to the network as possible. Another name for computer 
worms given is network viruses. Since computer worms are designed to copy itself from 
one computer to another, while viruses are designed to spread themselves from one file to 
another on a single computer, worms are more complex than viruses. The other primary 
distinction between a virus and a worm is that a worm does not need a host to cause harm 
unlike a virus.  
Trojan horses:  A Trojan horse is a seemingly harmless computer program 
designed to get access to the computer from another location and to perform unauthorized 
action by tricking computer users to run program masquerades as a legitimate program.  
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For example, the program could contain a useful function (such as local weather) to 
entice users to run the program. Trojan horses replicate in a different way than the 
replication procedure adopted by viruses and worms. However, a Trojan horse can be 
part of the payload of a worm and can be spread to many machines as part of a worm 
infection. It has also been reported that Trojan horses mostly have been sent out as email 
attachments (Szor 2005). Usually, Trojan horses are associated with accessing and 
sending unauthorized information from their host via email which could be classified as 
spyware as well. The embedded malware could also be a time bomb designed to activate 
at a certain time (Landwehr et al. 1994).  
Logic Bomb: created by malicious authors through inserting the malicious code 
into a system which remains dormant and executes its payload when malicious function 
conditions are met (such as pre-defined time), and is also named ‗slag code‘.  However, a 
logic bomb can be used by a virus, worm and other malicious code to gain power, and 
spreads before being noticed. When it gets executed, it could cause Denial of Service 
(DoS) that leads to slowing down of system or a storage overflow, and would remain 
dormant until activated. 
Rootkit: Rootkit name comes from the combination of two words, ―root‖ and 
―kit‖. The highest access level in UNIX environments is ―Root‖, while ―kit‖ refers to 
tools. Hence, a rootkit is defined as (Manap 2001) a collection of tools that enable 
attacker to have full control by obtaining the root access level on the compromised 
system in order to hide its payload from the operating system without being detect. A 
rootkit can hides its presence by hiding the actual files, processes, network connections, 
the sniffers, etc. so that there may be a number of processes running on a system that are 
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not revealed in Task Manager or established connections or netstat display. The rootkit is 
able to do this by manipulating function calls to the operating system and filtering out 
information that would normally appear. Once a rootkit is installed, it allows an attacker 
to mask the ongoing intrusion and maintain privileged access to the hacker by 
circumventing normal authentication and authorization mechanisms (Lobo, Watters, et al. 
2010a, 2010b). 
Botnet:  is a collection of computers which interact together to compromised 
computers and to accomplish their illegal goals. The compromised computers are referred 
to drones or zombies, and the malicious software running on them as 'bots'. Botnets send 
the majority of spam (McCombie et al. 2009). Bots use vulnerable machines with 
methods which are used by other malware classes and they use the command and control 
(C&C) channel.  
Spyware: is a software that is sneakily installed on a computer to collect 
information on system without the user knowledge or consent. However, this software 
can be classified as a Trojan horse as well. The consequences of spyware infections can 
be severe, including inundating the victim with pop-up ads, stealing the victim‘s financial 
information or passwords, or rendering the victim‘s computer useless (Moshchuk et al. 
2006). 
Backdoor:  is a software program which is installed by the attacker on a 
compromised system to bypass normal security controls on a system and facilitate the 
further unauthorized access of the attacker on the system.  
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Exploit: is software, a chunk of data or a sequence of commands that makes use 
of the vulnerabilities of the victim computer to create an unwanted action on the victim‘s 
computer. These actions include obtaining the control of the computer system, access 
control destruction, or DoS. Often exploits are used to install viruses, warms and rootkits. 
1.5  Infection Strategies of Malware Authors 
As shown in the previous Section (1.4) there are many types of malware, also different 
instances of malware have a variety of penetration methods, malicious purposes, and 
effects. A malware instance can be transported through remote exploit, by an e-mail, over 
a peer-to-peer network, or through removable media. It can also be automatically 
downloaded and installed by visiting a web site containing exploit code (Moshchuk et al. 
2006). 
The ability to execute program tasks without interrupting the user is very common 
in programming. A program will not want to interact with a user when an error occurs for 
reasons beyond the user's comprehension. Malware authors implement the same 
technique to prevent a user from suspecting infection. This can be very dangerous, as a 
virus is allowed to execute fully, without the expressed permission of the user, or indirect 
feedback from the computer. 
Criminals today have sophisticated service providers and high-tech expertise to 
fully take advantage of their current targets. Furthermore, the exploit servers used can be 
changed to avoid detection and countermeasures. Malware authors use variety of methods 
in order to avoid detection, and employ different kinds of deception (Watters & 
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McCombie 2011). The most common strategies adopted are summarised in the following 
subsections (Aycock 2006; Skoudis & Zeltser 2003): 
1.5.1  Overwriting Infection 
An overwriting infection is accomplished by inserting malicious code into an area of the 
original file of the host computer such as XLS, DOC or PDF. Some type of malware 
using this strategy completely overwrites a file which destroys the original file, rendering 
an entire program useless. However, the advanced malware do not try to destroy the file 
in order to trick the user and evade detection tools.  This is done by adding the malicious 
code in the head or the tail of the host file in order to not affect the functionality of the 
host file (Crescenzo & Vakil 2006). 
1.5.2  Companion Infection 
A companion infection is different from overwritten malware as it does not require a host 
file to insert the malicious code; instead it creates a companion file to the EXE host file 
(Jacob et al. 2009).  To test this infection, a simple experiment performed by injecting the 
windows XP professional system with a malware and named it similar to the original 
windows file calc but with the extension COM (calc.COM) and saved it in the same path 
of the original file of calc.EXE as shown in Figure 1.1. Many users have a tendency to 
type the name of the file at the ‗run‘ command without typing the extension in order to 
launch an executable program. Since Microsoft DOS looks for .COM files to be executed 
before it looks for .EXE files, malware authors need only to save or copy itself as .COM 
in the same directory as the original .EXE launched. Malware authors are taking this 
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advantage and they not only save the file with .COM at the same path as the .EXE, but 
they also conceal their existence by assigning a "hidden" attribute to the companion 
malicious file (the COM file).  This way they try to decrease the likelihood that the 
system's user could discover the companion file in the directory listing as by default, files 
with this hidden attribute do not appear in directory listings. Alternatively, the attacker 
tricks computer user into executing malicious code by creating a malware file with the 
same name as the benign program, and placing the malicious executable earlier in the 
path than the benign one (Skoudis & Zeltser 2003). 
 
Figure  1.1 Companion Infection example 
1.5.3  Appending Infection 
Also called hooking infection an appending infection is a method is predominantly 
adopted by the rootkits as they implant various hooks such as Import Address Table 
(IAT) hooks, inline function hooks, System Service Descriptor Table SSDT hooks, etc. 
appending infection uses operand command instructions (such as jump (JMP) and 
CALL), by modifying the first few instructions in the file function so that the execution 
jumps to the address pointed to the malicious function.  Usually the malicious code is 
inserted at the end of the file where it is not affected by the functionality of the file and 
does not raise any suspicion. An example of such a rootkit is the virus ‗Vienna‘. The 
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infection technique can be used in all type of portable executables (PE), such as EXE, 
NE, ELF, etc (Lobo, Watters, Wu, et al. 2010).  
1.5.4  Prepending Infection 
Prepending infection is similar to appending infection, except that the malware inserts 
itself at the start of a file. Malware authors have implemented this type of infection on 
various operating systems (Daoud et al. 2008). Since the malicious code is allocated at 
the start of the file, the malicious prepending code runs before the original code. An 
example of the use of this technique is the Hungarian virus Polimer.512.A, which inserts 
itself within the first 512 bytes of the beginning of the executable and shifts the original 
program content to follow this block of code. 
1.5.5  Cavity or space fill infection 
Cavity or space fill infection is an infection that attempts to enclose the malicious code in 
an empty space while not affecting the actual program and at the same time, not 
increasing the length of the program. Malware authors infect files without increasing 
their size or damaging the files. They accomplish this by overwriting unused areas of 
executable files. These are called cavity viruses. For example, the CIH virus, or 
chernoby1 virus uses this strategy to infect portable executable files. Also, in the 
Microsoft NTFS file system, Master File Table (MFT) is the core of NTFS since it 
contains details of every file and folder on the volume. Each MFT entry has a fixed size 
which is 1 KB containing two attributes; an attribute header and attribute content. The 
attribute header is used to identify the size, name and the flag value. The attribute content 
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can reside in the MFT followed by the attribute header if the size is less than 700 bytes 
(known as a resident attribute), otherwise it will store the attribute content in an external 
cluster called cluster run (known as a non-resident attribute).  This is because the MFT 
entry is 1KB in size and hence cannot fit as it occupies more than 700 bytes. The Lehigh 
virus is an example of this infection (Alazab, Venkataraman, et al. 2009). 
1.5.6  Boot Sector Malware 
Boot sector malware infection involves infecting the boot sector in order to infect the 
system every time the machine boots up. The boot sector placed in the beginning of each 
partition is appropriately called the partition boot sector (PBS) and the Master Boot 
Record (MBR) is allocated in the first sector of the hard drive which contains the boot 
code (Lobo, Watters, Wu, et al. 2010). Hence, when the system starts, it locates the first 
sector on the hard drive, and executes MBR. Boot sector malware infect the Master Boot 
Sector of the hard drive and infect the system every time it boots up. The Michelangelo 
virus is an example of a Boot sector malware. 
1.5.7  Macro Malware 
Embedded in a data ﬁle, the term macro means a series of command steps and character 
strings saved in a single location that is assigned a name (Alsagoff 2011).  Malware 
authors are using macros to infect applications such as word processing and spreadsheet 
ﬁles. Usually, when the name of the macro is found in a document ﬁle, the macro is 
expanded. The macro could perform the series of steps automatically for manipulating 
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and creating files, changing menu settings, etc (Yao & Liu 2011).  A macro virus is often 
spread as an e-mail virus. A well-known example is the Melissa virus in March, 1999. 
1.6  Malware on the horizon 
In this research the focus is to conduct static analysis effectively because all the hidden 
information can be captured and cannot be modified to produce false data, which is 
apparently the main drawback in live analysis techniques (Alazab 2010). Dynamic 
analysis techniques analyze the code of a program by actually executing it. They are 
robust to the obfuscation techniques and those anti-static-analysis techniques (i.e, self-
modifying). However, dynamic analysis has many drawbacks. First, it incurs much more 
overhead than the static analysis. There could be a lengthy code sequence that has to be 
executed to reach conclusions about the code behaviour. Second, it only covers a part of 
all possible program execution paths. Therefore, many important behaviours of the 
analyzed program cannot be discovered. Third, it is hard to simulate the execution 
conditions under which the analyzed malware exhibits its malicious behaviour. For 
instance, a bot program needs to receive control and command from a bot master to 
exhibit its malicious behaviour. Fourth, if the code is executed in a virtual machine, there 
are techniques that can be utilized by the attackers to determine whether the code is 
running in virtual environment. As a result, the code can be designed to modify its 
runtime behaviour. 
The research project presented in this document concentrates on detecting hidden 
malware, which is still an unsolved challenge for malware detectors (Stolfo et al. 2007).  
As a first step to address this challenge, this research would investigate offline file 
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systems and improve the digital forensic techniques that could be used to analyse and 
acquire evidences of hidden malware in NTFS disk images. 
The main goal of this research is to propose a methodology to effectively detect 
hidden malware. Since NTFS is predominantly used in most computer systems, and 
malware attackers take advantage of their weaknesses to hide malware, this research 
focuses on main areas of hidden malware growth in NTFS based systems.  With this in 
view, the research aims i) to explore the NTFS disk structure and its vulnerabilities, ii) to 
investigate weaknesses of existing commonly used digital forensic techniques such as 
signature-based, heuristic-based and anomaly-based, and iii) to propose and evaluate 
improved methods in static analysis of NTFS for identifying hidden malware by 
investigating the disk image (physical) and by detecting unknown malware through file 
content (logical) analysis.  
Since malware detection techniques work very well in detecting known malware, 
the malware authors have come up with new and improved techniques for their code to 
hide and evade detection by using many techniques, such as polymorphic and 
metamorphic techniques.  This has led the AV vendors to start studying the behavioural 
analysis of the file to check whether the file is benign or malware.  
Techniques used for malware detection can be classified into two categories: 
anomaly-based detection and signature-based detection. Since the major drawback for 
signature-based detection is the inability to detect new or unknown malicious code and 
zero day attack, the focus of this research is on anomaly-based detection, a technique that 
uses the knowledge of what is under consideration to find out what actually is malicious. 
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In anomaly-based detection, the inverse knowledge comes from the learning 
phase, Chapter 4 the knowledge was based on operand codes, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 
the knowledge was based on API function calls. So, anomaly-based detection alerts what 
is anomalous behaviour based on knowledge of the normal files. Malware detectors 
usually take two inputs. One input is the knowledge of the malicious behaviour, which 
comes from the learning phase. The other input is the file under inspection or testing that 
is analysed to decide if the file is malicious or benign.  
1.7  Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Malware identification and analysis is a technically intense topic, requiring deep 
knowledge of multiple computer science disciplines. To compound the problem, 
successful identification and analysis by malware analysts has been confounded by the 
use of hidden and obfuscated malicious binaries in recent years. Cybercriminals have 
adopted various obfuscation techniques to disguise the malware binaries, making it 
difficult to identify. There are available open-source and commercial tools which are 
being used to make the malicious code highly obfuscated in order to remain hidden in the 
NTFS file system hard disk drive without being detected by anti-virus tools.  
The majority of anti-virus detection systems are signature-based detection, which 
is the method used by most of anti-virus detection engines as it is highly effective in 
detecting known malware. Even though hybrid systems applying heuristics have been 
recently explored, today's anti-malware approaches are neither efficient nor effective in 
detecting current obfuscated malware attacks. Therefore, this research aims at proposing 
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and presenting effective and efficient techniques for detecting hidden and obfuscated 
malware.  
With the recent trend in malware to operate as obfuscated malicious code to 
remain hidden and evade from detection any live analysis technique or anti-virus tools, 
this research attempts to identify such unknown malware that adopt the following two 
predominant methods to attack: 
–       Physical space such as hidden malware in boot record or slack space, and   
–        Logical space such as code obfuscation of binary contents.  
The primary purpose of this research is to answer the following research 
questions: 
Q1: Could malicious code hidden in NTFS file system physical space be detected using 
an automated process? 
Our hypothesis is that signature based detection and existing forensic analysis 
tools are unable to reveal hidden malware in NTFS physical space and it calls for a new 
forensic analysis process.  
Q2: Could anomaly based detection using static features be applied to effectively detect 
and classify obfuscated malicious code attacking through binaries or executable files 
launched in the logical space of computer systems? 
Our hypothesis is that existing live analysis malware detection techniques and 
anti-virus tools that predominantly use signature based methods are unable to detect 
obfuscated malware hidden in binaries of the computer logical space, and hence calls for 
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new anomaly based detection techniques that could identify obfuscated malware features 
by conducting static analysis of the behaviour properties exhibited by such malware. 
1.8  Research Methodology 
To address the first research question (Q1) listed in section 1.7, this research requires a 
systematic methodology to search computer hard disk space to search for significant 
evidence of hidden malware attacks. We adopt the Integrated Digital Forensic Model 
(IDFM) by Carrier & Spafford (2003) that is widely reported in literature for digital 
forensics. We propose a new forensic analysis process within the IDFM framework to 
detect hidden malware in computer physical disk space such as boot record and slack 
space. 
For the second research question (Q2) listed in section 1.7, this research adopts 
static analysis methodology as it is well suited for byte-level content analysis of 
malicious patterns that is not possible using live or dynamic analysis conducted in 
existing anti-malware tools (Karim et al. 2005; Kotler and Maloof, 2006). Since signature 
based detection and other existing methods are unable to detect and classify the hidden 
malicious activities, this research proposes novel methods of extracting anomalies in the 
behaviour patterns of obfuscated malware.  We study their statistical behaviour properties 
by analysing patterns such as op-codes, API calls, n-gram byte sequences efficiently to 
identify and classify unknown malware hidden in the binaries of the computer logical 
space. A variety of data mining and machine learning techniques are adopted and the 
results are compared in order to determine the performance of our approach. 
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1.9  Contributions 
In this dissertation, multiple research problems related to the infection strategies of 
malware authors (Section 1.5) and code obfuscation explained in (Section 2.7) have been 
studied. These techniques attempt to bypass the most popular malware detection method, 
signature based detection. The overall observation is that malware authors are producing 
unique threats using different obfuscation methods, and signature-based detection is of 
little defense to our present computing environments and such traditional anti-virus 
techniques are rapidly becoming obsolete. Therefore, Anomaly Detection (AD) should be 
explored and used rather than signature-based detection. Also, anomaly-based detection 
methods are required to be adopted to detect malicious activities that are increasing 
exponentially since the start of this year. 
The literature review presented in Chapter two has clearly identified the lack of 
existing digital forensic methods and techniques for identifying hidden malware, which 
could be either in the form of slack space implantation (physical) or as obfuscated code 
(logical) in file content within the NTFS file system.  
The first contribution will fill the gap in literature and practice as there is no 
standard process, framework or model for conducting a comprehensive forensic 
investigation in NTFS slack space (Purcell & Lang 2008). By effectively extract features 
of slack space for detecting hidden malware of the first form will be given. Since 
malware attackers take advantage of NTFS file system weaknesses and the inability of 
existing AV to check the slack space, a guideline to investigate slack space for 
identifying known and unknown malware forms a significant contribution of the study. 
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Chapter 3 of thesis provides knowledge, methodology and discusses the analysis 
techniques used to successfully detect maliciousness in hidden data and hidden space, by 
investigating the NTFS file system boot sector. 
Sophistication in malware through code obfuscation has created another challenge 
for digital forensic examiners and reverse engineering, namely the detection rate of new 
and unknown malware is low rate (Passerini et al. 2009; Stang 2010) and identifying 
benign code as malicious, which is termed as false alarm rate,  is high (Patcha & Park 
2007). Extracting features from the obfuscated executables for reverse obfuscation is 
labor intensive and requires deep understanding of kernel and assembly programming. 
Chapter 4 and 5 in the thesis provide methodologies, develops fully automated system to 
extract two independent features, namely OP code and API function call features for 
finding the fingerprint of executable programs and for detection and differentiation of 
different files that are either malicious or benign.  
A signature-free detection method is proposed to cope with packer, polymorphic 
transformations and metamorphic obfuscations of malware, and use knowledge parts for 
building better anomaly detection.  For effective and efficient solutions, this thesis moves 
away from the signature based detection to anomaly based detection. This thesis provides 
two solutions to the limitation of signature based detection. First, the detection of 
malware uses the knowledge of normal behaviour patterns of the x86 IA-32 operation 
codes (op-codes) and a novel algorithm is proposed that combines op-code frequency 
statistics and hybrid wrapper-filter based feature selection technique for constructing a 
classifier for malware detection, as shown in Chapter 4. Also, hybridized op-code statistics 
with novel wrapper-filter based feature selection technique to optimise the process and 
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achieve the desired efficiency for large datasets. Experimental results show that our 
frequency-statistics based approach achieves high accuracy ~96%. Second, detection 
Malware based uses the knowledge of normal behaviour patterns of the Application 
Programming Interface (API) and proposes a five-step methodology for developing a 
fully automated system, also, investigates patterns of obfuscated code further using 
several data mining techniques aiming to increase the true positive rate, reduce the false 
alarm rate. Chapter five has used statistical n-gram analysis, feature extraction, feature 
selection, using SVM algorithm of binary content based on system call sequences 
together with innovative techniques to classify whether the binary content is benign or 
malicious would improve anomaly-based detection. Chapter Six, used the automated data 
mining system implemented for this study has achieved high true positive (TP) rate of 
more than 98.5%, and low false positive (FP) rate of less than 2%, which has not been 
achieved in literature so far. This is much higher than the required commercial 
acceptance level indicating that our novel technique is a major leap forward in detecting 
zero-day malware.  
This thesis also proposed similarity based detection of unknown malware and 
obfuscated malware using API function calls features, using various distance measures of 
vector models. As shown in Chapter 6 results show that our proposed method is an 
effective method to accurately differentiate malware from benign files and, more 
importantly, to detect obfuscated malware families. 
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1.10  Roadmap of the Dissertation  
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In the next chapter, the background of 
study and related work is provided. A literature review of related works is also presented 
in Chapter 2 along with the research contribution and significance of the study. Chapter 3 
discusses the forensic analysis of the NTFS file system and existing problems 
surrounding forensic analysis, such the vulnerabilities identified in the NTFS file system 
disk structure and the weaknesses present in the current forensic techniques. These form 
the main motivation in proposing the research questions that have been investigated in 
this project with the aim to address hidden malware problem in both physical and logical 
content of computer systems. Also, the proposed forensic analysis techniques could be 
used to detect hidden malware effectively by analysing the internal structure of the NTFS 
disk image (physical). Anomaly based detection uses the knowledge of normal behaviour 
patterns of the x86 IA-32 operation codes and the proposed novel algorithm that combines 
op-code frequency statistics and hybrid wrapper-filter based feature selection technique for 
constructing a classifier for malware detection is described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents 
an automated method of extracting API call features and analysing them in order to 
understand their use for malicious purposes.  In addition, a five-step methodology is 
proposed for developing a fully automated system to arrive at six main categories of 
suspicious behaviour of API call features. The methodology is devised to detect 
obfuscated malware by investigating the structural and behavioural features of API calls.  
In particular, n-gram statistical analysis of API calls is applied and experimental results 
with large datasets have been analysed for performance and accuracy. Chapter 6 has two 
detection methods proposed. First, based on similarity detection, this research proposes a 
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new method to identify zero-day malware that is obfuscated from an existing malware 
family by employing similarity measures for Nearest Neighbor (NN) search of Windows 
Application Programming Interface (API) call features. The second detection method is 
anomaly detection, where a data mining framework has been proposed to detect zero-day 
malware effectively as it learns through analysing the behaviour of existing malicious and 
benign codes in large datasets. Finally, Chapter 7 provides the conclusions of this study, 
highlighting the contributions of the research work and recommendations for future work. 
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Chapter 2 : Background of Study and Literature 
Review 
             
“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?" 
“The dog did nothing in the night-time." 
“That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes. 
— Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, “Silver Blaze,” 
The Strand Magazine (1892) 
2.1  Introduction 
Currently, the internet is the biggest platform where buyers and sellers of goods and 
services transact through an electronic medium. Today‘s society is getting more 
dependent on electronic technologies such as smart cards, electronic money, electronic 
purse, electronic checks, digital cash, stored value cards and online banking. This has 
created opportunities for serious threats to e-security. Cybercriminals facing current 
threats to organizations continue to aggressively hunt and develop new techniques to steal 
money and credential information, thereby resulting in an exponential rise in cybercrime 
year after year (RSA 2011). In the context of crime-ware, malware is the most valuable 
resource to perform unauthorized access by cybercriminals (Ghosh & Turrini 2010). 
Cybercriminals are using a variety of highly sophisticated techniques to fool, 
thwart and evade any commercially available detection engine. Therefore, ‗Free from 
danger‘ has become hard to achieve and is a dream for daily internet users. Malware 
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affects the secrecy and integrity of data as well as the control flow and functionality of a 
computer system. Escalating increase in commercial and financial transactions conducted 
online provides opportunities for cyber criminals to conduct unauthorized access to 
digital systems. Criminals use zero day vulnerabilities to conduct their activities and anti-
forensics techniques to evade being tracked (Alperovitch 2011). 
Indeed, a review of the history of malware (Ghosh & Turrini 2010; Venkatraman 
2009) and anti-malware reports (Symantec Enterprise Security 2010, 2011a, 2011b) and 
predictions (Konstantinou & Wolthusen 2008) show a continuous cybercrime growth 
thriven in sophistication over the years, and traditional malware detections appear 
insufficient to tackle increasingly sophisticated malware. Therefore, the detection of 
malware is not only of interest to researchers but is also a major concern to the general 
public. Recent trends in malware for such malicious and illegal purposes indicate 
increasing complexity and are evolving rapidly as systems provide more opportunities for 
more automated activities of late. The damages caused by malware to individuals and 
businesses have dramatically increased recently.  Hence, this forms the motivation for the 
research work to focus on the obfuscated techniques used in the malware in order to 
understand their behaviour and find patterns that would aid in detecting unknown 
malware.  Since malware exploits and uses file system vulnerabilities to infect the 
systems, this research start by the growth and attack strategies of malware through an 
illustration of Zeus botnets, and identifies the various existing malware detection methods 
that fail to combat them.  Hence, there is an imminent need for developing new malware 
detection techniques for addressing this situation of rapid malware evolution. 
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2.2  Growth in Malware 
As the internet plays an essential role in all areas of society, it has major impact on the 
economy, with even the military and government functions of a country being targeted by 
malware. The Internet now connects billions of computers and has become an easy 
platform to implant malware attacks by exploiting vulnerabilities or flaws in software 
systems and critical applications so as to intentionally disrupt their use, or to subvert 
them for specific purposes. The rapid increase in malware threatens not only individual 
computers, but the availability of the Internet itself as systems are being taken control by 
the malware without the knowledge of the computer users.  
Today the goals of those creating and unleashing malware have shifted, from 
simple vandalism and craving for recognition, to financial gain (James 2007; Stolfo et al. 
2007). Malicious attacks have become more organized and purposefully directed. Botnets 
in particular confirm this trend (Khan et al. 2010). Botnets are armies of remotely-
controlled computers, or zombies. These computers are compromised and then infected 
with software robots, or bots, that allow the zombie computers to be controlled remotely 
through established command and control channels (C&C). Collectively, under the 
control of C&C servers, botnets become powerful and effective slave computing assets 
that can be rented for illegal activities. Such activities include phishing attacks, installing 
backdoors or rootkits on host systems to obtain private information, sending spam for 
advertising, and launching large scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks 
(Seewald & Gansterer 2010). 
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A recent major malware threat, the Zeus Trojan, a financial malware Zeus botnet, 
is a well-known banking Trojan also called Zbot, NTOS, WSNPOEM, or PRG, and 
forms the king of financial malware ‗in the wild‘, both in terms of infection size and 
effectiveness (Seewald & Gansterer 2010). Furthermore, to date it is the biggest and the 
most sophisticated threat to internet security and to most of the detection engines such as 
Symantec (Symantec Enterprise Security 2011b) and McAfee (Alperovitch 2011). The 
Zeus Trojan is estimated to be responsible for about 90% of banking fraud worldwide 
(Alperovitch 2011) and found guilty in 44% of the banking malware infections, with 3.6 
million PCs infected in the US alone (Trusteer 2009). Symantec Corporation describes it 
as ―Zeus, King of the Underground Crimeware Toolkits‖.  
The Zeus Trojan software, with a friendly interface toolkit that is available in 
underground online forums for $1,500 – $20,000US, enabling cyber criminals to 
configure and create malicious software to affect user systems, allowing them to take 
control of a compromised computer, harming the data, logging keystrokes, and executing 
unauthorized transactions in online banking.  The name Zeus has created a panic in the 
world of computers and security experts today. Reports and studies show that since last 
year Zeus has been found embroiled in more than half of the banking malware infections 
in the world (Bitdefender Antivirus Technology 2010).  
The Zeus Trojan primarily carries a very light footprint and is designed to steal 
sensitive data stored on computers or transmitted through web browsers and protected 
storage (Alazab, Watters, et al. 2011). Once infected, the computer sends the stolen data 
to a bot command and control (C&C) server via encrypted HTTP POST requests, where 
the data is stored (Alazab, Watters, et al. 2011). Also, it allows cybercriminals to inject 
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content into a bank‘s web page as it is displayed in the infected computer browser in real 
time. It is setup such that the stolen data is sent to a ―drop server‖ controlled by an 
attacker called a botmaster and it allows cybercriminals to control the infected systems 
remotely. Moreover, Zeus is highly dynamic and applies obfuscation methods such as 
polymorphic encryption and metamorphic in a network of bots. In each infection, it re-
encrypts itself automatically to create a new signature to defeat signature-based detection 
that makes the signature difficult to comprehend (Alazab, Venkatraman, et al. 2011). 
However, The Windows Zeus is increasingly hard to combat as it can successfully evade 
commercial detection engines and is able to hide malicious features such as string and 
API function calls. Zeus trojan is still developing and it has versions and new plugin 
releases that can also infect latest operating systems such as Windows 7 and Vista. 
As a fresh threat, according to numerous research labs and hacker forums, the 
Zeus botnet recently has combined with the new release of 2010 ‗SpyEye Trojan‘ source 
codes to create more sophisticated bots and takes the malware threat to a new level 
(Maria 2011). This new toolkit is being reported to be currently available for purchase in 
the underground market and version 1.4.1 has been published on January 11, 2011 
(SPAMfighter News 2011). The new version of the combination has two versions of a 
control panel used for committing fraud and managing compromised systems.  Three 
trends, including the growth of the Internet connectivity, system extensibility and 
complexity, contribute to the growth and evolution of this problem (RSA 2011). The 
mono-culture nature of current both hardware and software makes it fairly possible to 
exploit a vulnerability which will infect a large number of host computers. The increasing 
connectivity of computers via high-speed Internet connections increases the visibility of 
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vulnerable systems and exposes them to these attacks (Altunaya et al. 2011). These 
trends indicate that self-learning and self-updating by observing system anomalies and 
behaviour patterns is much warranted in malware detection systems of the future 
(Venkatraman 2009). 
Popularity of the Internet is growing day by day and millions of users are 
connected to each other on a daily basis.  At the same time malicious activity is also 
growing with increasingly profit-driven motives and sophisticated evasion techniques.  
High speed data services, cheap broadband, low-cost mobile computing, remote access 
using online banking, Instant Messaging (IM), Internet Relay Chat (IRC), Common 
Internet File System (CiFS), Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) programs that 
support Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), scripting, Peer-to-Peer (P2P), as well as 
new operating systems with vulnerabilities, have all helped cybercriminals to propagate 
their malicious code faster and even helped them to create highly effective malware in a 
way those malware can thwart the detection engines. 
Creating and producing malicious code is not done only by malware writers, but 
there are also, malware kit vendors (Komisarczuk 2010)  such as  Zeus, exploit kits, 
Flesta, MyPolySploit, Limbo2 and SpyEye. These kits are used to create highly effective 
malware, serving as new offspring of malware. The new market for malware creation 
software on-sale is widely available on the internet and can be found easily using Google 
and other search engines. Malware kit or ‗crime ware‘ is being offered for sale on 
underground trading forums and IM for negotiation (Emigh 2006). Apart from 
purchasing these kits, one could also buy the updates for the kit thereby ensuring and 
guaranteeing it as a reliable ongoing business. Likewise, cybercriminals are being hired 
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in underground markets with even after sales services and offers of guaranteed 
effectiveness of evading security countermeasures (Danny 2010). As a result, 
cybercriminals update the construction kits to suit the needs of their client base to stay 
ahead of their contenders.   
"Full ZeuS Souurce code of last v2.0.8.9 (includes everything). 
Requires MSVC++ 2010. You can create your own HWID licenses and much 
more". 
According to the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3)
2
, malware are evolving 
rapidly more recently. A study conducted by University of Maryland  shows  that on an 
average, a  computer  connected to  the  Internet  may experience an attack every 39 
seconds. Equally important in the first quarter of 2010, another experiment conducted by 
the San Diego Supercomputer Center (SDSC) shows that an average of 27,000 hacking 
attempts were made per day.  Since 2010, these figures have grown exponentially (Ghosh 
& Turrini 2010; Komisarczuk 2010; RSA 2011). 
Currently, known malware can be recognized by all of the popular AV engines. 
However, attackers continually develop new techniques for creating malware that cannot 
be detected by AV engines. Once new malware is released, the AV engines will 
eventually update their signatures to combat the new malware. The growing size of the 
signature databases illustrates the mounting threat of malware. In February 2006, 
BiDefender Antivirus (Technology 2006) published that it had over 270 thousand 
malware signatures in its database. In 2009, Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 
announced that malware activity continues to grow at a record pace, and there are over 
1.5 million new malware instances, mostly developed in 2008 (Symantec Enterprise 
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Security 2009a). The increasing size of malware signature databases forces AV engine 
researchers and developers to think about more effective methods to check the signatures 
rather than traditional signature based techniques. Another reason for the growing sizes 
of the signature databases is that new malware propagation mechanisms are being 
adopted, rather than attempting to produce totally new malware. All types of malware 
such as worms, rootkits viruses, script viruses, trojans, macro viruses, backdoors, 
spyware, key loggers, etc. are being recycled to produce new variants of old malware. 
Symantec Internet Security threat published report in 2011 (Symantec Enterprise Security 
2011b) and 2010 (Symantec Enterprise Security 2011a) announced that the malicious 
code activity continues to grow at a record pace, and there are over 2.8 million new 
malicious code signatures, mostly developed in 2009. Other sources show the escalating 
infection rates with almost 120 million servers identified to be infected in the first quarter 
of 2010, with 64% of which were attacked by unknown malicious code (Komisarczuk 
2010). Recently, McAfee Labs identified almost 60,000 new pieces of malware per day 
and showing the sophistication in malware that makes their detection very difficult 
(Alperovitch 2011). 
In 2004 Marx revealed that the AV engines need an average of ten hours to 
respond with a publicly available update (Marx 2004). The spread of malware instances 
can be extremely fast, with some infections requiring only a few seconds (Staniford et al. 
2004). In December 1999, experiments conducted by the San Diego Supercomputer 
Center, where an operating system was installed and connected to the internet with no 
security updates, the computer was attacked just within eight hours of installation, this 
contrast with an attack every 39 seconds (General Information Security Statistics 2004). 
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After 21 days of installation, the system had experienced 20 different attacks and within 
about 40 days the computer had been compromised. In another case, when PSINet 
Europe purposely built an unprotected server and connected it to the Internet in 
2003, their results were astonishing: in the first 24 hours the server was maliciously 
attacked 467 times and a total of 626 malicious attacks were recorded over the three week 
period (Eisner 2003; James 2007). More recently, these figures have grown exponentially 
(Alperovitch 2011; Maria 2011; Yao & Liu 2011). 
In summary, new malware with variants or obfuscations from existing known 
malware are generated rapidly and are used to attack systems that are vulnerable to inflict 
as many systems as possible before AV companies are able to take any countermeasure.  
Hence, it is a very important requirement of a robust malware detection technique to 
handle obfuscating transformations.  Sections 2.3 to 2.6 provide a literature survey of 
various commonly adopted detection techniques. 
2.3  Conventional Malware Detection 
Malware detectors are used to scan a computer system to identify malware, with the main 
purpose of preventing it from adversely affecting the system. In order to protect 
computers AV engine must perform three main tasks: Scanning, Detection, Removal 
(Bakshi et al. 2010). A Malware detector (D) is defined as a function whose domain and 
range are the set of executable program (p), and its duty to determine executable program 
is malicious or benign D: P → malicious, benign. Modern and traditional AV engines 
scan the programs (p) in a system for a byte sequence or malware signature (s) that 
matches with the stored database engine.  If a signature is found in the program (p), it 
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will be identified as a malware, otherwise it is declared as benign, and this is represented 
in the equation 2.1. 
 ( )   {
               
                 
                                                (   )           
The malware signature is a byte sequence (a number derived from a string of text) 
that uniquely identifies a specific malware. An example malware signature for 
VirusWin32.Bolzano malware is shown in Figure 2.1 (a) Virus.Win32.Bolzano‘s source 
code (b) Virus.Win32.Bolzano‘s signature. Typically, a malware detector uses the 
malware signature to identify the malware like a fingerprint. Most countermeasures such 
as anti-malware engines are supplied with a database containing information of existing 
malware in order to identify maliciousness by looking for code signatures or byte 
sequences while scanning the system (Marx 2004; Townsend 2010). A malware detector 
scans the system in various locations for characteristic byte sequences or signatures that 
match with the one in the database and declares existence of malware, and subsequently 
blocks its access to the system. The process is called signature-based detection and most 
traditional AV engines use this method (Chouchane & Lakhotia 2006). It is a very 
efficient and effective method to detect known malware. The major drawback of this 
method is the inability to detect new or unknown malicious code and zero day attacks 
(Sung et al. 2004; Xu et al. 2004). Therefore, updating the detection engine or AV 
software daily with latest malware signatures is essential so as to protect the computer 
system against all known malware. The more malware signatures are fed into the AV 
engine, the more effective it is in detecting latest known malware.  Since hidden and 
obfuscated malware apply sophisticated evasion techniques, signature-based AV engines 
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fail to detect them. Symantec software has announced in its websitethat LiveUpdate is the 
most trusted way of updating virus definitions, but not for unknown malware  (Symantec 
Enterprise Security 2011a, 2011b).  
The new threat for computers is that the malware writers can change the byte 
sequence of the malcode without affecting the objective of the code, by using obfuscation 
techniques such as packing, polymorphic transformations and metamorphic obfuscations, 
instead of creating an entirely new malware (Tang et al. 2010). Signature based AV 
scanners will not be able to detect these new malware due to the non-existence of their 
fingerprints in the signature database. Hence, there is a need to capture the behaviour of 
malware based on anomalies or behavioural patterns exhibited by such hidden malware, 
which is the main focus of this research work (Chandola et al. 2009). 
Due to the growing size of the malware signature database, many AV software 
developers and researchers working on malware detection have suggested major changes 
in the scanning algorithm such as, i) using an expert system based on Artificial Immune 
System (AIS) method (Dasgupta 1997), ii) using I/O Request Package (IRP) sequences 
(Zhang et al. 2010), iii) using protocol-level malware scanner (Shetty 2004) to scan data 
that is being transferred or downloaded to a computer system at the protocol level,  iv) 
using disk processor to monitor disk requests to identify malicious programs based on 
characteristic properties of the disk requests (Paul 2008), and v) using scanning of 
multiple parts of a file to perform diffraction analysis for detecting polymorphic malware 
similar to X-RAY scanning (Perriot & Ferrie 2004).  
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Although signature based detection is one of the well-established methods by AV 
engines, there is a need to resort to the above mentioned behaviour based methods as 
signature based detection suffers from the following drawbacks: 
- High false positive: This occurs by identifying benign files as malware. In May, 2007, 
Symantec updated their malware signatures and crippled thousands of Chinese PCs by 
mistakenly identifying two core Windows.dll files as Trojan horse that Symantec 
dubbed "Backdoor.Haxdoor‖ (Keizer 2007). 
-  High false negative: from failing to detect unknown or new malware (Paul 2008). 
 
Virus.Win32.Bolzano’s source code 
B8 F2070000 MOV EAX,7F2 
03C5 ADD EAX,EBP 
E8 0D000000 CALL 0041158D 
B8 07080000 MOV EAX,807 
03C5 ADD EAX,EBP 
E8 01000000 CALL 0041158D 
C3 RETN 
 
(a) Win32.Bolzano‘s source code 
 
Virus.Win32.Bolzano’s  signature 
B8F2 0700 0003 C5E8 0D00 0000 
B807 0800 0003 C5E8 0100 0000 C3 
 
Figure 2.1  (a) Win32.Bolzano‘s source code (b) Win32.Bolzano‘s signature 
 (b) Win32.Bolzano‘s signature 
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Even though the quality of malware detectors used in popular AV software and 
anti-forensic methods is improving in their techniques, from virus signature-based 
detection towards heuristic-based detection, the malware cyber criminals are one step 
ahead (Ghosh & Turrini 2010; Venkatraman 2010). 
2.4  Modern Detection 
Countermeasures such as detection engines are responsible for detecting malicious code 
and classify the detected code based on the effects of that code to fall under categories 
such as viruses, worms, Trojans, spywares, adware, etc. Different detection engines such 
as the traditional signature based detection and heuristic based detection have evolved 
(Daoud et al. 2008). Malicious authors, in order to avoid signature based detection 
approaches, adopt a number of stealth techniques. Due to the inability of traditional 
signature based detection approach to detect obfuscated malicious code, the focus of 
research has shifted to improve heuristic based detection (TreadwellZhou & Zhou 2009 ). 
2.4.1  Heuristics Based Detection 
Heuristic methods can be static or dynamic, with recent malware detectors using 
signature based detection along with heuristics to detect variants of existing this 
heuristics approach is dependent on the behaviour of the malware (Symantec Enterprise 
Security 1997). Usually, malware authors design their malicious code to achieve a set of 
malicious functions; therefore, each piece of malware is unique. Heuristics approaches 
use certain base rules that determine the proper functioning of the system, its stability and 
data integrity.  
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Heuristic detection is successful in detecting new malware that are generated by 
applying toolkits on the known viruses, worms or Trojans to generate thousands of new 
malware from the same malware, each one distinct but belonging to the same family.  
Hence, heuristics based detection is good to identify threats belonging to the same family  
and useful for detecting macro viruses (Konstantinou & Wolthusen 2008). For instance, 
when ‗NewVirus‘ comes out, the definition created to detect it will also successfully 
identify ‗NewVius.b‘, ‗NewVirus.c‘, ‗NewVirus.d‘, and so on. For example, the Vundo 
Trojan that is designed to drop Adware onto a compromised system, has several family 
members. Symantec categorises the Trojan into two distinct families, in 2007 
Trojan.Vundo (Symantec Enterprise Security 2007), and in 2009 they were realized to be 
from the same family and the new malware was termed Trojan.Vundo.B.  (Symantec 
Enterprise Security 2009b). The only issue of this detector is the false positive rate is 
high, where it could identify a non-malicious file as a malware.  
Researchers have proposed a heuristic detection approach that targets obfuscated 
windows binary files being loaded into memory researchers (TreadwellZhou & Zhou 
2009 ). They look for anomalies, such as Original Entry Point (OEP) with Entry Point 
code that starts with a JMP or CALL, or suspicious imports from KERNEL32, or 
multiple PE Headers, or Patched Import table that has incorrect calculated SizeOfCodem, 
SizeOfData and SizeOfImage in the header. All of these methods could be used by 
malware authors and heuristics based detection can detect them within the existing 
malware families.   
Due to the high false alarm rate, heuristics based detection is believed to work 
well when combined with another detection technique such as signature based detection 
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(Yang et al. 2010). Results of other detection techniques  used to support heuristics based 
detection (Konstantinou & Wolthusen 2008). However, a malware author could write 
malicious code that does not fire the rules to cause damage. 
2.4.2  Behavioral Based Detection 
Behavioural detection is the recent trend for anti-virus softwares and does not rely on 
signatures to detect malware.  This detection is a dynamic analysis technique that 
observes the behaviour of a program by executing it in a sand-box environment in order 
to analyze the file during runtime. Whenever the behaviour of the malware seems 
―suspicious‖, it is flagged as malware and action will be taken. Behaviour based detection 
requires a templates or profile of suspicious behaviour (Govindaraju 2010a, 2010b). In 
other words, the templates or profile of the malware becomes its signature. Thus 
behaviour based detection technique is a kind of signature based detector except that the 
signature here is the functionality of the malware. This detection has two detection 
schemas (Jacob et al. 2008). First is Passive detection, which scans computer files to see 
if there are any deviations from the normal profile. Second is Active detection, which 
uses a sandbox to monitor the behaviour of a program.  
It is important to mention here that the recent malware is using code obfuscation 
methods that combine static evasion along with dynamic evasion techniques. However, 
the issue of the behaviour based detection approach is the high false positives, where a 
non-malicious file identified as malware is also not desired. The false positives are due to 
the fact that it is usually difficult to define malicious behaviours in an accurate way 
(Fukushima et al. 2010).  
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2.4.3  Semantic Based Detection 
A semantic analysis technique is used when the malcode is responsible to determine the 
malicious nature of the code. A signature is created based on the semantic property of the 
code (Christodorescu et al. 2005; Preda et al. 2008).  The idea of this detection method is 
used for creating signature based on program functionality, and not based on the byte 
sequence of the program.  
In 2005 Christodorescu et al. state that the fundamental deficiency in the pattern-
matching approach to malware detection is that it is purely syntactic and ignores the 
semantics of instructions (Christodorescu et al. 2005). Therefore, they proposed 
semantics-aware malware and put forward a malware detector that is able to handle some 
of the obfuscations commonly used by hackers. Experimental evaluation has shown that 
semantic detection can detect variants of malware with a relatively low run-time 
overhead.  
Since code obfuscation techniques, as shown in Section 2.6, change the malware 
signature but not its behaviour, which has to be preserved, formal methods for program 
analysis, such as semantics-based static analysis and model checking, could be used in 
designing more sophisticated malware detection algorithms (Kong et al. 2010).  Semantic 
based methods are able to deal with obfuscated versions of the same malware, such as 
identifying similarities through their execution traces (Preda et al. 2008). However, 
malware developed using code transposition and instruction substitution techniques can 
still evade semantic based detection methods.  
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2.4.4  Hidden Markov Model Based Detection 
Hidden Markov models (HMMs) have been extensively used in biological sequence 
analysis as it is well suited for statistical pattern analysis.  Since 1970, it is used to 
analyze and understand a Markov process and provide a result based on a series of 
observations related to the process (Krogh 1998). HMM is a state machine where the 
transitions between states have fixed probabilities, and it relies on the current situation 
and does not consider any past situation.   
In recent years, it has been shown that the detection of metamorphic malware is 
very effective using Markov models applied to malware detection (Wing Wong 2006). In 
addition, it is also been used to determine malware family (Camastra et al. 2011). 
Hidden Markov models provide a means to describe sequence variations 
statistically. On the other hand, Profile Hidden Markov Models (PHMM) is known for 
their success in biological sequence analysis. It has been found that PHMM can 
effectively detect metamorphic malware as well (Attaluri, S. & McGhee 2009; 
Govindaraju 2010a, 2010b). 
In 2007 and 2009, Attaluri showed that PHMM can be successfully used to 
detecting metamorphic malware, they still need to use machine learning concept of 
having good and better accuracy (Attaluri, Srilatha 2007; Attaluri, S. & McGhee 2009). 
2.4.5  Similarity Analysis 
Similarity analysis is a detection method based on the analysis of similarities of distance 
measures. Distance measures play an important role in a vector model, and similarity 
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analysis can be performed by using three commonly used distance measures, namely 
Euclidean, Manhattan and cosine similarity measure for nearest neighbor (NN) that is 
primarily used in text mining. In short, the maliciousness of a code is estimated (Shabtai 
et al. 2009). For instance, malware such as Win32.Evol (Orr 2006) has a multiple variant 
of the same sample malware because of the obfuscation methods. Similarity based 
detection approach can be used between the variants to check whether the variant is the 
child of the sample under inspection (Alazab 2011). Understanding the relationship used 
among the distance measures can help us to choose a proper distance measure for 
malware detection.  
Usually similarity detection is conducted by performing static analysis, where the 
executable program is first disassembled using reverse engineering tools.  Each 
disassembled executable (P) and the variant disassembled executable (P’) represent a 
vector of functions x, y, each function is represented as an array of vector of functions. 
The similarity between the functions of a program P and P' is computed. The value is 
then compared with the threshold value to determine if the executable is malicious or not.  
2.5  Malware Analysis  
Detection techniques can be in static, dynamic or hybrid forms. Static analysis uses the 
syntax and structural properties of the file. Dynamic analysis is also called Process Under 
Inspection (PUI) method, which means the analysis of the files during its running time. 
Hybrid analysis combines static with dynamic analysis. Theoretically, a static analysis is 
very effective on the information captured from structural properties, like sequence of 
bytes ―signatures‖ and anomalies in file content. Since dynamic analysis is only effective 
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with runtime information, such as running process of the PUI, and these are usually 
evaded by hidden malware, in this research the focus is on static anomaly based detection 
with the prime objective of identifying hidden malware (Egele et al. 2012). 
Even though live analysis techniques could help in capturing evidence during 
forensic investigations to a certain extent, they are far from infallible and lead to false 
negatives of hidden malware.  In live analysis, malware such as rootkits can hide and 
change itself without being seen.  Moreover the attackers can target hidden area on the 
system structure to hide the malware.   
Static analysis techniques analyze the code of a program without executing it. To 
perform static analysis on binary code, the binary code is required to be disassembled 
first, in other words converted into corresponding assembler instructions. Next, 
conclusions about the program behaviour can be derived by applying various control flow 
and data flow analysis techniques. The advantage is static analysis can exhaustively 
analyse the complete program code by examining all possible paths of execution. It is 
usually faster than the dynamic analysis as behaviour analysis is quite time consuming in 
dynamic analysis, where the system state keeps changing. However, the main drawback 
of static analysis is that attackers can deliberately craft malware that are hard to analyze 
statically. In particular, they can make use of various code obfuscation techniques to 
confuse the disassembly and code analysis. This problem is being addressed in this 
research work.  
In (Islam et al. 2010) authors used pattern recognition algorithms and statistical 
methods, theirs framework combines the static features of function length and printable 
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string information extracted from malware samples into a single test of 1400 unpacked 
malware and 151 clean ﬁles, they achieved an overall classiﬁcation accuracy of over 
98%. Same authors in theirs study (Tian et al. 2010) to distinguish malicious files from 
benign files on a dataset of 1368 malware and 456 benign files by  investigating the 
behavioural features using logs of  various API calls, using runtime features of malware 
files, the experimental results provided an accuracy of over 97%.   
2.6  Code Obfuscation  
Code obfuscation is used to transform the program code in such a way to make it difficult 
to read and understand. Detecting malware is a game of obfuscation and de-obfuscation 
that malware writers and AV vendors play against each other. The malware writers use 
obfuscators to evade detection, while, AV vendors try to deobfuscate code and improve 
their detection techniques. Recently, this game has become more advanced and highly 
complicated for AV vendors, preventing them from de-obfuscating the code easily. One 
such successful approach being adopted by malware writers is the evasion technique such 
as polymorphism (Szor 2005; Townsend 2010), metamorphism (Wing Wong 2006) and 
packing (Sun et al. 2010), where the malware is able to morph code such that detection 
techniques fail. Packers, metamorphic and polymorphic malware use command 
sequences that can be altered into a program without changing the main behaviour to 
evade the scanning process of the signature detection of malware. Example os this type of 
malware include MetaPHOR, Win32/Simile (MetaPHOR 2010), Lexotan32 (Orr 2007), 
W32.Evol (Orr 2006), RPME and Mistfall / Zmist (Ferrie & Szor 2001; Szor 2005). 
These are advanced obfuscated malware that demonstrate a set of packer, polymorphic 
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and metamorphic code writing skills, which include entry-point obscuring, randomly 
using an additional polymorph decryptor, code permutation and code integration.  
The term 'obfuscation' is defined here to mean the modifying of program code in a 
way that keeps it functionally identical with the aim to reduce vulnerability to any kind of 
static analysis, to deter reverse engineering and make it  difficult to understand, and less 
readable. Obfuscation techniques such as packing, polymorphism and metamorphism are 
used by malware authors as well as legitimate software developers. They both use code 
obfuscation techniques for different reasons. Using code obfuscation is very effective to 
malware author to evade the antivirus scanner since it modifies the program code to 
produce offspring copies which have the same functionality but with different byte 
sequence to make sure the new code is not recognized by antivirus scanner. By looking at 
real world threats such as Win32/Parite, Win32/Rimecud, Win32/Alcan, Win32/Rbot, 
Win32/CeeInject, Win32/Nachi Win32/Bagle, and many others, it has been found that the 
malware writers are recycling existing malware with different signatures by using 
obfuscation techniques such as packing, polymorphic transformations and metamorphic 
obfuscations, instead of creating an entirely new malware (Paul 2008). Because of such 
threats, sophisticated malware detection techniques are required, especially those that can 
capture the behaviour of malware based on observed anomalies. 
Obfuscation methods could transform malcode into a new code without affecting 
the original functionality or purpose so that the AV engine‘s scanning process skips the 
detection of the signature. The VX Heavens website provides access to thousands of 
thousands of malware variants in a variety of different categories (VX Heavens 2011). 
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For each malware variant, a signature must be identified, packaged, and downloaded to 
the signature database of users expecting protection from the new attack.  
Malware authors are continually developing new techniques for creating and 
applying obfuscation techniques T(p) on a malware program (p) to produce an obfuscated 
program (p') as shown in the equation 2.2 
 ( )                                                                                        (   )   
Thereby making it very difficult to reserve engineer and decipher the signature 
successfully, even though the two programs p and p' have the same functionality and 
exhibit the same affect. On the other hand, since p and p‘ have different byte sequence, 
AV engines and reverse engineers are applying de-obfuscation techniques D(p') on  the 
obfuscated program (p') in order to analyse the malware and to detect the malware, as 
shown in Figure 2.2. In summary, malware authors use obfuscation techniques to defeat 
the signature based detection by changing the malware signature.   These techniques are 
described next. 
 
Figure  2.2  Obfuscation Transformation 
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2.6.1  Packing 
Recently, malware authors have used packers to avoid detection and to run malware 
faster. This results in mainly changing any byte sequence in the PE into a different byte 
sequence in the newly produced packed PE. Packing the malware makes the obfuscation 
method difficult to understand (Sun et al. 2010) and the malware authors only need to 
change a small number of lines of code in order to change the malware signature.   
Packers are commonly used today for code obfuscation or compression. Packers 
are software programs that could be used to compress and encrypt the PE in secondary 
memory and to restore the original executable image when loaded into main memory 
(RAM). Cyber criminals do not need to change several lines of code to change the 
malware signature mainly because, changing any byte sequence in the PE results in a new 
different byte sequence in the newly produced packed PE and starts from its original 
entry point (OEP) so that the challenge here to find the OEP. For instance, Themida
i
, 
Obsidium
ii
, ASPack / ASProtect
iii
, PECompact
iv
, and Armadillo
v
 are all commonly used 
packers and malicious code authors are using such packers to produced new codes. 
Figure 2.3 explain three different packer protections (a) PECompact (b) Themida (c) 
ASPack. Packers have the essential features of reducing the size of malware, making 
malware easier to transform, and thereby producing malware more resistant to static 
analysis. Hence, packers being able to bypass detection engines have become the most 
favorite toolkits. 
                                                 
i
 www.oreans.com 
ii
 www.obsidium.de 
iii
 http://www.aspack.com 
iv
 http://www.bitsum.com/pecompact.php 
v
 www.siliconrealms.com 
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2.6.2  Polymorphic Malware  
Polymorphic malware uses encryption to change the body of the malware, and changes 
decryption routines in each infection to avoid static byte sequence and as long as the 
encryption keys change, the malware becomes difficult to detect by anti-malware 
programs (Tang et al. 2010; Xu et al. 2004). This has led AV programs to use different 
scanning techniques, from simple byte sequence matching to more complex techniques 
such as X-RAYING scanning (Perriot & Ferrie 2004), which scan multiple parts of a file 
and performs different analysis to detect polymorphic malware. Polymorphic malware is 
hard to detect through signature based detection since it could change the byte sequence 
on its own. Such examples are s W32.Fujacks, W32.Vundo, P2P-Worm.Win32.Polip, 
Virus.DOS.Chameleon, and w32.Detnat (Gu et al. 2007; Li et al. 2011). Figure 2.4 
shows a polymorphic code example of P2P-Worm.Win32.Polip.  
Polymorphic technique enables a malicious program to mutate at byte level when 
the program creates a copy of itself, where every new copy of the malware is encrypted 
with a unique key, which contains a unique byte sequence. Anti-malware vendors are 
confronting a serious problem of defeating the complexity of malware. Polymorphic 
malware uses encryption and data appending/ data pre-pending in order to change the 
body of the malware, and further, it changes decryption routines from infection to 
infection as long as the encryption keys change, making it very difficult to create 
antivirus signatures to block infections. Crime-ware tool kits such as CRUM Cryptor 
Polymorphic, PoisonIvy Polymorphic Online Builder and Mariposa, use polymorphic 
code and obfuscation techniques to avoid detection, and are available in black-market 
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with updates for between $50- $10000 depending on the features included (Alazab, 
Watters, et al. 2011). As a result, this will lead to anti-malware experts developing 
different scanning techniques from simple byte sequence matching to a combination of 
difficult antivirus engines to block its numerous propagation techniques. In early 2011, 
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report (Symantec Enterprise Security 2011a, 2011b) 
stated that detecting polymorphic malware such as w32.Polip and w32.Detnat is much 
more difficult and complex than any other type of Malware. The uses of simple scanners 
have made this type of obfuscation prolific and pose to continue the threat.  
Countermeasures such as AV engines defeat the polymorphic methods by waiting 
for the malware to de-obfuscate itself. Malware detection system can run a malware in a 
sandbox or emulators (Balakrishnan & Schulze 2005) in order not to cause any damages 
or affect the system. As the malware executes, it must decrypt itself to attempt to infect a 
file and therefore the emulator can scan for the malware signature when the malware 
decides to execute. However, this technique can still thwart the detection engine and the 
encryption algorithms have become sophisticated and complex that it becomes very hard 
to detect such malware in real time.  These types of new obfuscation mechanisms such as 
Web-attack toolkits continue to drive up the number of malware variants in common 
circulation. In 2010, Symantec encountered more than 286 million unique variants of 
malware (Symantec Enterprise Security 2011a). 
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(a) Packer protection from PECompact 
 
 
 
(b) Packer protection from Themida 
 
 
 
(c) Packer protection from ASPack 
 
Figure 2.3 Different Packer Protections (a) PECompact (b) Themida (c) ASPack 
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Figure  2.4 The Polymorphic Code Example of P2P-Worm.Win32.Polip 
The creations of polymorphic malware toolkits such as Mutation Engine, Dark 
Angel‘s Multiple Encryptor, NuKE Encryption Device, and TridenT Polymorphic 
Engine, have created big challenges for security researchers and AV engines (Li et al. 
2011). Generally the polymorphic malware toolkits engine, a small object file linked with 
the malware that would make a new polymorphic virus.  The code entitles the users to 
provide their own random number generator or can use the default one. Also, these 
toolkits provide a documentation of the engine which describes how it could be used and 
it also includes a demonstrator malware using the engine. 
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2.6.3  Metamorphic Malware 
Malware authors resort to sophisticated hiding techniques. Metamorphic engine uses 
code obfuscation techniques to produce morphed copies of an original program (Desai 
2010; You & Yim 2010). It changes the code itself without the need of using encryption. 
In general, there are four techniques commonly used for metamorphic obfuscation. These 
are,  
i) Dead-code Insertion which inserts operation that do nothing, such as a sequence 
of NOPs (No Operation Performed),   
ii) Code Transposition which changes the instruction sequence, such as using 
JMPs instructions so that the order of instructions is different from the original 
one,  
iii) Register Reassignment such as replacing [PUSH ebx] with [PUSH eax] to 
exchange register names, and  
iv) Instruction Substitution which replaces the instructions with different 
instructions so as to have the same result - some authors uses a database 
dictionary of equivalent instruction sequences to make it easier and faster. 
Subsections explain each one in details.  
The main difference between polymorphic and metamorphic is in the malware 
body. In polymorphic, the malware is encrypted by different encryption key during each 
infection and the malware body will decrypt by the same code across multiple infections. 
Metamorphic could use many techniques to transforming the code as shown in the 
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subsections below. Win95.Regswap was one of the early metamorphic viruses to make an 
impact via register usage exchange (Aycock 2006; Bakshi et al. 2010; Desai 2010; You 
& Yim 2010). Figure 2.5 shows the original code of Virus.Win95.Regswap. An example 
of metamorphic techniques used on the original virus code is described in the subsection 
that follows.    
 
Figure  2.5 Original code of Virus.Win95.Regswap 
2.6.3.1  Dead Code Insertion 
Dead-code insertion also known as trash insertion, involves insertion of code that does 
not change the malware behaviour such as a sequence of NOPs (No Operation 
Performed). Dead codes are designed to evade detection and fool antivirus software that 
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use basic signature-based detection matching. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6 (You & 
Yim 2010). 
Dead-code Insertion, which does nothing to the code logic but change the byte 
string of the code can be difficult to detect such as changes in the code using complicated 
code of sequence of operations if the function or code has no effect, used to change the 
virus signature to some extent. Examples; [NOPs], [MOV eax, eax], [SHL eax, 0], [ADD 
eax, 0] and [INC eax] followed by [DEC eax], not only, also passing values through 
memory rather than registers. Using such tricks of dead code insertion can make the 
analysis time consuming and sometimes fail the detection engine to detect such 
threat(Christodorescu & Jha 2004).  
 
Figure  2.6 Dead–Code Insertion 
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2.6.3.2  Code Transposition 
Code transposition shuffles the instructions so that the order in the binary content is 
completely different resulting in a new signature than the one used by the antivirus 
software and this could evade detection. Transposition use Jump instructions to shuffle 
the binary content. Figure 3.3.2 shows an example of code transposition. There are some 
scenarios that show how to detect this type of obfuscated such as, reorder the instructions 
and insert unconditional branches, or jump instructions to restore the original control. 
This is then followed by swap instructions if they are not interdependent. Most analysis 
techniques use an intermediate representation, such as the Control Flow Graph (CFG) 
(Bruschi et al. 2006) or the Program Dependence Graph (PDG) (Ferrante et al. 1987), 
that is robust against superfluous changes in control flow. 
Code Transposition such as Subroutine Permutation, Subroutine Inlining and 
Subroutine Outlining, results in changing of the instructions such that the order of 
instructions is different than the parent code, with the use of instructions such as using 
JMP, CALL instructions as shown in Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 (You & Yim 2010).   
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Figure  2.7 Code Transposition based on Unconditional Branches 
 
Figure  2.8 Code Transposition based on Independent Instructions 
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2.6.3.3  Register Reassignment 
The register reassignment transformation replaces code between registers by exchanging 
register names with no other effect on program behaviour. For example, if register ebx is 
dead throughout a given live range of the register eax, it can replace eax in that live 
range.  The signature that encodes [PUSH ebx] is not the same as the one that encodes 
[PUSH eax] and hence becomes obfuscated.  Register Reassignment such as replacing 
[PUSH ebx] with [PUSH eax] to exchange register names is shown in Figure 2.9. 
 
Figure  2.9 Register Reassignment 
2.6.3.4  Instruction Substitution 
This obfuscation technique uses a dictionary of equivalent instruction sequences to 
replace one instruction sequence with another. Figure 2.10 shows an example of 
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instruction substitution (You & Yim 2010). This kind of obfuscation relies upon human 
knowledge of equivalent instructions, making it a challenge for automatic detection of 
malicious code. For example, the IA-32 instruction set is rich and contains many different 
ways to perform the same operation. The IA-32 assembly language provides ample 
opportunity for instruction substitution. Instruction substitution uses an equivalent code 
substitution to replace the instructions by different instructions with the same result. 
Some authors use a database dictionary of equivalent instruction sequences to make it 
easier and faster, as shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Figure  2.10 Instruction substitution. 
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2.7  Summary of Literature  
In summary, signature based detection is disadvantageous as it cannot be used to detect 
novel attacks and the repository of known signatures has to be continually augmented to 
include newer signatures. Evidence has shown that new attacks are frequently generated 
through modifications of known attacks. The present malware detection system usually 
rely on existing malware signatures with limited heuristics  and are unable to detect those 
malware that can hide itself during the scanning process in online systems. In this 
dissertation, will be focus on develop a robust digital forensic process for NTFS file 
system, and then to design and apply innovative techniques for fulfilling the main 
objective of detecting hidden malware, also propose effective digital forensic techniques 
that could be used to analyse and acquire evidences of hidden malware in NTFS disk 
images is very important.   
Literature studies on malware detection have shown that there is no single 
technique that could detect all types of malware and countermeasures cannot detect 
 
Table 2.1 Instruction substitution and an equivalent code substitution 
Instructions Equivalent 
MOV EAX,ECX XOR EBX,EAX 
MOV EBX,EAX XOR EAX,EBX 
MOV ECX,EBX XOR EBX,EAX 
XOR EAX, EAX MOV EAX, 0 
MOV EAX, IMM 
PUSH IMM 
POP EAX 
OP REG1,REG2 
MOV MEM, REG1 
OP MEM, REG2 
MOV REG, MEM 
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unknown malware or unknown signatures which are uniquely identify a specific malware 
(Christodorescu & Jha 2004; Skoudis & Zeltser 2003). Therefore, signature based 
approaches fail to detect unknown malware. On the other hand, anomaly-based detection 
uses the knowledge of normal behaviour patterns to decide the maliciousness of a 
program code. It has the key advantage and ability to detect zero day attacks.  However, 
it is very difficult to accurately specify the system or program‘s behaviour and thus these 
approaches usually are resulting in more false positives (Kolter & Maloof 2006; 
Symantec Enterprise Security 2011b).  
As shown in the advanced malware, the malware obfuscation technologies have 
become sophisticated and complex. Clearly, such a tendency is expected to be retained 
based on the growth of the hardware and software technologies. Also, they will be 
revised to be suited for the popular infrastructures such as web and smartphone.  
The purpose of the research is a positive step towards overcoming the digital 
forensic problems identified in the above sections.  The possible approaches and methods 
that would be adopted in this research are detailed in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6. In a nutshell, these methods are categorised under 2 parts, i) Digital Data 
Investigation of Slack Space (Physical) Chapter 3 and ii) Obfuscated Malware Detection 
(Logical) Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  The first part involved investigation of the 
hidden malware in the slack space for identifying known and unknown malware as 
malware attackers take advantage of the NTFS weaknesses and the inability of existing 
AV to check the slack space. In the second part, a statistical n-gram analysis of binary 
content that is based on operation codes (op-codes) and API system call sequence feature 
together with the data mining learning techniques such as support vector machine (SVM) 
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algorithms were used to classify whether the binary content is benign or malicious These 
proposed methods are quite novel and would help in identifying hidden malware with a 
focus on an improved anomaly-based detection. 
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Chapter 3 : Forensic Analysis of the NTFS File 
System  
              
Sherlock Holmes: “The world is full of obvious things which nobody by any 
chance ever observes”. 
                                  —Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, “The Hound of the Baskervilles,” 
                   The Strand Magazine (1902) 
  
“Not everything that is undocumented is automatically useful… 
Some operating system internals are just internals in theirs 
Strict scene, that is, implementation details.” 
— Sven Schrieber 
3.1  NTFS File System 
Forensic analysis of the Windows NT File System (NTFS) could provide useful 
information leading towards malware detection and presentation of digital evidence for 
the court of law. Since NTFS records every event of the system, forensic tools are 
required to process an enormous amount of information related to the user / kernel 
environment, buffer overflows, trace conditions, network stack and many more.  This has 
led to forensic tools that are imperfect and though they are commercially available, they 
are not comprehensive and effective (Richard & Roussev 2006).  Many existing 
techniques have failed to identify malicious code in hidden data of the NTFS disk image 
(Vassil 2009). This chapter discusses the analysis technique explored to successfully 
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detect maliciousness in hidden data, by investigating the NTFS boot sector. The chapter 
also reports the experimental studies conducted with some of the existing popular 
forensics tools and their limitations that have been identified. Further, through the 
proposed three-stage forensic analysis process, the chapter shows how the experimental 
investigation has attempted to unearth the vulnerabilities of NTFS disk image and the 
weaknesses of the current forensic techniques.  
3.2  NTFS Investigation Goal  
Digital investigation is a process to answer questions about the compromised computers 
(Carrier 2005). This chapter focuses on static analysis since it can capture all the hidden 
information that cannot be modified during the analysis process, unlike live analysis 
techniques which could result in having falsified data.  An image copy of the NTFS hard 
disk would capture hidden data and hence this study entails developing efficient 
techniques to analyse this data in a confined lab environment for the identification of 
hidden malware. This research work forms an important contribution in digital forensics, 
which is the science of identifying, extracting, analysing and presenting the digital 
evidence that has been stored in the digital electronic storage devices to be used in a court 
of law (Baryamureeba & Tushabe 2006; Kruse & Heiser 2001; Reed & Angel 2007). It 
takes an initial step towards addressing the open problem of identifying unseen or new 
malware that could evade detection in the form of hidden or obfuscated malicious code in 
the physical file system.  
Static analysis of NTFS file system which is the standard and most commonly 
used file system could provide useful information for digital forensics. This chapter 
  
97 
discusses the analysis technique explored to detect data hidden based on the internal 
structure of the NTFS file system in the boot sector. Further, it attempts to unearth the 
vulnerabilities within a NTFS file system disk image and highlights the weaknesses of 
the current forensic techniques.  
The main goal of this chapter is to propose a methodology to effectively detect 
hidden malware stored in the physical NTFS file system. Since NTFS file system is 
predominantly used in most computer systems, and malware attackers take advantage of 
weaknesses in NTFS to hide malware, this chapter focuses on hidden malware forensic.  
With this in view, in this chapter the research aims i) to explore the NTFS disk structure 
and its vulnerabilities, ii) to investigate weaknesses of existing commonly used digital 
forensic techniques such as signature-based, heuristic-based and anomaly-based, and iii) 
to propose and evaluate improved methods in static analysis of NTFS for identifying 
hidden malware by investigating the physical disk image.  
A further goal of this chapter is to effectively detect hidden malware that could be 
implanted on a computer system in the slack space (physical) on hard disk drives. Hence, 
this chapter provides the background and methods adopted in investigating the physical 
slack space and in identifying the hidden malware. To facilitate the research process, a 
good understanding of the NTFS file system is essential, and this is briefly described 
next.  
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3.3  Windows Architecture 
Operating systems play a key role in identifying illegal activities. As files and their 
structure are determined by the operating system, understanding the relationship between 
the files and the files system of the operating system and their communication 
mechanism is really important for digital forensics. 
3.3.1  NTFS File System Architecture 
Today, NTFS file system is the basis of predominant operating systems in use, such as 
Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows 
Vista, and Windows 7 and supported by Linux based distributions. Due to the widespread 
use of the NTFS files system, attackers try to target NTFS, as this could result in 
affecting more computer users.  Another compelling reason for witnessing a strong 
relationship between computer crime and the NTFS file system is the sparse studies in  
literature that unearth the vulnerabilities of NTFS and lack of standardization in digital 
forensics procedures and techniques (Palmer 2001; Rogers & Seigfried 2004).  
The key feature to note in NTFS disk structure is that the Master File Table 
(MFT) is the core of NTFS file system since it contains details of every file and folder on 
the volume and allocates two sectors for every MFT entry.  The MFT entry within the 
MFT contains attributes that can have any format and any size. Further, as shown in 
Figure 3.1 every attribute contains an entry header which is allocated in the first 42 bytes 
of a file record, and it contains an attribute header and attributes content. The attribute 
header is used to identify the size, name and the flag value. If the size is less than 700 
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bytes (known as a resident attribute), the attribute content will reside in the MFT 
followed by the attribute header, otherwise it will store the attribute content in an external 
cluster called cluster run known as a non-resident attribute.  This is because; the MFT 
entry is 1KB in size and hence cannot fit anything that occupies more than 700 bytes. In 
addition, since the Windows operating system does not zero the slack space, it becomes a 
vehicle to hide data, especially in $Boot file.  
 
Figure  3.1  MFT Layout Structure 
In this chapter a preliminary investigation conducted in these aspects revealed the 
following problems that form the primary motivation of this research work. In an 
operating system, the file system is responsible the organization method of data on a hard 
disk volume. It comprises of two parts: the collection of files that store related data, and a 
directory structure that organizes and provides information about all the files in the 
system. The two most popular file systems used by windows users of today are FAT32 
(File Allocation Table) and NTFS file system. Later this chapter will discuss the NTFS 
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file system more in details and how it can allow malicious code to be hidden away from 
the radar of any commercially available antivirus tool.  
3.3.2  Portable Executable Architecture  
The Win32 Portable Executable File Format (PE) introduced by Microsoft is the standard 
executable format for all versions of the operating systems on all supported processors. 
Therefore, the approach explored in this research would be tested directly on the Portable 
Executable (PE) format files. Most programs in windows are constructed by accessing 
the Windows application programming interface (API) through functions available in 
dynamic Link Library (DLL) on the system. Microsoft provides a great number of DLLs, 
and each DLL can be used by more than one program at the same time. 
For the obfuscated malware detection system, this research focuses on extracting 
feature from API sequence and how to automate the API calls‘ extraction process. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the Portable Executable (PE) structure as the data 
structures adopted on disk are the same as the data structures used in the memory. For 
example, when the function LoadLibrary is called to load the executable into memory, a 
data structure such as the IMAGE_NT_HEADERS is identical on disk and in the 
memory. However, the Windows loader looks at the PE file and decides what portions of 
the file to be mapped in. This mapping is consistent in that higher offsets in the file 
correspond to higher memory addresses when mapped into memory.  Since a PE file 
comprises of various sections and headers, free PE tools (PE Explorer) has been used to 
view, analyze and reverse engineer Windows PE files such as EXE, DLL, OCX, ActiveX 
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Controls, Screensavers, SYS, DPL, Control Panel Applets, MSSTYLES, BPL, and 
executable files that run on MS Windows platform. 
Table 3.1 provides a good understanding of the PE structure that includes DOS 
headers and PE headers. The PE header starts with the signature bits ―PE‖ and has some 
file properties, such as timestamp, machine type and the number of sections. Section 
Table has code sections (.text), and data sections (.data). The .text section is the default 
section for code and the .data section stores writable global variables. It also contains the 
file‘s Original Entry Point (OEP). OEP refers to the execution entry point of a PE file, 
where the file execution begins. Finally, the .rdata section contains read-only data. 
Traditional detection engines search the binary files for stored signatures to 
identify known malware. However, the malware can easily fool the detection engine by 
applying obfuscation technique such as Packer (section 2.6.1) to obfuscate the malware 
internal code and data structures from being detected by security software. 
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Table 3.1 Portable Execution Structure 
Portable execution Structure 
Section Table  
DOS Header 
COFF File Header  
Optional Header  
Standard fields 
NT additional fields 
Optional Header Data Directories 
 Export Table 
 Import Table 
 Resource Table 
 Exception Table 
 Certificate Table 
 Base Relocation Table 
 Debug 
 Architecture 
 Global Ptr 
 TLS Table 
 Load Config Table 
 Bound Import 
 Import Address Table (IAT) 
 Delay Import Descriptor 
 COM+ Runtime Header 
 Reserved 
Section Table 
 .text 
 .rdata 
 .data 
 .idata 
 .rsrc 
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Metafile has been defined and its importance explained: Metafile refers to the file 
structure of the NTFS file system. It is also used to define files, system driver 
management volume, buffer file system changes, assign a drive letter to each partition, 
manage free space allocation, and store security and disk space usage information. The 
metafiles are treated specially by Windows and are difficult to directly view them. 
Metafiles in the NTFS disk root directory start with "$" character, and it is hard to get 
information about them by standard means. By looking at $MFT file size, it is possible to 
find out useful information such as, time spent by the operating system in cataloguing the 
entire disk. Table 3.2 provides the metadata files used by the operating system and their 
functions are described. 
3.4  Digital Crime Investigation Analysis 
According to Michael Andrew  (Andrew 2007), the general components in overall 
digital forensic process are; acquisition, preservation, and analysis. On similar notes, 
Brian Carrier (Carrie 2003; Carrier 2005) state that there is a three-process approach for 
digital investigation, which consists of system preservation, evidence searching, and 
reconstruction processes. Towards achieving the goal to detect hidden data based on the 
internal structure of the NTFS file system in the boot sector, this chapters describes the 
three stages used to perform digital forensic analysis in a comprehensive manner.  The 
three stages as explain in Figure 3.2 are; Stage 1:   Hard disk data acquisition, Stage 2: 
Evidence searching, and Stage 3: Analysis of NTFS file system. 
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Figure  3.2 The Three Stages of a Digital Crime Investigation 
‗Hard disk data acquisition‘ is the process of preserving the state of the digital 
crime scene and the purpose of this stage is to maintain the original evidence without 
being overwritten during the investigation work.  Such a process ensures that evidence is 
not lost in the investigation process and also to cater to the need for this stage to undergo 
any future analysis that may be required. The ‗Evidence searching‘ stage mainly involves 
searching for data that support the hypotheses about the incident, and details about how 
to perform searching inside the files and file system of the NTFS in a secure way. In the 
Analysis of NTFS file system stage, existing evidence collected, the physical place in the 
hard disk, unreached place such as slack space or between the partition, etc. are analysed.  
Therefore, it is very important to understand Medium Data and the volume in hard drives, 
and these are described in Sections (3.4.1) and (3.4.2).  
This chapter attempts to identify and fill the gap found in literature and practice by 
studying the techniques used in the analysis of the NTFS disk image. Hence, the main 
objectives are i) to explore the NTFS disk image structure and its vulnerabilities, ii) to 
investigate different commonly used digital forensic techniques such as signatures, data 
hiding, timestamp, etc. and their weaknesses, and iii) finally to suggest improvements in 
static analysis of NTFS disk image.  
Hard disk data 
acquisition 
Evidence 
searching  
Analysis of  
NTFS file system 
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Table 3.2 NTFS Metadata Files Information 
Metadata Name Metadata # Description 
Master File Table $MFT 0 Itself MFT 
Master File Table 
Mirror 
$MFTmirr 1 
Copy of the first 16 MFT records placed in 
the middle of the disk or the end of the 
partition. 
Log File $LogFile 2 Transaction logging file for the volume.  
Volume Decription 
Table  
$Volume 3 
Contains information about the volume 
label (partitions), file system version, time, 
etc. 
Attributate Definition 
Table  
$AttrDef 4 
List of standard files attributes on the 
volume 
Root Directory  $. 5 Root directory 
Cluster Allocation 
Bitmap 
$Bitmap 6 Volume free space bitmap 
Volume Boot Code $Boot 7 Boot sector (bootable partition) 
Quota Table $Quota 9 
Containing information if disk quota are 
being used on the volume. (only for NTFS)  
Upper Case Table  $Upcase 10 
Table containing information for 
coverating file names to the Unicode 16 bit 
file naming system for international.  
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3.4.1  Medium Data Analysis 
Some computers use big-endian ordering and others use little-endian ordering of digital 
data to organize multiple bytes (sets of 8 bits, 0 or 1) and the most common technique 
used is ASCII or Unicode to encode the characters. A sector represents the basic unit of 
data storage on a hard disk with each sector being able to store 512 bytes of data (4096 
bits). All types of Microsoft OS are designed to read and write blocks of data called 
clusters and these clusters are made up of an even number of sectors that are fixed blocks 
of data, e.g. 1024 bytes (2 sectors), 4096 bytes (8 sectors), etc. The number of sectors 
needed for a cluster is dependent upon the type of storage device, the operating system 
involved and the size of the logical storage device.   
The data collected for analysis from a computer system connected to a network 
could be classified as volatile and nonvolatile data. Volatile data is information that might 
be lost if the system is turned off, such as the current network connection, running 
services open TCP or UDP ports, internal routing table, users logged on, open files, 
running processes, scheduled jobs, cached NetBIOS name table, and others. To analyse 
volatile data, also called Live Analysis, the system needs to be running during the 
investigation. On the other hand, nonvolatile data is information that is not lost if the 
system turn off such as register data, file system time and date stamps, system version 
and patch level. In a Linux based system, information such as file system MD5 checksum 
values, user accounts, IIS logs, stored files could be investigated to collect evidence of 
malware. Such analysis of nonvolatile data is called Static Analysis. 
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Figure 3.3 shows the different analysis areas on a computer system, and physical 
storage media analysis forms the base and lowest level analysis of devices such as hard 
disks, memory chips, CD-ROMs, Flash memory, and others.  Since all of the data is 
stored on medium devices, and that malware exploits the weakness of the disk structure  
to store itself without being recognized by the AV engines, the necessity emerges to start 
analysis from the physical storage media. Therefore, analysis of the physical storage 
media could provide useful information leading towards malware detection and 
presentation of digital evidence for the court of law. 
 
Figure  3.3 Analysis Areas 
3.4.2  Volume Analysis 
A volume is a collection of addressable sectors that the users can use for data storage 
(read and write) and is responsible for the creation of partitions that could be defined as a 
set of consecutive sectors. Figure 3.4 provides an example of HDD partition and volume 
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of a typical NTFS file system. Volume Analysis involves looking at the data structure 
with partitioning and assembling data in digital storage media devices that are stored 
when installing Microsoft Windows operating system. Examples of such information are, 
the primary or logical partitions on the hard disk, and in the windows system, each 
partition has one or more tables to describe the starting and the ending sector (the length) 
and the type of partition. Even though these concepts are found to be similar in other 
operating systems such as the Linux operating systems, not all of them use volume in the 
same way as Microsoft Windows does. 
 
Figure  3.4  Hard Disk Drive Volume and Partition. 
Partitioning is dependent on the OS and not the type of interface on the hard disk. 
Windows OS uses the same partition system, whether the disk uses an AT Attachment 
interface (ATA/IDE) or Small Computer System Interface (SCSI). This research project 
is not focusing on the hard disks and types but their basic structures are explored to see 
how the malware can hide itself as hidden data.  Many existing techniques have failed to 
identify malicious code in hidden data of the disk structure (Naiqi et al. 2008). Therefore 
it is very important to analyse the volume system and the first task is to investigate the 
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data structure that describes the volumes. When analysing a volume system it is 
important to check the consistency of the partitions by checking the start and end sectors.  
Disassembly is the process of recovering a symbolic representation of a program 
from its binary representation. Disassembling binaries is a difficult task for two primary 
reasons: variable-length instructions and fundamentally indistinguishable data embedded 
inside code regions. There are two standard disassembly techniques, the linear sweep 
method and the recursive traversal method. Various techniques have been proposed to 
improve the disassembly coverage and accuracy. Cifuentes et al. in (Cifuentes & 
Fraboulet 1997; Cifuentes & Gough 1995) used speculative disassembly techniques to 
improve disassembly coverage. Their approach made certain assumptions on the 
properties of the machine and the conventions of the programming language or the 
operating system. Program obfuscation has been used to protect software security. For 
example, it has been used to protect software content from malicious reverse engineering 
(Sun et al. 2010; You & Yim 2010). Linn and Debray (Linn & Debray 2003) proposed 
two techniques to foil disassemblers by tailoring the static analysis process against a 
particular tool. One is through inserting unreachable junk code into the program and the 
other is through using a branching function in place of regular call instructions. Kruegel 
et al. (Kruegel et al. 2004) proposed static binary analysis techniques to improve the 
disassembly success rate for obfuscated binaries. These static disassembly methods 
cannot correctly handle code which contain self-modifying and overlapping instructions 
or in which other static-resilient techniques are used in (Zhang, 2009). Additionally, to 
apply these various techniques to disassemble code buried in network traffic, the starting 
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point of the code should be found first. Our choice reverse engineering tool IDA pro uses 
the linear sweep method. 
3.5  Problem Background 
With the recent trend in malware to operate as hidden malicious code that evade detection 
by anti-virus tools and other live analysis techniques, this research firstly attempts to 
identify hidden malware that adopt Physical such as ―Slack Space‖ implantation 
techniques through exploiting the vulnerabilities of the system . 
3.5.1   Vulnerabilities of NTFS Disk Structure 
Cybercriminals make use of file system vulnerabilities in order to infect more computers 
and guarantee effectiveness of evading security countermeasures. For instance, keeping 
the last modified date of an infected file unchanged to make it seem like it was uninfected 
was one of the first early techniques cyber criminals had adopted to thwart detection. The 
cybercrimes are based on exploiting the vulnerability in applications and operating 
systems. This type of matured obfuscation technique has resulted in hidden class of 
threats that many would not have been exposed to previously. 
Cyber criminals target a vulnerable area on the system structure to hide the 
malware.  Since NTFS is predominantly used in most computer systems, and malware 
cyber criminals take advantage of NTFS weaknesses to hide malware, more computers 
get infected without being detected by commercial detection engines (Naiqi et al. 2008). 
They are capitalizing on the vulnerabilities of NTFS to hide the malware from AV 
engines and further exploit the weaknesses of the present digital forensic techniques from 
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being detected. A preliminary study conducted on the hidden data of the $Boot file 
(Alazab, Venkataraman, et al. 2009; Alazab, Venkatraman, et al. 2009; Huebner et al. 
2006). It takes an enormous amount of time to analyse the data derived with such tools 
and most of the existing tools are complex and not easy to use. Moreover, not all 
computer infections are detected by forensic tools, especially intrusions that are in the 
form of hidden data in the $Boot file go unchecked. Hence, the conclusion drawn here is 
that the existing forensic tools are not comprehensive and effective in identifying the 
recent computer threats. This confirms what is reported in literature as well (Ahmad 
2002; Palmer 2001; Purcell & Lang 2008; Reith et al. 2002). 
As shown in Section 3.3.1 the architecture of the NTFS file system have 
weaknesses which led to attackers using different techniques such as disguising file 
names, hiding attributes and deleting files to intrude the system. 
NTFS, Windows NT‘s native file system, is designed to be more robust and 
secure than other Microsoft file systems. The key feature to note in NTFS disk structure 
is that the Master File Table (MFT) contains details of every file and folder on the 
volume and allocates two sectors for every MFT entry. Since the Windows operating 
system does not zero the slack space, cybercriminals make use of MFT to hide malicious 
code without raising any suspicion. Such limitations in NTFS have led to cyber criminals 
using different techniques such as disguising file names, hiding attributes and using 
deleted files to intrude the system.   
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3.5.2  Insufficiency of Malware Detection Tools  
Current live malware detection tools such as anti-virus software are able to identify 
known malware. Once new malware is released, the AV engines will reactively update 
their signatures to combat the new malware. However, recent methods adopted by 
computer intruders, attackers and malware are to target hidden and deleted data so that 
they could evade from virus scanners. As a result, some malware adopt circumvention 
techniques such as polymorphic, metamorphic obfuscations, etc. so that they cannot be 
detected through current live analysis techniques.  
Countermeasures such as detection engines are failing to detect malware and are 
identifying benign file as malware resulting in high false alarm rate and false positives. In 
2010 David Stang tested 41 updated scanners on 54,016 malware files, finding less than 1 
among the files capable of being detected by only half of the scanners used and on an 
average the scanner detected only 62% with a maximum  of about 80%  (Stang 2010). 
However, sophistication in malware through code obfuscation has created another 
challenge for digital forensic examiners, namely the detection rate of new and unknown 
malware is very low, (Passerini et al. 2009; Symantec Enterprise Security 1997), and 
identifying benign code as malicious (false alarm rate) is quite high (Stang 2010). This is 
due to the fact that existing techniques and methods do not perform sufficient statistical 
analyses to determine if the anomaly was ‗actually‘ malicious. Though recent studies that 
use statistical analysis of file binary content including statistical n-gram modeling 
techniques (Shafiq et al. 2008; Stolfo et al. 2005, 2007) concentrate on identifying 
malcode in document files, the statistical modeling of hidden malcode that predominantly 
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use Windows API calling sequence that reflects the behaviour of a particular piece of 
code to evade detection is yet to be explored.   
3.5.3  Weaknesses in Digital Forensic Analysis Tools 
There is no standard methodology and approach for conducting digital forensics 
investigations (Palmer 2001), in spite of the fact that digital crimes are on the rise and 
less than 2% of the reported cases result in conviction (Baryamureeba & Tushabe 2006).  
The literature surveys conducted in the last few years on digital forensics were more 
focused on the technical aspects without any consideration for a generalized model.  
While some road maps indicate steps to collect image copy of physical devices, the main 
challenge is that ―analytical procedures and protocols are not standardized nor do 
practitioners and researchers use standard terminology‖ (Palmer 2001). This has resulted 
in a variety of forensic analysis tools that provide different ways to search for the digital 
evidence of malware and most of these tools adopt different techniques for different kind 
of information.  
Since NTFS file system stores all events that take place on a computer system, 
huge amount of data analysis is required while scanning the entire NTFS disk image for 
forensic purposes.  From a preliminary study of this research work conducted on the 
hidden data of the $Boot file, it is observed that a variety of tools and utilities have to be 
adopted along with manual inspections to identify unseen malware.  
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3.6  Proposed Forensic Analysis Process 
Since the physical medium is the fingerprint of both legal and illegal activities, it is very 
important to analyse the physical medium for malware deposits.  This research adopts a 
procedure of data acquisition from NTFS images as explaining in Section 3.8.1.  There 
are currently no consistent or standardized procedure for accomplishing digital forensics 
and there are many models and frameworks suggested by many organisations, agencies 
and researchers such as: Farmer and Venema (Farmer & Venema 2005), Kruse and 
Heiser (Kruse & Heiser 2001), III and Roussev (Richard & Roussev 2006) , The 
Enhanced Integrated Digital Investigation Process (EIDIP) model by Baryamureeba and 
Tushabe (Baryamureeba & Tushabe 2006) and the enhanced version of the Integrated 
Digital Investigation Process Model (IDIP) proposed by Brian Carrier and Eugene 
Spafford (Carrier & Spafford 2003), the Abstract Digital Forensics Model (Reith et al. 
2002),Forensic Process Model by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ),  the Scientific 
Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE 2000).  
In this section, the forensic analysis process proposed and adopted to achieve the 
above mentioned objectives of this research work are described. An empirical study 
conducted using selected digital forensic tools that are predominantly used in practice is 
explained. Several factors such as effectiveness, uniqueness and robustness in analysing 
NTFS disk image have been considered in selecting the tools / utilities required for this 
empirical study. Each utility does some specific functionality, a collection of such tools 
have been adopted to perform a comprehensive set of functionalities. The forensic 
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utilities / tools used to conduct the experimental investigation in this research work are 
listed below: 
i. Disk imaging utilities such as DD (Garner 1970) or DCFLDD  (Harbour 
2006)  for obtaining sector-by-sector mirror image of the disk; 
ii. Evidence collection using utilities such as Hexedit (Phillips 2010), Frhed 
1.4.0 (Kibria 2009) and Strings V2.41 (Russinovich 2009)  to introspect the 
binary code of the NTFS disk image; 
iii. NTFS disk analysis using software tools such as The Sleuth KIT (TSK) 
v3.01 (Carrier 2011), Autopsy  (Carrier 2010) and NTFSINFO v1.0 
(Russinovich 2006) to explore and extract intruded data as well as hidden 
data for performing forensic analysis.  
In the first stage of forensic analysis, the DCFLDD developed by Nicholas Harbour 
(Harbour 2006) and DD utility from George Garner (Garner 1970) was used to acquire 
the NTFS disk image from the digital electronic storage device.  This utility was selected 
for investigation since it provides simple and flexible acquisition tools. The main 
advantage of using these tools is that one could extract the data in or between partitions to 
a separate file for more analysis. In addition, this utility provides built-in MD5 hashing 
features. Some of its salient features allow the analyst to calculate, save, and verify the 
MD5 hash values. In digital forensic analysis, using a hashing technique is important to 
ensure data integrity and to identify which values of data have been maliciously changed 
as well as to explore known data objects. 
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 Stage 1:   Hard disk data acquisition, 
 Stage 2:   Evidence searching and 
 Stage 3:   Analysis of NTFS files system. 
3.6.1  Stage 1 - Hard Disk Data Acquisition 
In the first stage of forensic analysis, the DCFLDD developed by Nicholas Harbour 
(Harbour 2006) and DD utility from George Garner (Garner 1970) was used to acquire 
the NTFS disk image from the digital electronic storage device.  This utility was selected 
for investigation since it provides simple and flexible acquisition tools. The main 
advantage of using these tools is that one could extract the data in or between partitions to 
a separate file for more analysis. In addition, this utility provides built-in MD5 hashing 
features. Some of its salient features allow the analyst to calculate, save, and verify the 
MD5 hash values. In digital forensic analysis, using a hashing technique is important to 
ensure data integrity and to identify which values of data have been maliciously changed 
as well as to explore known data objects. 
3.6.2  Stage 2 - Evidence Searching  
The next stage involved searching for evidences with respect to system tampering.  An 
evidence of intrusion could be gained by looking for some known signatures, timestamps 
as well as even searching for hidden data.  In this stage, the Strings command by Mark 
Russinovich (Russinovich 2009), Frhed hexeditor tool by Rihan Kibria (Kibria 2009) and 
WinHex hexeditor tool by X-Ways Software Technology AG (X-Ways Software 
Technology AG) we used to detect a keyword or phrase from the disk image. 
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3.6.3  Stage 3 - Analysis of NTFS File System  
In the final stage of the experimental study, the data obtained from the NTFS disk image 
were analysed, that contributed towards meaningful conclusions of the forensic 
investigation. A collection of tools were adopted such as The Sleuth Kit (TSK) (Carrier 
2011), Autopsy Forensic by Brian Carrier (Carrier 2010) and NTFSINFO from Microsoft 
Sysinternals by Mark Russinovich (Russinovich 2006) to perform different aspects of the 
NTFS file system analysis. 
3.7  Forensic Investigation Steps 
Many aspects must be taken into consideration when conducting a computer forensic 
investigation (Venkatraman 2011). There are different approaches adopted by an 
investigator while examining a crime scene. From the literature, five steps are commonly 
adopted, such as, Policy and procedure development, Evidence assessment, Evidence 
acquisition, Evidence examination, and Documenting and reporting. In the proposed 
approach for the digital forensic investigation described in this chapter, the following 
nine steps as shown in Figure 3.5are suggested and were successfully adopted in the 
experimental study: 
Step 1: Policy and Procedure Development – In this step, suitable tools that are 
needed in the digital scene are determined as part of administrative considerations. All 
aspects of policy and procedure development are considered to determine the mission 
statement, skills and knowledge, funding, personal requirement, evidence handling and 
support from management. 
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Step 2: Hard Disk Acquisition – This step involves forensic duplication that could 
be achieved by obtaining NTFS image of the original disk using DD tool command. This 
step is for obtaining sector-by-sector mirror image of the disk and the output of the image 
file is created as Image.dd. 
Step 3: Check the Data Integrity – This step ensures the integrity of data acquired 
through reporting of a hash function. The MD5 tool is used to guarantee the integrity of 
the original media and the resulting image file. 
Step 4: Extract MFT in the Boot Sector – In this step, the MFT is extracted from 
the boot sector. The MFT is analyzed using WinHex hexeditor tool, and NTFSINO is 
used to check the number of sectors allocated to the NTFS file system. 
Step 5: Extract $Boot file and Backup boot sector – In this step, the $Boot file is 
extracted to investigate hidden data.    The hidden data is analyzed in the $Boot metadata 
file system using WinHex, TSK and Autopsy tools. 
Step 6: Compare Boot sector and Backup – A comparison of the original and 
backup boot sectors is performed in this step. Using the DD tool, another 2 boot sector 
images from the original Image are generated resulting in two image files named, 
backupbootsector.dd and bootsector.dd. These two files are then analysed using WinHex 
hex-editor tool, TSK and Autopsy tools. 
Step 7: Check the Data Integrity – In this step the integrity of data is verified again 
for test of congruence.  The hashing technique of MD5 tool is adopted to check the data 
integrity of the two created image files. 
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Step 8: Extract the ASCII and UNICODE – This step involves extracting the   
ASCII and UNICODE characters from the binary files available in the disk image.  The 
Strings command tool is used for this and keyword search for matching text or 
hexadecimal values are recorded on the disk. Through keyword search,  even files that 
contain  specific words that could be related to maliciousness are identified. 
Step 9: Physical Presentation – In this final step, all the findings from the forensic 
investigation are documented. It involves presenting the digital evidence through 
documentation and reporting procedures. 
3.8  Boot Sector Analysis of NTFS  
3.8.1  NTFS Disk Image 
As mentioned in the previous section, the first step to be adopted by a digital forensic 
investigator is to acquire a duplicate copy of the NTFS disk image before beginning the 
analysis.  This is to ensure that the data on the original devices have not been changed 
during the analysis. Therefore, it is required to isolate the original infected computer from 
the disk image in order to extract the evidence that could be found on the electronic 
storage devices.  By conducting investigations on the disk image, any hidden intrusions 
could be unearthed since the image captures the invisible information as well. The 
advantages of analysing disk images are that the investigators can: a) preserve the digital 
crime scene, b) obtain the information in slack space, c) access unallocated space, free 
space, and used space, d) recover file fragments, hidden or deleted files and directories, e) 
view the partition structure, and f) get date-stamp and ownership of files and folders. 
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Figure  3.5 Forensic Investigation Steps 
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3.8.2  Master File Table 
To investigate how intrusions take place through data hiding, data deletion and other 
obfuscations, it is essential to understand the physical characteristics of the Microsoft 
NTFS file system.   Master File Table (MFT) is the core of NTFS since it contains details 
of every file and folder on the volume and allocates two sectors for every MFT entry 
(Vacca 2005) . Hence, a good knowledge of the MFT layout structure also facilitates the 
disk recovery process. Each MFT entry has a fixed size which is 1 KB (at byte offset 64 
in the boot sector one could identify the MFT record size). MFT layout has been provided 
and represents the plan of the NTFS file system using Figure 3.4. The main purpose of 
NTFS is to facilitate reading and writing of the file attributes and the MFT enables a 
forensic analyst to examine in some detail the structure and working of the NTFS 
volume. Therefore, it is important to understand how the attributes are stored in the MFT 
entry. 
3.8.3  Boot Sector Analysis and Results 
The boot sector analysis was performed by investigating metadata files used to describe 
the file system. The steps described in previous section were followed by first creating a 
NTFS disk image of the test computer using the DD utility for investigating the boot 
sector. The NTFSINFO tool was run on the disk image. Table 3.3 shows the boot sector 
of the test device and information about the on-disk structure. Such data structure 
examination enables the forensic analyst to view the following: MFT information, 
allocation size, volume size and metadata files. Useful information such as the size of 
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clusters, sector numbers in the file system, starting cluster address of the MFT, the size of 
each MFT entry and the serial number given for the file system could be extracted.  
From the information gained above, the steps in Figure 3.6 are followed to analyze 
the boot sector image. As shown in Figure 3.6 and Table 3.4, an analysis of the data 
structure of this boot sector and the results of the investigation conducted using existing 
forensic tools is summarized in Table 3.4. From these results, the conclusion is that the 
existing forensic tools do not check possible infections that could take place in certain 
hidden data of the boot sector.  Hence, the hidden data analysis technique adopted in this 
research is described in the next section. 
 
Figure  3.6 Analysis of the Test Boot Sector 
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Table 3.3 NTFS Information Details 
NTFS Information Details 
 
Volume Size 
----------- 
Volume size           : 483 MB 
Total sectors          : 991199 
Total clusters         : 123899 
Free clusters          : 106696 
Free space             : 416 MB (86% of drive) 
 
Allocation Size 
---------------- 
Bytes per sector       : 512 
Bytes per cluster      : 4096 
Bytes per MFT record   : 1024 
Clusters per MFT record: 0 
 
MFT Information 
--------------- 
MFT size               : 0 MB (0% of drive) 
MFT start cluster      : 41300 
MFT zone clusters      : 41344 - 56800 
MFT zone size          : 60 MB (12% of drive) 
MFT mirror start       : 61949 
Meta-Data files 
 
 
  
124 
3.9  Hidden Data Analysis and Results  
The recent cybercrime trends are to use different obfuscated techniques such as 
disguising file names, hiding attributes and deleting files to intrude the computer system.  
Since the Windows operating system does not zero the slack space, it becomes a vehicle 
to hide data, especially in $Boot file.  Hence, in this study, the hidden data is analysed in 
the $Boot file structure.  The $Boot entry is stored in a metadata file at the first cluster in 
sector 0 of the file system, called $Boot, from where the system boots. It is the only 
metadata file that has a static location so that it cannot be relocated. Microsoft allocates 
the first 16 sectors of the file system to $Boot and only half of these sectors contains non-
zero values (Huebner et al. 2006).  
 In order to investigate the NTFS file system, one requires possessing substantial 
knowledge and experience to analyze the data structure and the hidden data. The $Boot 
metadata file structure is located in MFT entry 7 and contains the boot sector of the file 
system. It contains information about the size of the volume, clusters and the MFT. The 
$Boot metadata file structure has four attributes, namely, 
$STANDARD_INFORMATION, $FILE_NAME, $SECURITY_DESCRIPTION and 
$DATA. The $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute contains temporal information 
such as flags, owner, security ID and the last accessed, written, and created times. The 
$FILE_NAME attribute contains the file name in UNICODE, the size and temporal 
information as well. The $SECURITY_DESCRIPTION attribute contains information 
about the access control and security properties. Finally, the $DATA attribute contains 
the file contents. These attribute values for the test samples are shown in Table 3.4 as an 
  
125 
illustration.  To achieve the invetsigation of NTFS file system, the following TSK 
command tools were used:   
 Istat  –f  ntfs  c:\image.dd  7  
By investigating the resulting attribute values, it was observed that the $Boot data 
structure of the NTFS file system was used to hide data. By analysing the hidden data in 
the boot sector, one could provide useful information for digital forensics. The size of the 
data that could be hidden in the boot sector is limited by the number of non-zero that 
Microsoft allocated in the first 16 sectors of the file system. The data could be hidden in 
the $Boot metadata files without raising suspicion and without affecting the functionality 
of the system. 
Analysis of the $Boot data structure of the NTFS file system will identify any 
hidden data. The analyzer should start by making a comparison between the boot sector 
and the backup boot sector. The image with the boot sector and backup boot sector are 
supposed to be identical; otherwise there is some data hidden in the $Boot data structure. 
One method is to check the integrity of the backup boot sector and the boot sector by 
calculating the MD5 for both of them. A difference in checksum indicates that there is 
some hidden data. For the experimental investigation, this comparison was done using the 
following commands on the $Boot image file and the backup boot image: 
dd if=image.dd bs=512 count=1 skip=61949 
of=c:\backupbootsector.dd –MD5sum –verifymd5 –
MD5out=c:\hash1.md5 
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dd if=image.dd bs=512 count=1 of=c:\bootsector.dd –MD5sum –
verifymd5 –MD5out=c:\hash2.MD5 
Table 3.4  Results of $Boot Analysis 
$Boot Analysis 
 
MFT Entry Header Values: 
Entry: 7        Sequence: 7 
$LogFile Sequence Number: 0 
Allocated File 
Links: 1 
 
$STANDARD_INFORMATION Attribute Values: 
Flags: Hidden, System 
Owner ID: 0 
Created: Mon Feb 09 12:09:06 2009 
File Modified: Mon Feb 09 12:09:06 2009 
MFT Modified: Mon Feb 09 12:09:06 2009 
Accessed: Mon Feb 09 12:09:06 2009 
 
$FILE_NAME Attribute Values: 
Flags: Hidden, System 
Name: $Boot 
Parent MFT Entry: 5  Sequence: 5 
Allocated Size: 8192    Actual Size: 8192 
Created: Mon Feb 09 12:09:06 2009 
File Modified: Mon Feb 09 12:09:06 2009 
MFT Modified: Mon Feb 09 12:09:06 2009 
Accessed: Mon Feb 09 12:09:06 2009 
 
Attributes:  
Type: $STANDARD_INFORMATION (16-0)   Name: N/A   Resident   size: 48 
Type: $FILE_NAME (48-2)   Name: N/A   Resident   size: 76 
Type: $SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR (80-3)   Name: N/A   Resident   size: 116 
Type: $DATA (128-1)   Name: $Data   Non-Resident   size: 8192 
0 1 
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The main observations from the investigation conducted are that hidden data in the $Boot 
data structure could not be detected directly by the currently available popular existing 
forensic tools and laborious manual inspections are required to be performed alongside 
these tools. Hence, by analysing various existing utilities and tools, the following results 
have been arrived at: 
i. Since NTFS stores all events that take place on a computer system, there is a huge 
amount of data analysis required while scanning the entire NTFS disk image for 
forensic purposes.  In this empirical study that was focusing on the hidden data of the 
$Boot file alone, a variety of tools and utilities were required to be adopted along 
with laborious and knowledge-intensive manual inspections.   
ii. The existing forensic tools are not comprehensive and effective in identifying the 
recent computer threats. Not all computer infections are detected by forensic tools, 
especially intrusions that are in the form of hidden data in the $Boot file go 
unchecked.  
iii. It is essential to perform manual investigations alongside the existing tools. By 
adopting a manual introspection of the $Boot file using the three-stage approach of  
i)   hard disk acquisition, ii)  evidence searching and iii) analysis of the NTFS file 
system, it is possible to identify hidden data in the $Boot file. 
iv. Intelligent search techniques could be adopted to extract the ASCII and UNICODE 
characters from binary files in the disk image on either the full file system image or 
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just the unallocated space, which could speed-up the process of identifying hidden 
data. 
v. One of the main reasons for having varying tools is that Microsoft has different 
versions of the NTFS file system to be catered for. While Windows XP and 
Windows Server 2003 use the same NTFS version, Windows Vista uses the NTFS 
3.1. The new NTFS 3.1 on Windows 7 has changed the on-disk structure. For 
example, the location of the volume boot record is at physical sector 2,048. Most of 
the existing tools do not work with all the different versions of NTFS file system, 
and hence a comprehensive tool is warranted to cope with these changes.  
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Table 3.5 Analysis of the Test Boot Sector 
 
Byte 
Range 
Size Description Value Action / Result 
 0  --  2 3 
Jump to boot 
code               
9458411 
If bootable, jump. If non-
bootable, used to store error 
message 
 3 -- 10 8 OEM Name – System ID NTFS   
11 -- 12 2 Bytes per sector:     512   
13 -- 13 1 Sectors per cluster 8   
14 -- 15 2 Reserved sectors     0 Unused – Possible Infection 
16 -- 20 5 Unused 0 Unused  – Possible Infection 
21 -- 21 1 Media descriptor        0   
22 -- 23 2 Unused 0 Unused – Possible Infection 
24 -- 25 2 Sectors per track 63 No Check – Possible Infection 
26 -- 27 2 Number of heads 255 No Check – Possible Infection 
28 -- 31 4 Unused 32 No Check – Possible Infection 
32 -- 35 4 Unused 0 Unused – Possible Infection 
36 -- 39 4 Drive type check 80 00 00 00 For USB thumb drive 
40 -- 47 8 
Number of sectors in file 
system (volume) 
0.47264 GB   
48 -- 55 8 
Starting cluster address 
of $MFT     
4*8=32   
56 -- 63 8 
Starting cluster address 
of MFT Mirror  $DATA 
attribute 
619,49   
64 -- 64 1 
Size of record - MFT 
entry 
210=1024   
65 -- 67 3 Unused 0 Unused – Possible Infection 
68 -- 68 1 Size of index record 01h   
69 -- 71 3 Unused 0 Unused – Possible Infection 
72 -- 79 8 Serial number     C87C8h   
80 -- 83 4 Unused 0 Unused – Possible Infection 
84 -- 509 426 Boot code ~   
510 --511 2 Boot signature 0xAA55   
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Chapter 4 : Anomaly Detection Based on OP-Code  
              
“China and Russia have thousands of well-trained cyberterrorists 
and we are just sitting ducks”. 
 —Professor George Ledin, Sonoma State University 
4.1  Overview 
Malware that make use of obfuscation of the extended x86 IA-32 operation codes (OP codes) 
pose a great challenge for malware detectors, as they can easily evade current signature-
based, as well as heuristic-based, detection engines. In this chapter, a novel algorithm has 
been proposed that combines op-code frequency statistics and hybrid wrapper-filter based 
feature selection technique for constructing a classifier for malware detection. Existing op-
code statistical fingerprinting techniques found in the literature are not efficient for analysing 
large op-code features that are possible due to the numerous obfuscations taking place in 
reality. The novelty of approach presented in this chapter is that hybridized op-code statistics 
with a novel wrapper-filter based feature selection technique are used to optimise the process 
and have achieved the desired efficiency for large datasets. The main contribution of the 
wrapper-filter based feature selection technique used, is that it is capable of selecting the 
most important op-codes used in the detection of malware based on the observed patterns of 
their obfuscation behaviour. The proposed hybrid wrapper-filter approach uses Maximum 
Relevance-Minimum Redundancy and Artificial Neural Net Input Gain Measurement 
Approximation (ANNIGMA) and integrates the filter‘s ranking score with the wrapper-
heuristic‘s score to guide the search process in the wrapper stage, and takes advantage of both 
the approaches. Also investigated and compared is the malware detection accuracy using 
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Maximum Relevance (MR), filter ranking heuristics with ANNIGMA, and combined MR-
ANNIGMA approaches. Experimental results on large real world malware datasets show that 
our frequency-statistics based approach achieves high accuracy in all the three cases, with 
additional efficiency achieved through the MR-ANNIGMA wrapper-filter that arrives at a 
very compact minimum set of op-codes.  Such an approach results in an optimal set of op-
codes representative of the innumerable obfuscation patterns adopted by malware attackers 
would aid in real-time efficiency that is warranted in unknown malware detection. 
4.2  Malware Behaviours 
Malware affects the secrecy and integrity of data as well as the control flow and 
functionality of a computer system (Alperovitch 2011). Recent attacks using obfuscated 
malware (TreadwellZhou & Zhou 2009 ) have resulted in disruption of services leading 
towards huge financial and legal implications (Bilar 2007; Lawton 2002; McGraw & 
Morrisett 2000).  Researchers and anti-malware vendors are faced with the challenge of 
how to detect such zero day attacks (Chouchane & Lakhotia 2006), which is also a major 
concern for various computer user groups, including home, business and even 
government users.  
Literature surveys on malware detection have shown that there is no single 
technique that could detect all types of malware. However, there are two techniques 
commonly used for malware detection, signature-based detection and anomaly-based 
detection (Birrer et al. 2009; Dinaburg et al. 2008; Lawton 2002). Anti-Virus engines use 
malware signatures to detect known malware. The malware signature is a byte sequence 
that uniquely identifies a specific malware. Typically, a malware detector uses the 
  
132 
malware signature to identify the malware like a fingerprint. Most AV engines are 
supplied with a database containing information of existing malware to identify 
maliciousness, by looking for code signatures or byte sequences while scanning the 
system. A malware detector scans the system for characteristic byte sequences or 
signatures that match with the one in the database and declares the existence of malware 
blocking its access to the system. The signature matching process is called signature-
based detection and most traditional AV engines use this method. It is a very efficient and 
effective method to detect known malware (Venkatraman 2009). But, the major 
drawback is the inability to detect new or unknown malicious code. The signature 
generation involves manual processing and requires strict code analysis. To overcome 
signature based methods, polymorphic malware have an in-built polymorphic engine that 
can generate new variants each time it is executed and a new signature is generated. 
Therefore, signature based approaches fail to detect such malware. On the other hand, 
anomaly-based detection uses the knowledge of normal behaviour patterns to decide the 
maliciousness of a program code. This approach has the ability to detect some zero day 
attacks.  However, it is very difficult to accurately specify the system or program‘s 
behaviour and thus these approaches usually are resulting in more false positives than 
signature based methods. 
In this chapter, combines op-code frequency statistics and hybrid wrapper-filter 
based feature selection technique have been combined in order to construct malware 
detector. The novelty of the proposed approach is the use of op-code frequency statistics 
that does not require the signature of malware while detecting the malware in the AV 
engine. Our contribution also includes the following hitherto unreported in the literature. 
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1) Statistical differentiation of the op-code frequency is proposed by exploring 
the op-code relationship with regard to malware and benign programs. 
2) A fully automated heuristic method is proposed to disassemble the binary 
executables and compute op-code frequency statistics 
3) A novel hybrid wrapper-filter based feature selection technique is proposed 
to find the most important op-code for malware. This kind of approach has 
not been explored in the malware literature yet.  
4) A signature-free detection method is proposed to cope with polymorphic 
transformations and metamorphic obfuscations of malware. 
In the proposed approach, a hybrid heuristic of mutual information-based 
Maximum Relevance and Artificial Neural Net Input Gain Measurement Approximation 
(ANNIGMA) has been developed which is used along with a novel op-code frequency 
statistics. The significance of this approach is that it integrates the filter‘s ranking score 
with the wrapper-heuristic‘s score to guide the search process in the wrapper stage that 
can take the advantages of both approaches and find the most significant op-codes to 
detect malware. 
4.3  Assembly Language and Executable File Format 
The language of reversing compiled binary code is the assembly language (Eilam 2005). 
In this chapter, the focus is on the ‗x86‘ also called the (‗IA-32‘, 386,  or the i386-
architecture) which is Intel‘s 32-bit architecture and is the basis for all of Intel‘s x86 
CPU, since the first version of i386 to our day. The focus was on the Intel-32 assembly 
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language for these experiments, because it is almost exclusively used in every computer 
and is the most popular processor architecture. The IA-32 architecture and IA-64 are 
almost same in term of architecture and programming environment, the main difference 
is that IA-64 bit processors use the prefix/extension to the 80386 instruction set. 
However, there are popular instructions that most likely could exist in any program either 
in  IA-32 or IA-64 such as moving data, arithmetic or compare operators, conditional 
branches and function calls. Instead of focusing on the basic instructions ,our study 
considers all IA-32 instructions and have used the list of instructions from the Intel IA-32 
Architecture Software Developer's Manual, Volume 1(Intel 2010a), Volume 2A 
(Yanfang et al. 2010) and Volume 2B (Intel 2010b). 
The Win32 Portable Executable (PE) (Christodorescu & Jha 2003) file formats 
such as (.EXE and .DLL) introduced by Microsoft, which is the standard executable 
format for all versions of the Windows operating system on all supported processors. As 
shown in Figure 4.1 PE file has different sections and headers, Windows PE files start 
with the DOS header which is identified by ‗MZ‘. The second section is the PE Signature 
field, which when viewed as ASCII text is PE\0\0. Third is the 
IMAGE_FILE_HEADER containing the most basic information about the file. Fourth, is 
IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER that contains the structure of additional information 
provided by the PE creators, beyond the basic information found in the 
IMAGE_FILE_HEADER. Last is the section table that has code sections (.text), and 
data sections (.data). The .text section is the default section for code and the .data 
section stores writable global variables and also contains the file‘s Original Entry Point 
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(OEP) which refers to the execution entry point (where the file execution begins) of a 
portable executable file. Finally, the .rdata section contains read-only data. 
The experiment in this chapter have been tested on the PE format files; to 
compare operation code distributions within malicious and benign files. Automated the 
inspection of the op-code frequency statistics implemented, and have given a preliminary 
assessment of its frequency used for detection and differentiation different files of 
malicious and benign. IDA Pro Dissasember (IDA Pro 2010) has been selected to view 
and analyse the PE files.  
 
Figure  4.1 The Executable File Format 
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4.4  Descriptive Analysis of Data 
In our dataset for malware and benign files, the aggregate malware dataset yielded 
roughly about 48,629,512 op-codes and the aggregate benign dataset yielded roughly 
about 405,942 op-codes. The experiment was run on a total of 590 different op-codes 
collected from Intel, but for the analysis part the op-codes that have been found in our 
sample binaries was only just considered which are in total of 80 op-codes.  Analysis 
show that the top 13 listings for both malware and benign are identical (ADD/ CALL/ 
CMP/ JMP/ JNZ/ JZ/ LEA/ MOV/ POP/ PUSH/ RETN/ TEST/ XOR). 
Many of the new op-codes were not used at all in all our samples such as:   Move Data 
from String to String (MOVS/ MOVSB/ MOVSW/ MOVSD/ MOVSQ), Compare String 
Operand (CMPS/ CMPSB/ CMPSW/ CMPSD/ CMPSQ), Load Machine Status Word 
(LMSW), Load String (LODS/ LODSB/ LODSW/ LODSD/ LODSQ) , Repeat String 
Operation Prefix (REP/ REPE/ REPZ/ REPNE/ REPNZ) , Scan String  (SCAS/ 
SCASB/ SCASW/ SCASD). Figure 4.2 shows the top 13 listings for both malware and 
benign and theirs frequent op-codes, the Figure shows that percentage of using the op-
codes in malware and clean binaries are almost similar Figures.  
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Figure  4.2  The Most Frequent 13 OP-Codes for Both Malware and Benign 
4.5  Proposed OP-Code Detection Methodology 
In this chapter a methodology based on op-code analysis is proposed that does not require 
any previous knowledge of the binary signatures.  The new proposed method for finding 
the fingerprint of executable programs and for detection and differentiation of different 
files those are malicious and benign. These experiments consider the op-codes based on 
the extended x86 IA-32 binary assembly instructions. As features approach is to first 
disassemble the binary executable for OP-Code Frequency statistics (section 4.5.1 and 
Section 4.5.2) and then to adopt (section 4.6) op-code feature selection algorithms using 
Maximum Relevance Filter Heuristic and ANNIGMA Wrapper Heuristics (MR-
ANNIGMA) for malware detection.  By adopting such a methodology obfuscated code 
such as packing, polymorphism and metamorphism. The proposed signature-free 
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approach is divided into two main steps which are described in the following sub-
sections. 
4.5.1  Disassemble Executable for Op-Code Frequency Statistics 
In the first step, a fully automated method is developed for extracting op-code frequency 
statistics from malicious and benign binaries executables.  Figure 4.3 shows the system 
architecture of such an automated process.  All samples collected were pre-processed for 
anomaly testing. In order to translate a program into an equivalent high-level-language 
program based on the binary content, the most reliable disassembly tool used for static 
analysis, namely,  Interactive Disassembler Pro (IDA Pro 2010) has been chosen which 
can disassemble all types of non-executable and executable files (such as ELF, EXE, PE, 
etc.). Also, IDA Pro was selected as a component of the automation process of this 
research work because it automatically recognizes instruction names of the op-codes for 
various compilers and can be further extended with our Python programs and compiled 
plugins, resulting in incredibly powerful implementation with flexible levels of analysis 
and control. IDA Pro loads a file into memory to analyse the relevant program portion, 
creating an IDA database whose components are stored in four files: .id0 that contains the 
content of a B-tree-style database, .id1 that contains flags describing each program byte, 
.nam that contains index information related to program locations, and .til that is used to 
store information concerning local type definitions to a given database. IDA Pro 
generates the IDA database files into a single IDB file (.idb) by disassembling and 
analysing the binary of the file.  
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Figure  4.3 Flow Diagrams for OP-Code Frequency Statistics. 
IDAPython (IDAPython 2011) has been used, which is an IDA Pro plugin that 
integrates the Python programming language, allowing scripts to run in IDA Pro to 
automate the process, also the C library SQLite (Naiqi et al. 2008) has been used, that 
implements a self-contained SQL database engine with our python program to enable us 
to convert the binary executable to a database. Therefore, we developed IDA Pro in 
SQLite name ‗IDA2SQLite‘ plug-in to store the initial analysis results with the extension 
(.db). Our developed plugin generates eight tables of information, each table contains 
information about the executable namely Blocks, Functions, Instructions, Names, Maps, 
Stacks, Segments, and TargetBinaries. Each of these tables contains different information 
about the binary content. For the analysis of the features, we have run the SQL 
commands through our Python program to compute the machine op-codes frequency 
statistics.  
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4.5.2  Selection of Most Significant OP-Codes  
In this step, the frequency statistics of op-codes are used with the wrapper-filter feature 
selection to construct a signature-free malware detection approach. Significant research 
works have appeared in the literature on feature selection (Balagani & Phoha 2010; Blum 
& Langley 1997; Hu et al. 2008; John et al. 1994; Wolf & Shashua 2005). These can be 
grouped broadly into three main categories based on the evaluation criteria: 1) the filter 
model (section 4.6), 2) the wrapper model (Section 4.7), and 3) hybrid models (section 
4.9). The filter models are based on the intrinsic characteristics of the data and do not 
involve the application of an induction algorithm. Diverse filter models have been 
advanced often involving relevance measures or distance measures as their evaluation 
criteria (Wang, H. et al. 1999). A popular filter approach is Maximum Relevance based 
on mutual information, which is described in the next section. 
4.6  Maximum Relevance Filter Heuristic 
Relevant features provide more information about the class variable than irrelevant 
features. Mutual information based maximum relevance has been proposed as a good 
heuristic to select salient features within the data mining area (Wang, H. et al. 1999). If S 
is a set of features and class variable is c, the maximum relevance can be defined as: 
                  (   )   
 
   
 ∑   (    )
    
               (   ) 
  (    ) is the mutual information between    and  class c which is defined as: 
  (    )    (  )   (      )                                                   (   ) 
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  (  ) is the entropy of    with the probability density function   (  ) where    takes 
discrete values from the set   *        + then   (  )  is defined as: 
  (  )    ∑   (  )       (  ) 
     
                                         (   ) 
 (      ) in equation (4.2) is the conditional entropy between    and c and is defined as: 
 (      )     ∑ ∑  (     )       (      )
          
                  (   ) 
Where class variable c takes the discrete values from the set   *        +.  
In general, filter models are computationally cheap due to their evaluation criteria. 
However, feature subsets selected by filter may result in poor prediction accuracies, since 
they are independent from the induction algorithm. 
  In contrast, wrapper models use a predetermined induction algorithm and use 
predictive accuracy as the evaluation criteria for the feature selection. Wrapper models 
face huge computational overhead due to the use of the induction algorithm‘s 
performance criteria as their evaluation criteria. In (Hung-Ju et al. 2002), (Zhu et al. 
2007), (Elaiwat et al. 2010a) and (Elaiwat et al. 2010b) a hybrid of genetic algorithm and 
filter heuristic was proposed, where GA framework forms the subset generation process, 
while the filter heuristic improves local search. GA-based approaches face huge 
computational overheads due to the evaluation of the induction algorithm embedded in 
the GA fitness function. Some wrapper approaches (Hung-Ju et al. 2002) use heuristics 
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generated from wrapper knowledge over wrapper iteration. A popular wrapper heuristics 
is Artificial Neural Network Input Gain Measurement Approximation (ANNIGMA). 
4.7  ANNIGMA wrapper-heuristic 
Artificial Neural Network Input Gain Measurement Approximation (ANNIGMA) is a 
weight analysis based wrapper heuristic that ranks features by relevance based on the 
weight associated with feature in a Neural Network based wrapper approach  (Hung-Ju et 
al. 2002). Features that are irrelevant or redundant will produce more error than relevant 
features. Therefore, during training, weights of noisy features are controlled in such a 
way that they contribute to the output as little as possible. ANNIGMA is based on the 
above strategy of the training algorithm. As shown in Figure 4.4, for a two layer Neural 
Network, if  i, j, k are the input, hidden and output layers and Q is a logistic activation 
function (4.1) of the first layer and second layer has a linear function, then the output of 
the network     is as (4.2). Here    are the input feature and W are the weights between 
network layers. 
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Then local gain is defined as: 
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Then ANNIGMA score is the local gain normalized on a unity scale as equation (4.8) 
(Hung-Ju et al. 2002): 
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Figure  4.4  A Single Hidden Layer Multi-Layer Perceptron Neural Network in Wrapper 
Approach 
 
4.8  OP-Code Selection 
The proposed op-code-selection and malware detection algorithm in this chapter is a 
hybrid of the Wrapper-Filter approach using Maximum Relevance-based Filter Heuristic 
and the Artificial Neural Network Input Gain Measurement Approximation (ANNIGMA) 
Wrapper Heuristics. Standard filter approaches can extract knowledge of the intrinsic 
characteristics from real data. However, filter approaches do not use any performance 
criteria based on predictive accuracies. This does not guarantee that selected feature 
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subset will be able to do better in the classification tasks. In contrast, the wrapper 
approach uses a predetermined induction algorithm and different search strategies to find 
the best feature subset. Use of predictive-accuracy based evaluation criteria in the 
wrapper ensures good performance from the selected feature subset. However, repeated 
execution of the induction algorithm (in the worst case exponential search space) in the 
search process incurs a high computational cost in the wrapper approach. Earlier research 
shows that a hybrid of wrapper-filter heuristic significantly improves the performances 
while applying in data mining applications (Huda et al. 2010). 
In this chapter, a hybrid approach is proposed that introduces the filter heuristic in 
the wrapper stage and take advantage of both approaches which is able to find more 
significant op-codes than either wrapper or filter alone to find the Malware. The idea 
behind this approach can be explained by the Venn-diagram as shown in Figure 4.5. If 
the two feature subsets ACBF and ADBE are separately ordered/ ranked according to 
their score, then common higher ranked feature subset (ACBD) is the strongly 
recommended most significant feature subset by both feature selection algorithms. If the 
scores of both algorithms are normalized on the same scale and combined, then feature 
subsets with higher combined scores provide the common higher ranked feature subset 
from both algorithms. A Backward Elimination (BE) search strategies based on the 
combined score along with the wrapper evaluation criteria can find the most significant 
features. Performance of the combined score may be affected due to the performance of 
the incorporated filter for a particular wrapper approach in the hybrid. However, different 
filter approaches can be combined to find a suitable hybrid for a particular wrapper 
heuristic and vice-versa. In this chapter, we have combined mutual information based 
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Filter-Maximum Relevance (MR) with Artificial Neural Network Input Gain 
Measurement Approximation (ANNIGMA) based wrapper. Here, we have focused on a 
Neural network based wrapper and different filter heuristics. We will use other wrapper 
approaches in a future work. The following sub-sections describe the proposed hybrid 
algorithm. 
The proposed hybrid approach avoid the computational overhead of hybrid GA-
based approaches takes advantage of both filter and wrapper heuristics which are absent 
in the traditional GA-based hybrid approaches (Hung-Ju et al. 2002; Kohavi & John 
1997). This type of hybrid approach is a new concept and has not been explored yet in the 
malware detection literature. The different sub-components in the hybrid approach have 
been shown in Figure 4.6 and main steps are described in the follow sections. 
 
Figure  4.5 Venn Diagram for Hybrid Algorithm 
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Figure  4.6  Framework for Hybrid of Wrapper and Filter Feature Selection 
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Algorithm 1: Procedure Hybrid Wrapper-Filter approach for Malware detection 
 
Input: // Training data with m features 
Output:  //an optimal subset of features 
Begin 
1. Let S=whole set of m features  
2. =Initial set of feature which records all generated subsets with  accuracy  
// Apply a Backward Elimination (BE) search strategy 
3. for N = 1 to m-1 
4. Current set of feature =S 
5. Compute Filter score by (11) 
6. for fold=1 to n 
7.       Train the network with  
8.       Compute ANNGMA of all  features  
9.       Compute Accuracy 
10. endfor  
11. Compute average accuracy of all folds for  
12. Compute average ANNIGMA of   by (11) 
13. Compute combined score for every feature in    
       by (11-13) for both hybrids 
14. Rank the features in  using the combined score  
       in descending order 
15.   
16. Update the current feature set     
      by removing the feature with lowest score 
17. endfor 
18.  = Find the subset from  with the highest accuracy. 
19.  return  
End 
 
4.9  Hybrid Models 
The computation of combined score Hybrid of Maximum Relevance and ANNIGMA 
based signature-free for malware detection technique uses Artificial Neural Network as 
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the induction algorithm in the wrapper. An n-fold cross-validation approach has been 
used in MR-ANNIGMA to train the wrapper. In each fold we compute the ANNIGMA 
score for every feature. Then after training of all folds, the ANNIGMA score is averaged 
as (4.9): 
        (  )     ( 
 
 
 ) ∑         (  ) 
 
 < 
   (   ) 
While computing the combined score in the proposed ANNIGMA, the relevance 
of a feature in the current subset is computed from the individual score which is scaled to 
the maximum individual relevance of the subset.  The, relevance of a feature in a subset 
within the hybrid approach is defined as given in equation (4.10) 
          (  )   
 (    )
    (     )   (    )
                                     (    )  
The combined score of the filter‘s heuristic and the wrapper‘s heuristic in the 
proposed MR-ANNIGMA is computed as in equation (4.11) 
               (          )
    
 (    )
    (     )   (    )
         (  )                                     (    ) 
The detail of algorithm of this hybrid approach is described in Algorithm 1. 
4.9.1  Search Strategies 
MR-ANNIGMA uses a Backward Elimination (BE) search strategy to generate a subset 
of op-codes. Initially, it starts with the full op-code set. Subset generation in BE is guided 
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by the wrapper-filter hybrid heuristic score. The combined score computation follows the 
steps of sub-sections. When the number of op-codes in BE process is significantly 
reduced compared to the total op-codes, the filter score component is weighted less than 
the wrapper score as given in equation (4.12) 
               (          )
      
 (    )
    (     )  (    )
            (  )                       (    ) 
Where 0,1  vu  
4.9.2  Wrapper Step in MR-ANNIGMA 
MR-ANNIGMA uses a single hidden layer Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) Network 
(Figure 4.4) in the wrapper stage. An n-fold cross validation approach has been applied in 
the training of the network. The evaluation criterion of op-code subset is based on the 
average prediction accuracy over n-fold of the wrapper (MLP network). In Algorithm 1, 
steps 1 to 5 compute the filter score of the current feature subset. Step 6 to 11 compute 
the average accuracy over n-folds and compute the wrapper score for the current subset 
of op-codes. Step 12 to step 14 computes the hybrid scores and the op-codes are ranked 
based on their combined score. Step-15 to step-16 would then generate a new subset 
based on the op-code ranking and would keep a record of evaluated op-code subsets with 
their accuracy. The BE processes in MR-ANNIGMA would update the MR and 
ANNIGMA and the combined score in every iteration. The combined score then guides 
the subset generation. The BE continues until a single op-code remains in the current 
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subset. The subset with the highest accuracies or close to the highest accuracies with 
fewer op-code set is then chosen as the final op-code subset for the detector. 
4.10  Discussion on Experimental Results 
The proposed MR-ANNIGMA based signature-free approach has been tested on a large 
set of real and recent malware samples for detecting more unknown malware. We have 
two types of datasets, namely malware, and executable benign files or ‗good wares‘. For 
the malware dataset, we have collected the infected files from honeypots, honeynet 
project and other sources, and for benign datasets, we have considered different good 
files such as, application software  (Educational software, Mathematical software, Image 
editing, Spreadsheet, Word processing, Decision making software, Internet Browser, 
Email and system software and Programming languages software, and many others). 
1,474 executable files have been used in which 450 are benign files and 1,024 malware 
samples that have been uniquely named according to their MD5 value. Overall, the op-
code set consists of 97 op-codes, and the list was gathered from Intel, based on the 
extended x86 IA-32 binary assembly instructions. A single hidden layer neural network 
with 22 hidden nodes and (tansig-- hidden layer function and purelin—output layer 
function) is used as Figure 4.5. 
Experimental results have been described in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 provide the score for 
filter approach MR, wrapper approach ANNIGMA, and combination of filter approach 
MR and wrapper approaches ANNIGMA (MR- ANNIGMA). The backward elimination 
(BE) process starts with all 97 op-codes and accuracies of different iterations of the BE 
process for all three algorithms have been given in Table 4.2. With all 97 op-codes, 
ANNIGMA achieves accuracies of 96.029 %, MR achieves accuracies of 96.002% and 
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MR-ANNIGMA achieves 95.820%. The op-codes are sorted according to their score. In 
the same Table 4.1 hybrid score of MR-ANNIGMA has been provided. In the second 
iteration, the op-code with lowest score is discarded and then the subset is evaluated. 
The BE process continues, while total op-codes 28, in Figure 4.7, the hybrid re-
computes all op-code scores resulting in op-code 6 attaining the lowest for ANNIGMA, 
op-code 19 attaining the lowest for MR and op-code 74 attaining the lowest for combined 
score. Therefore in this iteration, op-code 74 is eliminated and MR-ANNIGMA achieves 
an accuracy of 97.203%. In the next cycle, MR-ANNIGMA eliminates op-code-58 due to 
its lowest combined score in Figure 4.7 and accuracy of hybrid increases to 97.434%. In 
Figure 4.9 when total op-code is 17, MR-ANNIGMA eliminates op-code 22 and in 
Figure 4.10 op-codes 90 is eliminated at total-16 op-codes (due their lowest combined 
score) where MR-ANNIGMA achieves accuracy of 97.434%. In the next cycle, BE 
process eliminates op-code-97 for lowest combined score in Figure 4.11 at total-15 op-
codes. The BE process continues and ANNIGMA achieves (96.877%) accuracies with 25 
op-code set and accuracies of ANNIGMA drops to 68% with one op-code for 
ANNIGMA. MR achieves 97.475% accuracies with 27 op-codes as shown in Figure 4.8 
and 97.405% with 26 op-codes. MR-ANNIGMA achieves an accuracy of 97.573% at 
total op-code 24 and an accuracy of 97.597% at total op-code 23. Accuracies for MR-
ANNIGMA decreases to 93.944% for one op-code. MR-ANNIGMA achieves (97.529%) 
accuracies as given in Table 4.2 with smallest set op-codes (15 only) which is the closest 
to the accuracy level at the op-code set 23 with highest accuracy 97.597%. Therefore, op-
code set 15 has been considered as the final and most significant op-code set for MR-
ANNIGMA. The accuracy results in the BE process  as shows in the same table (Table 
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4.2) that hybrid approach proposed is achieves the highest accuracies with smallest op-
codes sets for detection of Malware.   
The final op-codes sets from all three algorithms (ANNIGMA, MR and MR-
ANNIGMA) have been used in a 10-fold cross validation set. The class discriminative 
performance of the most significant op-code sets form all three algorithms has been 
tested by varying the NN‘s threshold values of the output node in the cross-validation. 
Then average sensitivity and specificity over 10-fold have been used to produce a 
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve for each algorithm which have been 
presented in Figure 4.12. The ROC curve of MR-ANNIGMA achieves the highest 
sensitivity with the highest specificity in all three algorithms. This demonstrates the 
efficacy of the proposed hybrid algorithm MR-ANNIGMA in Malware detection.  
Our experimental results show that the proposed wrapper-filter based approach 
finds a small op-code set for malware detection while maintaining very high accuracy 
and sensitivity levels with high specificity. The proposed approach does not need any 
signature to detect malware. However, further investigation could be made using other 
wrapper approach. One of the limitations of the proposed approach is that it is supervised 
and needs to re-train, which may be difficult for end user. However, this limitation could 
be avoided by using a rule generation step along with the result of the proposed approach. 
In such a case, the users are required to update only the rules. This would be explored in 
future research along with more investigations with regard to feature selection using other 
wrapper approaches.  
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Figure  4.7 Score of OP-Codes When Total Attributes=28  
 
 
Figure  4.8 Score of OP-Codes When Total Attributes=27 
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Table  4.1 Heuristics Score for MR, ANNIGMA and MR-ANNIGMA 
 
OP-
Code 
ANNIGMA MR 
MR-
ANNIGMA 
OP-
Code 
ANNIGMA MR 
MR-
ANNIGMA 
OP-
Code 
ANNIGMA MR 
MR-
ANNIGMA 
AAA 0.093 0.011 0.104 JA 0.010 0.691 0.701 RCL 0.030 0.521 0.551 
AAD 0.288 0.010 0.298 JB 0.009 0.814 0.823 RCR 0.011 0.091 0.102 
AAM 0.024 0.021 0.045 JBE 0.014 0.703 0.717 REPXX 0.003 0.000 0.003 
AAS 0.076 0.015 0.092 JMP 0.024 0.954 0.977 RET 0.003 0.000 0.003 
ADC 0.011 0.474 0.485 JNB 0.017 0.733 0.750 RETF 0.108 0.185 0.293 
ADD 0.011 0.854 0.865 JNZ 0.049 0.962 1.011 RETN 0.043 0.943 0.986 
AND 0.008 0.696 0.704 JXX 0.002 0.000 0.002 ROL 0.046 0.429 0.475 
ARPL 0.175 0.007 0.182 JZ 0.009 0.982 0.992 ROR 0.080 0.526 0.606 
CALL 0.155 0.987 1.142 LAR 0.051 0.003 0.054 SAHF 0.045 0.260 0.305 
CBW 0.328 0.018 0.346 LDC 0.002 0.000 0.002 SAL 0.045 0.007 0.052 
CLC 0.028 0.025 0.053 LEA 0.093 0.962 1.056 SAR 0.009 0.492 0.501 
CLD 0.013 0.445 0.458 LGDT 0.013 0.001 0.014 SBB 0.009 0.254 0.264 
CLI 0.101 0.026 0.128 LIDT 0.004 0.001 0.005 SCASB 0.003 0.000 0.003 
CLTS 0.005 0.000 0.005 LMSW 0.002 0.000 0.002 SCASW 0.002 0.000 0.002 
CMC 0.041 0.117 0.158 LODSB 0.003 0.000 0.003 SGDT 0.003 0.000 0.003 
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CMP 0.021 0.978 0.999 LODSW 0.002 0.000 0.002 SHL 0.098 0.467 0.565 
CMPSB 0.003 0.000 0.003 LOOP 0.026 0.227 0.253 SHR 0.053 0.624 0.677 
CMPSW 0.003 0.000 0.003 LOOPX 0.002 0.000 0.002 SIDT 0.016 0.002 0.017 
CWD 0.279 0.018 0.297 LSL 0.075 0.004 0.079 STC 0.016 0.040 0.057 
DAA 0.113 0.015 0.128 LTR 0.007 0.000 0.007 STD 0.008 0.410 0.418 
DAC 0.105 0.008 0.113 MOV 0.010 1.000 1.010 STI 0.029 0.025 0.054 
DEC 0.017 0.837 0.854 MOVSB 0.003 0.000 0.003 STOSB 0.003 0.000 0.003 
DIV 0.015 0.553 0.568 MOVSW 0.002 0.000 0.002 STR 0.009 0.000 0.010 
ESC 0.003 0.000 0.003 MUL 0.015 0.110 0.124 SUB 0.020 0.775 0.794 
FLDCW 0.029 0.302 0.331 NEG 0.019 0.585 0.604 TEST 0.012 0.927 0.939 
HLT 0.788 0.005 0.793 NOP 0.066 0.111 0.177 VERR 0.012 0.002 0.014 
IDIV 0.080 0.526 0.606 NOT 0.006 0.308 0.314 VERW 0.003 0.000 0.003 
IMUL 0.027 0.364 0.391 OR 0.016 0.681 0.697 WAIT 0.098 0.295 0.393 
IN 0.170 0.021 0.190 OUT 0.269 0.020 0.289 XCHG 0.007 0.375 0.382 
INC 0.028 0.887 0.914 POP 0.016 0.989 1.005 XLAT 0.076 0.017 0.093 
INT 0.038 0.042 0.080 POPF 0.020 0.030 0.050 XOR 0.026 0.824 0.850 
INTO 0.284 0.006 0.290 PUSH 0.023 0.999 1.022 
    
IRET 0.087 0.015 0.101 PUSHF 0.031 0.037 0.068 
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Table  4.2 Accuracies at Different Iteration for MR, ANNIGMA and Proposed Hybrid Approach MR- ANNIGMA 
 
 
OP-
Code 
ANNIGMA MR 
MR-
ANNIGMA 
OP-
Code 
ANNIGMA MR 
MR-
ANNIGMA 
OP-
Code 
ANNIGMA MR 
MR-
ANNIGMA 
AAA 68.83 94.71 93.94 JA 96.35 97.20 97.31 RCL 96.33 96.38 96.71 
AAD 68.42 94.85 94.28 JB 96.00 96.88 97.05 RCR 96.10 96.55 96.70 
AAM 95.30 95.53 94.90 JBE 96.42 96.84 97.11 REPXX 96.52 96.43 96.77 
AAS 95.34 95.34 95.25 JMP 96.50 97.39 97.26 RET 96.40 96.38 96.97 
ADC 95.47 96.51 95.25 JNB 96.42 97.16 96.89 RETF 96.19 95.93 96.20 
ADD 95.41 96.58 95.71 JNZ 96.29 97.07 97.03 RETN 96.32 96.38 96.19 
AND 95.33 96.50 95.57 JXX 96.13 96.92 96.81 ROL 96.46 96.46 96.27 
ARPL 95.28 96.63 95.71 JZ 96.31 96.77 96.82 ROR 96.38 96.74 96.40 
CALL 95.29 96.80 96.33 LAR 96.04 96.51 96.71 SAHF 96.67 96.00 96.28 
CBW 95.18 96.55 96.39 LDC 96.04 96.99 96.92 SAL 96.66 96.43 96.21 
CLC 95.28 96.84 96.35 LEA 95.90 97.18 97.01 SAR 96.67 96.73 96.59 
CLD 95.42 96.73 96.32 LGDT 96.28 96.65 96.69 SBB 96.35 96.13 96.04 
CLI 95.40 96.39 96.92 LIDT 96.42 97.12 96.66 SCASB 96.13 96.25 96.29 
CLTS 95.11 96.70 97.30 LMSW 96.38 96.52 96.92 SCASW 96.17 95.85 96.42 
CMC 96.00 96.70 97.53 LODSB 96.25 96.88 96.97 SGDT 96.61 96.35 96.48 
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CMP 96.12 96.76 97.43 LODSW 96.36 96.76 96.61 SHL 96.48 96.14 96.61 
CMPSB 96.28 96.92 97.07 LOOP 96.61 96.77 96.77 SHR 96.47 96.54 96.52 
CMPSW 96.25 96.96 96.89 LOOPX 96.42 96.84 96.55 SIDT 96.59 96.42 96.47 
CWD 96.43 96.31 97.37 LSL 96.85 96.78 96.63 STC 96.14 96.33 96.27 
DAA 96.50 96.97 97.23 LTR 96.61 96.28 96.77 STD 96.43 96.16 96.48 
DAC 96.55 96.70 97.07 MOV 96.52 96.55 96.25 STI 96.13 95.89 96.54 
DEC 96.05 96.09 97.41 MOVSB 96.78 96.32 97.08 STOSB 96.35 96.10 96.16 
DIV 96.77 97.00 97.60 MOVSW 96.39 96.51 96.73 STR 96.54 96.39 96.21 
ESC 96.78 97.14 97.58 MUL 96.54 96.36 96.99 SUB 96.40 96.19 96.40 
FLDCW 96.88 97.37 97.31 NEG 96.48 96.88 96.38 TEST 96.16 96.42 96.50 
HLT 96.80 97.41 97.54 NOP 96.62 96.61 96.93 VERR 96.57 96.48 96.33 
IDIV 96.12 97.48 97.43 NOT 96.71 96.52 96.61 VERW 96.09 96.36 95.89 
IMUL 96.33 97.27 97.20 OR 96.36 96.85 96.86 WAIT 96.25 96.50 96.69 
IN 96.80 97.61 97.16 OUT 96.47 96.65 96.17 XCHG 96.15 96.08 96.32 
INC 96.14 97.31 97.22 POP 96.33 96.82 96.58 XLAT 95.86 96.05 95.99 
INT 96.59 97.41 97.38 POPF 96.31 96.66 96.89 XOR 96.03 96.00 95.82 
INTO 96.63 97.19 97.27 PUSH 96.54 96.66 96.51 
    
IRET 96.51 97.48 97.61 PUSHF 96.48 96.78 96.65 
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Figure  4.9 Score of OP-Codes When Total Attributes=17 
 
Figure  4.10 Score of OP-Codes When Total Attributes=16 
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Figure  4.11 Score of OP-Codes When Total Attributes=15 
 
Figure  4.12 Receiver Operating Characteristics Analysis 
Total Op-codes in the set=15 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
97 37 30 63 39 82 72 65 91 16 41 19 44 9 54
Op-codes serial number
S
c
o
re
ANNIGMA MR MR-ANNIGMA
ROC Analysis
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1.0- Specificity(False positive rate)
Se
ns
iv
ity
MR ANNIGMA MR-ANNIGMA
  
160 
Chapter 5 : Malware Behaviour by the Extraction of API 
Calls  
              
Sherlock Holmes: “It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. 
Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit 
facts.”  
                                —Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, “A Scandal in Bohemia,‖ 
        The Strand Magazine (1891) 
5.1  Overview 
As shown earlier, a recent technique adopted by malware authors is to use packers or 
software tools that instigate code obfuscation in order to evade detection by antivirus 
scanners. It is a common practice to undergo manual unpacking or static unpacking using 
existing software tools, and to use human expertise in analysing the Application 
Programming Interface (API) calls for malware detection. However extracting these 
features from the unpacked executables for reverse obfuscation is time consuming, labour 
intensive, and requires deep understanding of kernel and low-level programming such as 
assembly programming. This chapter presents an automated method of extracting API 
call features and analysing them in order to understand their use for malicious purpose.  
While some research has been conducted in arriving at file birthmarks using API call 
features and the like, there is a scarcity of work that analyses deeply with respect to the 
use of such features in malcodes.  To address this gap, automatic methods to classify 
malware based on the behaviour the API function calls are proposed in this chapter. The 
  
161 
proposed approaches also provide scope for deeper understanding of code obfuscation 
and to reverse engineer malware automatically. 
This chapter proposes a five-step methodology for developing a fully automated 
system to arrive at six main categories of suspicious behaviour of API call features. Also, 
the methodology is devised to detect obfuscated malware by investigating the structural 
and behavioural features of API calls.  In particular, n-gram statistical analysis of API 
calls is applied and experimental results with a dataset of 21942 malware and 15275 
benign files have shown a promising accuracy of 96.5% for the unigram model.  A 
preliminary analysis using support vector machine (SVM) with n-values varied from 1 to 
5 is also provided. Various analysis of the methods used have considered performance 
measurements such as accuracy, false positives and false negatives.  Overall, the main 
objective of this chapter is to apply SVM, train the classifier and derive an optimum n-
gram model for detecting both known and unknown malware efficiently. 
The chapter is organized as follows: next section explains the API calls. Sections 
5.3 and 5.4, describe the background of this research, which is based on a thorough 
foundation on API calls and PE file formats. Section 5.5 provides the motivation of this 
research and the current limitations of AVs. The Section 5.6 highlights the main 
contributions of the study. Section 5.7 provides the methodology adopted and the system 
architecture of the fully-automated system implemented for this research study. Then in 
Section 5.9, the experimental results are discussed. Finally, the limitations and future 
work of this ongoing research are provided in Section 5.10. 
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5.2  Windows API Functions  
Application Program Interface (API) enables the programs to exploit the power of 
Windows and malware authors also make use of API calls to perform malicious actions 
(Sharif et al. 2008). Windows API function calls fall under various functional levels such 
as system services, user interfaces, network resources, windows shell and libraries. Since 
the API calls reflect the functional levels of a program, analysis of the API calls would 
lead to an understanding of the behaviour of the file. Malicious code is able to disguise its 
behaviour by using API functions provided under Win32 environment to implement their 
tasks. Therefore, in binary static analysis, the focus is on identifying all the documented 
Windows API call features to understand the malware behaviour.  
Simply, the API entitles application programs to communicate with the operating 
system and malware authors make use of these API functions to exploit vulnerability in 
the system. The Windows API, or ‗WinAPI‘ is Microsoft's core set of application 
programming interfaces available in the Microsoft Windows OS and the core Win API 
contains approximately 2500 APIs. 
In the Windows operating system, user applications rely on the interface provided 
within a set of libraries, such as KERNEL32.DLL, NTDLL.DLL and USER32.DLL in 
order to access system resources including files, processes, network information and the 
registry. This interface is known as the Win32 API. Applications may also call functions 
in NTDLL.DLL known as the Native API. The Native API functions perform system 
calls in order to have the kernel provide the requested service. The approach described in 
this chapter extracts and analyses these API call features including hooking of the system 
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services that are responsible to manage files. The extracted calls are confined to those that 
affect the files. Various features related to the calls that create or modify files or even get 
information from the file to change some value and information about the DLLs loaded 
by the malware before the actual execution are considered for the analysis. Then 
statistical testing on the extracted features is performed to determine the malware class 
based on suspicious behaviours. 
APIs are divided into 3 categories: kernel, user, and GDI. Figure 5.1 shows the 
relationship between the DLLs. Windows has a number of main sub-system DLLs such 
as USER32.DLL, GDI32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, NTDLL.DLL and KERNEL32.DLL 
For the purpose of this research, the focus is on NTDLL.DLL since it serves as the 
fundamental user-mode interface of the windows Native APIs. NTDLL.DLL contains the 
Native APIs, while KERNEL32.DLL, USER32.DLL, GDI32.DLL consist of the main 
Win32 Core Subsystem APIs. Native API is the set of functions exported from both 
NTDLL.DLL and ntoskrnl.exe. The actual implementations of the Native API calls reside 
in ntoskrnl.exe, which means that Native API is the most direct interface into the 
windows kernel.   
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 Figure  5.1  The WinAPI Interface DLLs and their Relation  
The information of character strings in Portable Executable, such as file header, 
the number of DLL, the number of API calls and so on, could be distilled, and normal 
programs and virus programs are classified by naive Bayes algorithm, and the detection 
result reported in literature is quite good (Sun et al. 2010; You & Yim 2010) . However, 
the information in PE file header could be modified easily, and it has some difference 
from the true calls of programs.  The existing techniques and methods do not perform 
sufficient statistical analyses to determine if the anomaly was ‗actually‘ malicious. 
Therefore, in this research, static anomaly-based detection analysis have been used, 
which consists of examining the code of programs to determine properties of the dynamic 
execution of these programs without running them.  This technique is adopted to extract 
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and identify the API function calls used by malware 21942 executables samples. The 
dataset contains recent malware samples that were collected between July 2009 and 
March 2010 from honeypots, honeynet project and other sources. The approach used is 
static analysis of the malware based on the Windows API calling sequence and this 
chapter describes how to extract those windows calls that reflect the behaviour of a file.  
5.3  API Analysis methods 
 Windows OS has many undocumented APIs to give Microsoft an edge over one software 
vendor or another.  This creates a real challenge for malware analysers where the 
investigation is based on the API features. However, identifying the API calls in an 
executable is very important since it could lead to detecting the behaviour of the 
Malware. In addition, it provides a sample of how the API is used and exactly what is the 
data it sends/receives. There are many different methods of locating APIs such as the 
traditional method that uses kernel mode debugger such as Numega SoftICE (Chang, H. 
& Atallah 2002) and WinDbg (Microsoft WinDbg 2010). Applying any of these methods 
in any big dataset will take a long processing time. 
The Native API implemented in NTDLL forms most of the undocumented calls 
inside the user-mode service in Windows and hence making a dump of the export 
directory of NTDLL.DLL was exported to a file called a ‗dump‘. The dumps from the 
export directories, headers and data sections of executable help to Figure out what their 
dependents and what the functions and services provided by NTDLL.DLL along with 
service numbers which are used in kernel mode. The name of documented and 
undocumented API and the name of the DLL that exports it are extracted and then the 
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binaries that use it are looked for, since MSDN library explains only default functions 
that Windows presents. 
Offline analysis of these API calls within binary executable code is performed by 
using a disassembler to convert it into readable code.  Offline analysis provides a better 
understanding of the code since the methodology adopted performs a deep analysis into 
the code program and their statistical properties. Therefore, in this research, static 
anomaly-based detection analyses have been used, which consists of an introspection of 
the program codes to determine various dynamic properties of these codes in an isolated 
environment.  This technique is applied to extract and identify the API function calls 
5.4  Finding Intrusions 
Current anomaly-based techniques use heuristics approach of detection that is inefficient 
and usually results in false positives (Jacob et al. 2008). In this chapter, a novel approach 
is proposed to extract the structural and behavioural features from program codes in order 
to detect both known and unknown malware. 
Windows API calling sequence reflects the behaviour of a particular piece of code 
(Ban et al. 2010; Wang, C., Pang, Zhao, Fu, et al. 2009). The API enables the programs 
to exploit the power of the operating system and the malware authors are using the API 
call as a vehicle to perform malicious actions. A novel technique of extracting the 
structural and behavioural features of API calls with the aid of statistical n-gram analysis 
has resulted in effective malware detection.  
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An n-gram is an n-contiguous sequence, mainly used for pattern recognition. It 
has been used and applied successfully in many areas  of computer science applications 
such as Computer Speech Recognition (Xiao et al. 2007; Zitouni 2007), Language 
Identification (MacNamara et al. 1998), Spelling Correction (Varol & Bayrak 2011), 
Optical Character Recognition (OCR) (Järvelin et al. 2007), Authorship Analysis (Layton 
et al. 2009) etc. An n-gram method of feature extraction and analysis is quite thorough 
but time consuming as the size of n increases. To overcome this constraint, this chapter 
proposes an intelligent machine learning technique of feature recognition to train a 
classifier for identifying malicious code. Literature studies indicate that a predominantly 
used machine learning technique called, Support Vector Machines (SVMs) (Hearst et al. 
1998)  have been applied successfully to classify text, handwritings (Adankon & Cheriet ; 
Do & Artières 2009) and many other datasets.  Since malware also exhibit the behaviour 
patterns in the form of a file print or feature, this work applies SVM for effectively 
classifying the program code as either malicious or benign. 
5.5  Modern Malware Detector Issues  
The results of the following recent studies have been the prime motivation for this 
research: 1) malware authors are able to easily fool the detection engine by applying 
obfuscation techniques on known malware (Sharif et al. 2008) , 2) identifying benign 
files as malware is becoming very difficult ( high false positive), 3) failure to detect 
obfuscated malware is high (high false negative) (Symantec Enterprise Security 2010, 
2011a), 4) the current detection rate is decreasing, and 5) current malware detectors are 
unable to detect zero day attacks (RSA 2011; Symantec Enterprise Security 1997). These 
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results imply that code obfuscation has become a challenge for digital forensic examiners 
with the limitations of signature based detection (Santos et al. 2009; Tang et al. 2010).  
As a first step to addressing these issue, this chapter proposes a five-step approach 
of anomaly based detection that captures and analyses the structural and behavioural 
features of API calls from program codes or executables using n-gram and SVM to detect 
and classify unknown and obfuscated malware. In this chapter, a method is given on how 
to automate the process of effectively extracting the behaviour features of application 
programming interface function calls of the core of Windows operating system. The 
fully-automated system processes both packed and unpacked portable execution (PE) 
files and reverses obfuscation. This chapter discusses further the processes adopted to 
extract the n-gram distributions of all the API call features from the malicious and benign 
executables and then to apply SVM for machine learning.  
The first step of this proposed method is to extract the most frequently occurring 
n-grams in each file and collate that list into an overall list for the entire dataset and the 
next step is to collect the n-gram distribution for each executable for each n-gram in the 
larger list. The third step is to apply principle component analysis (PCA) approach to the 
result to account for 95% of the variation and for an effective feature reduction process.  
With the extracted features, the main goal of detecting unknown malware is now possible 
if the proposed approach caters to all possible code obfuscation techniques that could be 
adopted by the malware authors. 
Malware authors are continually developing such new techniques for creating 
malware that cannot be detected by AV engines, and their level of sophistication is 
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continuing to grow. Through experimental tests, it has been found that all obfuscated 
techniques described in Section 2.6 can be used to fool the current detection engines by 
obfuscating the malware signature. Hence, in order to cater to all these obfuscation 
techniques, this research focuses on unpacking and extracting the behaviour of the 
malware through API call analysis rather than the typical "pattern matching" detection 
process that are evaded by obfuscations of the byte sequence through packing, 
metamorphic and polymorphic techniques. The features of the extracted API calls are 
identified in the unpacked executable binary using the n-gram statistical analysis that is 
described in the next section. 
5.6  Contributions of the Chapter 
Recently, API calls have been explored for modeling program behaviour. There are 
studies that have used analysis of API calls for generation of a birthmark on portable 
execution (Choi et al. 2009; Park et al. 2008a, 2008b; Tamada et al. 2006). The use of 
statistical analysis of file binary content including statistical n-gram modeling techniques, 
have been tested in identifying malware in document files and does not have sufficient 
resolution to represent all class of file types (Stolfo et al. 2005; Wang, C., Pang, Zhao & 
Liu 2009).  From other study on related work it has been found that the statistical 
modeling of hidden malcode that predominantly use Windows API calling sequence for 
evading detection is yet to be explored (Bruschi et al. 2006; Chang, H. & Atallah 2002; 
Ferrie & Szor 2001; Linn & Debray 2003; Perriot & Ferrie 2004; Venkatraman 2009).  
This is the motivation for this research towards a positive contribution in understanding 
malware behaviour through statistical analyses of API calls.    
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In this chapter, the static analysis tool IDAPro disassembler (IDA Pro 2010) is 
used to disassemble, analyze and extract the API function calls from the binary content of 
malware, and to statically identify the behaviour from the API calls. A novel approach is 
presented to automate and extract the API function calls from the malware binary 
content.  A static anomaly based detection technique is applied and it consists of 
examining the malware programs without it being executed, so as to determine the 
behaviour of the actual execution, and to have it combine with API call feature extraction 
for reflecting the overall behaviour of a file. 
There are four other main contributions. First, the development of a fully-
automated system to unpack, de-obfuscate and reverse engineer the program codes and 
apply feature extraction techniques effectively. Second, the intelligent extraction of the  
behaviour of features of API calls that relate to i) hooking of system services, ii)  creating 
or modifying files, iii) getting information from the file for changing information about 
the DLLs loaded by the malware. Third, measurement based application of n-gram 
statistical modeling to obtain the distribution of the executables for n-values ranging from 
1 to 5.  The model is measured based on factors such as accuracy, false positives and 
false negatives. Fourth, robust identification of malicious code as against benign code 
using SVM to train the classifier for machine learning. 
5.7  Proposed Approach and Implementation 
This section describes the methodology adopted for the automation of API extraction, the 
analysis and the identification of malicious behaviour.  The proposed approach shown in 
Figure 5.2 consists of five steps for the automated detection of malware using API calls:  
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Step 1: Unpack the malware and disassemble the binary executable to retrieve the 
assembly program.  
Step 2: Extract API calls and important machine-code features from the assembly 
program.  
Step 3: Map the API calls with MSDN library and analyse the malicious behaviour.  
Step 4: Extract binary n-gram features.  
Step 5: Train a classifier and build a model using support vector machine.  
 
Figure  5.2  Fully-Automated Architecture to Distribute the API Function Calls 
5.7.1  Step 1: Unpack and Disassemble Malware. 
Researchers have been trying to build semi-automated tools for automatically unpacking 
malware, such as PolyUnpack (Royal et al. 2006), Renovo (Kang et al. 2007), 
OmniUnpack (Martignoni et al. 2007), Ether (Dinaburg et al. 2008), and Eureka (Sharif 
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et al. 2008). PolyUnpack is an automated unpacking technique for extracting the hidden 
code through process execution and uses the Windows debugging API to single-step. The 
second tool, Renovo, is implemented using the QEMU machine emulator and supports 
multiple layers of unpacking (QEMU can run an unmodiﬁed target operating system and 
all its applications in a virtual machine). However, OmniUnpack uses a coarse-grained 
execution tracking approach at the page-level protection mechanism available in 
hardware in order to identify when the code gets executed from a page that was newly 
modified. Eureka, is similar to OmniUnpack except that Eureka tracks execution at the 
system call level. Eureka follows a statistical bigram analysis and coarse-grained 
execution tracing method and provides several Windows API resolution techniques that 
identify API calls based on their functionality in the unpacked code. Lastly, Ether, is 
based on an application of hardware virtualization extension such as Intel VT, and resides 
outside the operating system. By studying these semi-automated tools, it is observed that 
none of them are completely meet the purpose of analysing the behaviour of 
automatically malware by extracting API call features. 
In the experiment conducted on 21942 samples of malware, PEiD (PEiD 2008) 
was used as it is a detector adopted by most common packers, cryptors, compilers and 
even signature-based packer detection in PE files. The results indicate that about 77% of 
malware are packed and 23% are unpacked, as shown in Figure 5.3. From the result in 
Figure 5.3, it can be concluded that the majority of malware change their byte sequence 
or 'Signature' by applying packing techniques to evade detection by anti-virus scanners.   
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Figure  5.3   Distribution of Obfuscation Packers Used in Malware 
5.7.2  Step 2: Extract API Function Calls Features. 
The unpacked malware from Step 1 with the aid of SQLite and IDA pro (IDA Pro 2010) 
to generate a database containing the application programming interface (API) calls (.idb) 
automatically from the entire dataset of malware and benign programs. API call features 
are extracted from the assembly code of the executables so that the generated information 
could be used for effective analysis, using IDA pro from the unpacking.  
IDA Pro provides access to its internal resources via an API that allows users to 
create plug-ins to be executed by IDAPro. The Python program has been created to 
automatically run and create the plugin to use SQLite with IDA Pro for generating the 
Nothing found  23%
Upack  6%
Petite 4%
PELock  8%
PECompact 4%
UPX 10%AsProtecect 3%
Microsoft Visual C++  2%
Microsoft Visual Basic  2%
MEW  2%
kkrunchy 6%
Borland Delphi 4%
Armadillo 21%
FSG 5%
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database (.db). An interface is developed for accessing the database file (.db) so that the 
results from the assembly code of the malware stored in the database could be used for 
better binary analysis. The plugin, nameD IDASQLit is created and used with IDA pro 
Dissasember to generate eight tables of information, namely Blocks, Functions, 
Instructions, Names, Maps, Stacks, Segments, TargetBinaries. 
Each of these tables contains different information about the binary content. Function 
table contains all the recognizable API system calls and non-recognizable function names 
and the length (start and the end location of each function). Instructions table 
contains all the operation code and their addresses and block addresses. Maps table 
contains the function address and source of block address and the destination of the 
function address. Names table contains function addresses, the name of the function 
and the type of the function. Stacks table contains function address, the stack 
name, and the start and the end address. Segments table contains information that 
describes each segment in an executable file, segment name (Code, Data, BSS, 
_idata, _tls, _rdata, _reloc, and _rsrc) and the segment length. 
Finally, TargetBinaries contain the file name, path name, MD5, and start and the 
end of running. 
5.7.3  Step 3: Map the API Function calls with MSDN Library. 
Using the downloaded Windows API from Microsoft Developer Network 
(MSDN) (Microsoft Developer Network 2011), the proposed approach of the system 
compares and matches API calls outputted with the look-up table of API libraries from 
MSDN. The required processes are implemented in Python to compare and match the 
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API from MSDN and the API calls generated in the database (.db of Step 2) for the 
malware sample set. Another Python program was written to extract features such as the 
frequency of each API call, call sequence patterns and actions immediately preceding or 
after the call. Specific actions are considered that lead to invalid memory references or 
undefined registers or invalid target jumps for refining the extracted API call features. 
In addition, to list all the API calls that are associated with malcode and to analyse 
the features, the machine op-codes such as Jump and Call operations as well as the 
function type (import or function) are considered. SQL code snippets are as shown below. 
For the analysis of malware behaviour, features such as frequency of call, call sequence 
pattern and actions immediately preceding or after the call are being considered.    Some 
actions that lead to invalid memory reference or undefined register or invalid jump target 
are helpful in refining the extracted features for analysis. The SQL command below used 
to the information from the tables maps and names, to get all the API calls in the PE file 
where the operation code (OP) is been called or jumped of the other functions of the same 
program or the API is imported from the DLL of another PE. 
All executable programs, malicious or not, have the goal to perform an action 
using API calls. Disguised malicious code uses a different, relatively peculiar action 
SELECT function_address, src_block_address, name  
from Maps, Names" 
Where (op='call' or op='jmp')and(type='import' or type = 
'function') 
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called suspicious behaviour. Behaviour identification is becoming a rich area to study and 
as explained earlier, the malware authors target their malware on the commonly used 
NTFS by using API functions provided under Win32 environment to implement their 
functions. A statistical analysis of the Windows API calling sequence reflects the 
behaviour of a particular piece of code. In this research work, the API call features from 
the binary of a program were extracted and analysed to understand their malicious 
behaviour and finally to classify the program as malicious or benign. The extracted 
features were subjected to a statistical test to determine the malware class based on 
suspicious behaviours. As a result of the experimental analysis on the malware samples, 
the objective is to identify six main groups of commonly used API function call features 
that are based on the malicious behaviour patterns (Table 5.1) and these are listed below: 
 Search files. 
 Copy/Delete files. 
 Get file information. 
 Move Files. 
 Read /Write files. 
 Change file attributes. 
Figure 5.4 shows the frequency distribution of these six main groups of API calls 
invoked within the experimental dataset for malicious purposes. From result as showing 
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in Figure 5.4, it is clear that the most prominent behaviour commonly exhibited by 
malware is to infect file through API calls that perform read/write files. 
 
Figure  5.4 API Call Distribution of Malware Samples 
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Table  5.1 Main Malicious Behaviour Groups of API Call Features 
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5.7.4  Step 4: Extract Binary n-gram features. 
An n-gram model (Brown et al. 1992), in simple terms, uses the statistical properties of 
n-grams for predicting the next item in a sequence. It is a subsequence of ‗n‘ items from a 
given sequence. For this research, the items refer to the list of API calls within an 
executable file. An n-gram could be of different sizes: 'unigram' referred when the size is 
n=1; 'bigram' where the size is n= 2; size n=3 referred to "trigram; and size n=4 or more 
is generally called 'n-gram'. Many disciplines have applied n-gram analysis as the model 
is efficient and successful in solving classification problems. In this chapter, n-grams are 
applied to the problem of malware detection; by extracting the list of API calls contained 
within both packed the unpacked malware. A classifier is trained on the differences in n-
gram distributions between malicious and benign executable files. 
Some studies have analysed unigram and bigrams of ASCII byte values (Stolfo et 
al. 2007) and computed the frequency and variance of each gram. They have observed 
that applying 'unigram' analysis to Portable Document Format (PDF) files embedded with 
malcode are pretty effective in malware detection when compared to the COTS AV 
scanners. However, such studies are limited to specific document files types and do not 
have sufficient resolution to include all classes of file types. 
As the number of n-grams is going to be very large, feature selection measures 
such as ASCII, UNICODE, API and others are being adopted to yield better results. For 
the obfuscated malware detection problem, this work applies n-gram on API call based 
features.  The last four proposed approaches results in an effective n-gram feature 
extraction from API call sequences for classifying executables as malicious or benign 
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with the use of step 5 the use of Support Vector Machines (SVM) as the machine learning 
classifier. 
To extract the n-gram distributions of all of the malicious and benign executables, 
first the frequency of each n-gram within the entire corpus is counted. Once that has been 
completed, reduce this list to the top 100 most frequent n-grams. The above procedure is 
replicated for n values between 1 and 5 inclusive. 
5.7.5  Step 5: Build a Support Vector Machine Model.  
The machine learning SVMs (Cortes & Vapnik 1995) are a set of related supervised 
learning methods used for classification and regression. SVM constructs a hyperplane or 
set of hyperplanes in a high-dimensional space, which can be used for classification. 
Basically, a good separation is achieved by the hyperplane that has the largest distance to 
the nearest training data points of any class, since in general the larger the margin the 
lower the generalization error of the classifier. The method produces a linear classifier, so 
its concept description is a vector of weights ~w, and an interceptor a threshold b. 
However, SVMs use a kernel function to map training data into a higher dimensional 
space so that the problem is linearly separable. It then uses quadratic programming to set 
~w and b such that the hyper plane‘s margin is optimal, meaning that the distance is 
maximal from the hyperplane to the closest examples of the positive and negative classes.  
In 2006, Kolter (Kolter & Maloof 2006) described the use of machine learning 
and data mining to detect and classify malware. Kolter tested several classifiers 
including, IBk, naive Bayes, support vector machines (SVMs), decision trees, boosted 
naive Bayes, boosted SVMs, and boosted decision trees. Kolter found that support vector 
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machine performed exceptionally well and fast as compared to the other classifiers.  
Hence, for the obfuscated malware detection system, this research adopts SVM as a 
classifier for the detection of hidden malware that invariably uses API call sequence. 
SVMs have performed well on traditional text classification tasks, and on 
executable files. The supervised learning SVM method is a reliable and popular technique 
for data classification. SVM is considered easier to use than many machine learning 
approaches such as Neural Networks (NN). Hence, in this step, SVM classification is 
used to construct an N-dimensional hyperplane that separates the dataset into two groups, 
namely, ‗Malware‘ and ‗Benign‘. Initially, in this step, the data is separated into two sets: 
training and testing data sets. Then SVM is applied to the training data with the goal to 
produce a model, which is then used to predict the target of the test data. In order to 
achieve a higher accuracy of the predictive model for generalisation, K-fold cross-
validation approach is used and applied for test data, with k=10. This value is commonly 
used to estimate how well the trained SVM model is going to perform in the future. 
For the experiment in this research work, LIBSVM tool is used (Chang, C. & Lin 
2011). Both benign files and known malicious files are used to train the SVM classifier 
so that the model could be used to test for new obfuscated malware that evades detection 
from AV scanners. The verification and validation of the proposed method was 
performed for malware detection based on the standard measures in Section (5.8). 
Among the four basic types of kernels used by SVM to map the training vectors to 
the N-dimensional space, the Radial Basic Function (RBF) kernel is applied, as it can 
handle the nonlinear cases. Classification performance has been tested based on 
 
  
   and 
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C parameters from the equation given below, where C > 0 is the penalty parameter of 
error term. 
  (   )     (  
‖   ‖ 
  
)                                   (   )    
5.8  Verification and Validation 
The proposed method for malware detection is evaluated based on the following standard 
measures:  
a. True Positive (TP): Number of correctly identified malicious code,  
b. False Positive (FP): Number of wrongly identified benign code, when a detector 
detects benign file as a malware. 
c. True Negative (TN): Number of correctly identified benign code. 
d. False Negative (FN): Number of wrongly identified malicious code, when a 
detector fails to detect malware. 
The efficiency of the proposed method is evaluated using the following performance 
measures: 
Positive (P): The predicted attribute belong to the right class.  
            
Negative (N): The predicted attribute belong to the wrong class.  
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Overall Accuracy: Percentage of correctly identified code, given by: 
                  
     
           
  
     
   
 
5.9  Experimental Results 
In order to conduct an experimental investigation, the methodology of the system, 
described in the Section (5.7) has been used to the dataset collected from honeypots, 
honeynet project and other sources between July 2009 and November 2009. The dataset 
used is about 37217 executable files in total, with 15275 benign files and 21942 malware 
infected files that have been uniquely named according to their MD5 value.  From the 
experimental study, it has been observed that the overall accuracy of the classifier 
decreases as n increases, as shown in Table 5.2. The trend observed here could be due to 
the specific dataset that was used for the experimental testing. However, any 
generalisation of the observed trend could only be emphatically determined with larger 
and wider range of datasets. The initial experimental result of 96.5% accuracy for 
unigrams is still very promising as a benchmark for improvements in our future research 
work. Further to this, there are clear trends in both the false positive and false negative 
values with increasing values of n. While unigrams create the better n-gram models for 
the values shown in Table 5.2, the high false negative rate indicates that there is still work 
to be done on improving this value. 
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Table  5.2 Experimental Results from SVM Classifier Using n-grams 
n-value Accuracy False Positives False Negatives 
Unigram 96.50% 1.91% 1.56% 
Bigrams 92.99% 6.36% 0.63% 
n = 3 88.22% 11.46% 0.03% 
n = 4 85.99% 14.01% 0.00% 
n = 5 85.03% 14.97% 0.00% 
 
5.10  Limitations and Future Work 
The automated system makes use of existing unpacking tools, such as PolyUnpack, 
Renovo, OmniUnpack, Ether, and Eureka that are still under research and development.  
If the existing tools are unable to unpack malware that uses an unknown packing 
algorithm, this would pose a limitation for Step 1 of the automated system. However, the 
proposed approach from Step 2 onwards would still work in this case by conducting a 
manual unpacking in Step 1. Another limitation of the proposed approach system is that 
Step 3 is based on the latest updates of Microsoft with the MSDN library of API call list. 
It is believed that this revision is done up-to-date, as MSDN library forms the main 
reference for the mapping of the API calls in both malware and benign files. 
Future work in this area includes techniques to increase the accuracy of the 
system. The FP rate increases while the FN rate decreases as n increases, indicating that it 
  
185 
could be possible to use a boosting technique to apply a classifier model derived from a 
higher n value to first determine if a file appears to be malicious, then the model uses a 
lower n value so as to more accurately determine if this suspected file is in fact malicious. 
The system call interface is the facility that the OS offers to user-mode 
applications. UNIX operating system has a well-documented, clearly defined set of 
system calls. The MINIX operating system has a system call interface consisting of only 
53 routines. Everything that the MINIX operating system is capable of doing ultimately 
can be resolved into one or more of these system calls. The Window operating system, 
which refers to its system call interface as the native API of Windows, has not provided 
an official document for its native API. However, today Windows is the most OS 
commonly used. Therefore, this research is a step towards addressing malware that try to 
target on windows operating system, which is the main target for malware authors with 
the view of affecting more computer users.  Hence, this research work has limitations in 
its application exclusively to malware that make use of Windows API calls. 
Other future work entails extracting binary n-gram features to complement the 
API call features and to train the classifier resulting in building a model using support 
vector machine (SVM). Also the model needs to be tested against larger sets of malware 
samples for verifying the accuracy of the modelled system.  
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Chapter 6 : Malware Detection based on Data Mining of 
API calls 
              
Sherlock Holmes: “Data! Data! Data! ... I can‟t make bricks without clay.” 
       —Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, ―The Adventure of the Copper Beeches,” 
            The Strand Magazine (1892) 
6.1  Overview 
As seen in earlier chapters, code obfuscation techniques can modify the parent code to 
produce offspring copies which have the same functionality with different signatures. 
There is number of freeware programs that are being used to generate obfuscated code. 
These new generations of signatures are growing and at the same time the level of 
sophistication of malware is also increasing. However, by analysing the offspring copies 
using pattern recognition, the obfuscated code could be detected. In Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 we showed that using certain pattern recognition methods to analyse op-codes 
and API calls leads to successfully detecting zero-day or unknown malware. This chapter 
investigates these patterns of obfuscated code further using data mining techniques.  
In Chapter 4, signature free detection has been proposed and developed based on op-code 
obfuscations adopted by malware writers. In Chapter 5, an automation method of 
extracting the API call features has been presented and to understand their use for 
malicious purpose has been introduced.  A preliminary analysis has been provided using 
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support vector machine with n-gram statistical analysis of API calls by varying n-values 
from 1 to 5. 
In this chapter, a machine learning framework is proposed and evaluated with large 
datasets to further investigate the preliminary observed patterns. A variety of data mining 
techniques are used to detect malware from benign files. The proposed framework 
focuses in finding the best features and building models that can classify a given program 
into a malware or a benign class.  The approach rests on the analysis of patterns based on 
the frequency of occurrence of each Windows Application Programming Interface calls 
found in the datasets. Also, this chapter describes in detail how various data mining 
techniques have been adopted to classify and detect a malware based on the frequency of 
Windows API calls. Also, this chapter discussed similarity based detection method by 
employing similarity measures of Windows Application Programming Interface (API) 
call features as shows in Section (6.7). Different distance measures have been 
implemented and similarity analysis performed by using eight commonly used distance 
measures in vector models, namely  Cosine, Bray-Curtis, Canberra, Chebyshev, 
Manhattan, Correlation, Euclidean, and Hamming distance similarity measure for Nearest 
Neighbor (NN).  
A supervised learning approach has been adopted that uses a dataset to train, validate and 
test, an array of classifiers. In order to achieve the goal of developing a detection system 
to identify zero day malware, robust classifiers have been selected as shown in Section 
(6.11) namely Naive Bayes (NB) Algorithm, k−Nearest Neighbor (kNN) Algorithm, 
Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) Algorithm with 4 different kernels; i) SMO - 
Normalized Polynomial Kernel Function, ii) SMO – Polynomial Kernel Function, iii) 
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SMO – PUK, and iv) SMO- Radial Basis Function (RBF), Backpropagation Neural 
Networks Algorithm, Logistic Regression, and J48 decision tree.  
This chapter also provides details of how data will be collected to conduct the 
experimental analysis and the data mining algorithms adopted for the study will be 
evaluated.   
6.2  Data Mining  
In recent years data mining has been the focus of many malware researchers to detect 
unknown malware or to classify malware from benign files. Data mining is also referred 
to as knowledge discovery in databases. Frawley  (Frawley et al. 1992) define it as ―The 
nontrivial extraction of implicit, previously unknown, and potentially useful information 
from data‖. It is also defined as ―The science of extracting useful information from large 
data sets or databases‖ (Hand et al. 2001). In this research, data mining involves the 
application of a full suite of statistical and machine learning algorithms on a set of 
features derived from malicious and benign files.  
  Feature can be described as the input data to the detection systems, and can be 
used as patterns for classification in malware detection systems.  Reverse engineering 
results in extracted features useful for two types of detections; i) Host-Based Intrusion 
Detection System (HIDS) – to check, analyse and monitor the computer system internally 
such as extract byte sequences, ASCII, instruction sequences, and API call sequences, 
and ii) Network-Based Intrusion Detection system (NIDS) - to detect malicious activity 
by monitoring network traffic such as denial of service (DOS) attacks, port scans.   
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A data mining approach to malware detection is to employ statistical 
classification. Each classification algorithm constructs a model, using machine learning, 
to represent the benign and malicious classes. In this approach, a labeled training set is 
required to build the class models during a process of supervised learning. The key to 
statistical classification is to represent the malicious and benign samples in an appropriate 
manner to enable the classification algorithms to work effectively. Feature extraction is 
an important component of effective classification, and an associated feature vector that 
can accurately represent the invariant characteristics in the training sets and query 
samples is highly desirable. Classification is the process of classifying data into two or 
more predetermined groups based on features, it responsible in determining if binary 
under inspection belongs to the group of malicious programs or to the group of benign 
programs. 
Chapter five explained how API function calls reflect the functionality of a 
program and, hence, is an excellent candidate for data mining to classify malicious 
behaviour. Also, in Chapter 5 it was noticed that using features of API for classification 
can provide high accuracy rate and low false alarm rate. Therefore, in the following 
sections different classification techniques used in this research study and analysed based 
on API function call features will be discussed.   
6.3  Related Study  
Data mining techniques for malware detection usually starts with the first step of 
generating a feature set. In 2005, studies reported that a temporal consistency element 
was added to the system call frequency to calculate the frequency of API system call 
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sequences (Malan & Smith 2005). Similarity measures were calculated using edit 
distance and measuring similarity using the intersection of sets. The first measure was on 
ordered sets of native API system calls, while the second one was on unordered sets. Both 
similarity measures based on API gave the probabilities of two peers. The drawback is 
that they had considered only native API call features.  
Static Analysis for Vicious Executables (SAVE) is another work based on API 
calls made in an attempt to detect polymorphic and metamorphic malware (Sung et al. 
2004). SAVE defines signature as an API sequence of calls and started the reverse 
engineering process from decompressed 16 binaries, which are then passed through a PE 
file parser. Next, Windows API calls were and mapped, and passed through the similarity 
measure module, where similarity measures such as, Euclidian distance, Sequence 
alignment, Cosine measure, extended Jaccard measure, and the Pearson correlation 
measure were used. Binary executables under inspection were classified by identifying a 
high similarity to a known instance of malware in the training set. Although these 
similarity measures enable SAVE to detect polymorphic and metamorphic malware 
efficiently against 8 malware scanners, their weakness is not being able to detect 
unknown malware. 
Another signature-free system to detect polymorphic malware and unknown 
malware based on the analysis of Windows API execution sequences extracted from 
binary executable is called Intelligent Malware Detection System (IMDS) (Ye et al. 
2007). IMDS was developed using Objective-Oriented Association (OOA) mining based 
classification with a large data set gathered for the experiment (29580 binary executables, 
of which 12214 were benign binary executables and 17366 were malicious). For 
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detection, a Classification Based on Association rules (CBA) technique such as Naive 
Bayes, SVM and Decision Tree were used. The result was compared against anti-virus 
software such as Norton, Kaspersky, McAfee, and Dr.Web. In 2010 the authors of IMDS 
had incorporated CIDCPF into their existing IMDS system, and called it CIMDS 
(Yanfang et al. 2010). CIDCPF adapted the post processing techniques as follows: first 
Chi-square testing was applied and insignificant rules were pruned followed by using 
Database coverage based on the Chi-square measure rule ranking mechanism and 
Pessimistic error estimation, and finally prediction was performed by selecting the best 
First rule. Their results were good, but involved unbalanced test data while the training 
data was quite balanced. The detection rate for the training set was 89.6% and the 
accuracy was approximately 71.4%. The testing set had a detection rate 88.2% and 
accuracy of 67.6%, showing further improvements is necessry. 
In 2006, (Kolter & Maloof 2006) described the use of machine learning and data 
mining to detect and classify malicious executables. They tested several classifiers 
including, IBk, naive Bayes, support vector machines (SVMs), decision trees, boosted 
naive Bayes, boosted SVMs, and boosted decision trees. Kolter found that SVMs 
performed exceptionally well compared to the other classifiers. Hence, for the obfuscated 
malware detection system, this research adopts SVM as a classifier for the detection of 
hidden malware that invariably uses API call sequence.  
API based features are not only good in classification of malware, but is also good 
in detecting injected malicious executables. DOME (Rabek et al. 2003) is a host-based 
technique that uses static analysis based on monitoring and validating Win32 API calls 
for detecting malicious code in binary executables. In a study on the performance of 
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kernel methods in the context of robustness and generalization capabilities of malware 
classification (Shankarapani et al. 2010), results revealed that analysis based on the Win 
API function call provides good accuracy to classify malware.  
In 2010, (Shankarapani et al. 2010) showed that the frequency of Windows API 
calls can be used to classify and detect malware with good accuracy. Authors have 
performed a static analysis to measure the similarity for 1593 executables, of malware 
and benign. Two analysis methods have been used based on the frequency of occurrence 
of each Windows Application Programming Interface (API). First similarity analysis, 
computed the mean value for 3 similarity measures (Cosine measure, extended Jaccard 
measure) have been used on the dataset. Second used SVM machine learning kernel RBF, 
to classify malware and benign. However, the result of the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curve was low and the false positive rate was too high for practical 
usage. In the same year of 2010, (Cesare & Xiang 2010) have performed similarity 
analysis using string edit distances based on control flow to Identify malware variants. 
However, the analysis was focused on only packed malware.  
Most of previous work relating to similarity based detection exhibit some 
drawbacks. They performed their experiments either using small datasets or small set of 
API calls or PE sequences, and more importantly did not give prominence to unknown 
malware due to obfuscation techniques adopted in existing malware families.   
API based features are not only good in classification of malware, but also in 
detecting injected malicious executable that result in obfuscated malware. DOME (Rabek 
et al. 2003) is a host-based technique that uses static analysis based on monitoring and 
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validating Win32 API calls for detecting malicious code in binary executables. In a study 
on the performance of kernel methods in the context of robustness and generalization 
capabilities of malware classification (Shankarapani et al. 2010), results revealed that 
analysis based on the Win API  function call provides good accuracy to classify malware. 
Hence, our work focuses on investigating obfuscated malware from large datasets by 
employing similarity based detection methods of data mining using API call features.  
6.4  Methodology  
This section describes the methodology, which is an extension of the methodology 
provided in Chapter 5. Figure 6.1 shows the overall methodology used, which consists of 
three groups of processes;  In the first group, the first 3 steps from Chapter 5 has been 
used, Step 1: Unpack the malware and disassemble the binary executable to retrieve the 
assembly program. Step 2: Extract API calls and important machine-code features from 
the assembly program. Step 3: Map the API calls with MSDN library and analyse the 
malicious behaviour to get the API sequence from the binaries.  In the second group, after 
obtaining the API sequence from binaries, the signature database is updated based on 
these API calls.  This sequence is compared to a sequence or signature (from the 
signature database) and is passed through the similarity measure module to generate the 
similarity report. Different distance measures have been implemented and similarity 
analysis performed by using eight commonly used distance measures in vector models, 
namely  Cosine, Bray-Curtis, Canberra, Chebyshev, Manhattan, Correlation, Euclidean, 
and Hamming distance similarity measure for Nearest Neighbor (NN).  
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In third group, Mutual Information (MI) based Maximum Relevance (MR) filter 
ranking heuristics on the set of API function calls is used for feature selection of relevant 
features, which provide more information about the class variable than irrelevant features. 
After extracting the best features from the set of API calls, supervised learning 
experiments have been applied that uses a dataset to train, validate and test, an array of 
classifiers.  Nine robust classifiers have been selected for this purpose, They are, Naive 
Bayes (NB) Algorithm, k−Nearest Neighbor (kNN) Algorithm, The Sequential Minimal 
Optimization (SMO) Algorithm with 4 different kernels i) SMO - Normalized 
Polynomial Kernel Function, ii) SMO – Polynomial Kernel Function, iii) SMO – PUK, 
and iv) SMO- Radial Basis Function (RBF), Backpropagation Neural Networks 
Algorithm, Logistic Regression, and J48 decision tree.  
The classification methods require training data to validate the models formulated. 
Therefore, K-fold cross-validation has been used for evaluating the results of a statistical 
analysis generating an independent dataset using 10 folds. Having k=10 folds uses 90% 
of full data is used for training (and 10% for testing) in each fold test. Evaluation (feature 
selection + classification) was done inside 10-fold cross-validation loop on all Malware 
and benign dataset.  
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Figure  6.1 API Calls Automation, Similarity, Feature Selection and Malware 
Detection Methodology 
6.5  Database 
The dataset used in this research study consists of 66,703 executable files in total, as 
shown in Table (6.1).  Among them, 51,223 recent Malware have been collected from 
honeynet project, VX heavens (VX Heavens 2011) and other sources. The remaining 
consists of 15,480 benign files that include : Application software  such as Databases, 
Educational software, Mathematical software, Image editing, Spreadsheet, Word 
processing, Decision making software, Internet Browser, Email and many others system 
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software and Programming languages software and many other applications. All files 
have been uniquely named according to their MD5 hash value. 
6.6  Signature Generation based on API calls 
Signature database has been used to statistically calculate and compute the similarity 
measures. Eight distance measures have been adopted to analyse and differentiate 
between malware variants and benign executables from various families (section 6.7).  
The Signature database has been generated from the database of malware and benign files 
(section 6.5) to produce fingerprints or benchmarks for each record based on the API 
calls that the executable programs had used as shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.1 Data set 
File Type Qty 
Max. Size Min. Size Avg. Size 
(KB) (KB) (KB) 
1 Benign 15,480 109,850 0.8 32,039 
2 Virus 17,509 546 1.9 142 
3 Worm 10,403 13,688 1.6 860 
4 Rootkit 270 570 2.8 380 
5 Backdoor 6,689 1,299 2.4 685 
6 Constructor 1,039 77,662 0.9 1,193 
7 Exploit 1,207 22,746 0.5 375 
8 Flooder 905 16,709 1 1,397 
9 Trojan 13,201 17,810 0.7 1,819 
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The database signature has been used later in Section (6.7) to measure the 
distances between the programs, and also used in Section (6.11) to apply supervised 
machine learning algorithms.  
6.7  Experiment Based on Similarity 
Similarity mining is a detection method based on the analysis of similarities of the 
distance measures and has been adopted to detect unknown malware. Different distance 
measures have been implemented and similarity analysis performed by using eight 
Table 6.2 Signature Sample of API Database 
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commonly used distance measures in vector models; Cosine, Bray-Curtis, Canberra, 
Chebyshev, Manhattan, Correlation, Euclidean, and Hamming distance. The 
maliciousness of a code is estimated using these measures. For instance, malware such as 
Win32.Evol (Orr 2006) has a multiple variant of the same sample malware because of the 
obfuscating methods adopted by the malware authors. Similarity based detection 
approach can be used between the variants to checked whether the variant is the child of 
the sample under inspection with similar features. Understanding the relationship among 
the distance measures can help us to choose a proper distance measure for malware 
detection.  
Similarity based detection is well-suited for static analysis, where firstly the 
executable program is disassembled using reverse engineering tools. Each disassembled 
executable (P) represents a vector of functions x, y. (P‘) is the variant malware of the 
original executable (P). Each function is represented as an array of vector of functions. 
The similarity between the functions of a program (P) and (P') is computed. The value is 
then compared with the threshold value to determine if the executable is malicious or not.  
Metamorphic and Polymorphic engines can generate and produce thousands of 
the malware variants. Effective engines will generate highly dissimilar copies. A 
‗similarity analysis‘ can quantify the level of similarity and the difference between two 
binary executables.  In this section the similarity will be tested based on the extracted 
Win API function calls of both malware and benign files. In other words, the signature is 
an API sequence of known binaries that has been previously identified for both malware 
and benign.  
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For all the distance measure in the subsection below: 
   is the API sequence of the test file. 
    is the API sequence of  a file in the database.  
   is the vectors dimension. 
   is the distance between vectors u and v. 
6.7.1  Cosine Distance  
The Cosine distance computed between two n-vectors u and v  is defined as: 
      
   
|   |
 
|   |
 
                                                          (   )  
6.7.2  Bray-Curtis Distance 
The Bray-Curtis distance measured between two n-vectors u and v is defined as: 
   
∑        
∑        
                                                                     (   ) 
6.7.3  Canberra Distance 
The Canberra distance between two n-vectors u and v is defined as: 
   
∑         
∑         
                                                                  (   )  
6.7.4  Chebyshev Distance  
The Chebyshev distance computed between two n-vectors u and v is defined as: 
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                                                                            (   )  
6.7.5  Manhattan Distance 
The Manhattan distance between two n-vectors u and v is defined as: 
   ∑        
 
                                                                (   )  
6.7.6  Correlation Distance  
The correlation distance computed between two n-vectors u and v  is defined as: 
          (   ̅ ) (   ̅)    (   ̅ )        ̅   
   (   ) 
 where   ̅ is the mean of a vectors elements and n is the common dimensionality of u and 
v. 
6.7.7  Euclidean Distance 
The Euclidean distance between two n-vectors u and v  is defined as: 
                                                                                  (   ) 
6.7.8  Hamming Distance 
The Hamming distance between two n-vectors u and v  is simply the proportion of 
disagreeing components in u and v, and is defined as: 
   
        
 
                                                                    (   )  
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where     is the number of occurrence of   , -            , -               
6.8  Result Based Similarity Distance  
The experimental investigation of the similarity analysis was carried out by implementing 
distance measures and analysis of the various data mining algorithms in Python 
Programming Language. The experiment was run in three different processors, Pentium 
(R) Core (TM) 2 Due CPU, 2.19 GHz, 2.98 of RAM with Windows XP professional as 
the operating system. The similarity analysis implemented in Python aided in the 
malware classification and was evaluated using very large real-life malware dataset. The 
datasets were obtained through public databases explained in Section (6.5). The 
Similarity distance system was able to automatically identify all malware variants. 
Similarity matrix for one set of malware in the same family are shown in Table (6.3) and 
Table (6.4) and the highlighted cells identifying a malware variant is defined as having a 
similarity equal or less 0.5. As shown the entire cell in the Table (6.3) (6.4) can be 
detected as a variant of the original malware Win32.Dadobra. 
Similarity matrix for two malware datasets in the same families shows in Table 6.3 and 
Table 6.4 
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Table 6.3 Similarity of Trojan.Downloader.Win32.Dadobra 
  .aa .aj .ak .al .am .bf .bh .bw 
.aa 0.000 0.100 0.207 0.100 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.143 
.aj 0.100 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.233 
.ak 0.207 0.226 0.000 0.226 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.276 
.al 0.100 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.233 
.am 0.138 0.226 0.207 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.207 
.bf 0.138 0.226 0.207 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.207 
.bh 0.138 0.226 0.207 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.207 
.bw 0.143 0.233 0.276 0.233 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.000 
Table 6.4 Similarity of Worm.Win32.Delf 
  am d f g h m R t v w z 
am 0.000 0.226 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.194 1.000 1.000 0.167 1.000 0.167 
D 0.226 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.067 1.000 1.000 0.103 1.000 0.103 
F 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
G 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
H 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
M 0.194 0.067 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.100 1.000 0.100 
R 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
T 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
V 0.167 0.103 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.100 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
W 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Z 0.167 0.103 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.100 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
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The similarity matrix for two malware dataset from different families is given in Table 
6.5. The results from Table 6.3, Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 show that there is low 
distance/high similarity between malware variants but not with the benign programs. 
Table 6.6 shows there is high distance/low similarity between the benign datasets. Table 
6.7 shows the mean values for 8 different similarity measurements applied to the entire 
dataset, when the threshold for the similarity ratio is less than or equal to 0.5. The overall 
results in Table 6.7 demonstrate that the system finds high similarities between malware 
variants but not with the benign programs, for 8 different similarity measurements 
applied to the entire dataset. 
Table 6.5 Similarity between Trojan.Downloader.Win32.Dadobra vs Worm.Win32.Delf 
  .aa .aj .ak .al .am .bf .bh .bw 
am 0.100 0.188 0.290 0.188 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.200 
D 0.200 0.219 0.200 0.219 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.267 
F 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
G 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
H 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
M 0.167 0.188 0.226 0.188 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.233 
R 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
T 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
V 0.138 0.226 0.207 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.207 
W 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Z 0.138 0.226 0.207 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.207 
 
  
204 
 
Table 6.6 Similarity Matrix Benign Files 
  
bint
ext 
Dic ffind msgr 
ms 
hearts 
msimn 
ms 
msgs 
Skin 
Creator 
Skype SkyTel 
slide 
showz
illa 
bintext 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Dic 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ffind 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
msgr 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 11.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.38 
ms hearts 1.00 0.78 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
msimn 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
msmsgs 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.81 0.98 0.98 1.00 
Skin 
Creator 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.00 1.00 0.77 1.00 
Skype 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.98 1.00 
SkyTel 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.77 0.98 0.00 1.00 
slide 
showzilla 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 
 
 
Table 6.7 Mean similarity matrix (   ) 
 
Distance Method Malware – Benign Malware – Malware Benign – Benign 
Cosine 0.34 0.29 0.39 
Bray Curtis 0.84 0.77 0.86 
Canberra 0.84 0.77 0.86 
Chebyshev 61.27 31.45 79.98 
Manhattan 14.32 96.24 18.03 
Correlation 0.35 0.243 0.403 
Euclidean 78.94 44.31 106.39 
Hamming 0.034 0.04 0.03 
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From above Tables (6.2), (6.3), (6.4), (6.5), and (6.6) it can be seen that similarity 
analysis is very efficient and effective to detect Malware variants from the same family or 
different families of Malware.  Also, the experiments confirm that there is no similarity 
among the benign files, which is logical and true. Another important observation is that it 
is very hard to find similarity between the malware dataset and the benign dataset, 
thereby validating that the proposed system is able to clearly distinguish between 
malware and benign datasets. In conclusion, Malware can be classified according to 
similarity and further, similarly test can be applied to detect malware variants.  The 
proposed similarity based detection and classification of malware is further improved in 
performance by using feature selection, especially when large datasets require more 
computing memory and time for processing the extracted features. 
6.9  Feature Selection and Extraction  
Feature selection was used to select the best subset from the input space. Its ultimate goal 
is to select the optimal features subset that can achieve the highest accuracy results. Many 
feature selection algorithms involve a combinatorial search through the whole space. 
Usually, heuristic methods, such as hill climbing, have to be adopted since the size of 
input space is exponential in the number of features. Other methods divide the feature 
space into several subspaces which can be searched easily. 
There are basically two types of feature selection methods: filter and wrapper. 
Filters methods select the best features according to some prior knowledge without 
thinking about the bias of further induction algorithm. These methods perform 
independent of the classification algorithm or its error criteria. 
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In feature extraction, most methods are supervised. These approaches need some 
prior knowledge and labeled training samples. Standard filter approaches can extract 
knowledge of the intrinsic characteristics from real data. However, filter approaches do 
not use any performance criteria based on predictive accuracies. This does not guarantee 
that selected feature subset will be able to do better in the classification/prediction tasks.  
In this step, the frequency statistics of the API calls is used to build a robust 
signature-free malware detection system. The filter models are based on the intrinsic 
characteristics of the data and do not involve the application of an induction algorithm. 
Diverse filter models have been advanced, including the ones that use a relevance 
measure, and others that deploy a distance measure as their evaluation criteria. Filter 
models are computationally cheap due to their evaluation criteria. However, feature 
subsets selected by filter may result in poor prediction accuracies, since they are 
independent from the induction algorithm.  
For better result, there is a need to adopt feature selection approach on the set of 
Win API function calls on different data mining algorithms and integrating the filter‘s 
feature ranking score to find optimal feature subset for an efficient signature-free 
malware detection. In this approach, hybridized novel filter heuristic Mutual Information 
(MI) based Maximum Relevance (MR) filter ranking heuristics has been applied with 
different data mining algorithms.  
Maximum Relevance (MR) for feature selection for relevant features provide 
more information about the class variable than irrelevant features. Therefore, mutual 
information based maximum relevance is a good heuristic to select salient features within 
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the data mining area. If S is a set of features iF  and class variable is c, the maximum 
relevance can be defined as (6.9). 
                  (   )   
 
   
 ∑  (    )
     
            (   ) 
 (    ) is the mutual information between iF  and  class c which is defined as (6.10). 
 (    )   (  )   (      )                                               (    ) 
)( iFH is the entropy of  iF  with the probability density function )( ifp  where iF  takes 
discrete values from the set }...,{ 21 ifffF  , then )( iFH  is defined as (6.11) 
 (  )      ∑  (  )
     
      (  )                                     (    ) 
 (      ) in (6.10) is the conditional entropy between iF  and c and is defined as (6.12) 
 
 (      )          ∑ ∑  (     )
     
 
     
 (       )                (    ) 
where class variable c takes the discrete values from the set },...,{ 21 icccC  .  
6.10  10-Fold Cross Validation 
The classification algorithms require training data to train the formulated models, and 
testing data to test those models. Validation of the models is achieved by making a 
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partition on the database of malware and benign for carrying out the experiments. The 
cross-validation is a technique used for evaluating the results of a statistical analysis by 
generating an independent dataset for Malware and benign. The most common types of 
cross-validation are repeated random sub-sampling validation and K-fold cross-validation 
(Hand et al. 2001). For this research study of Malware and Benign classification, K-fold 
cross-validation has been selected for validation as it is commonly adopted for many 
classifiers (Bhattacharyya et al. 2011; Witten & Frank 2010). 
In k-fold cross-validation the data is first partitioned into k sized segments or 
folds. Then, k iterations of training and validation are performed such that within each 
iteration a different fold of the data is held-out for validation while the remaining k-1 
folds are used for learning. The advantage of K-Fold Cross validation is that all the 
examples in the dataset are eventually used for both training and testing. Also, all 
observations are used for both training and validation, and each observation is used for 
validation exactly once. Extensive tests on malware and benign dataset with different 
learning techniques, as shown in Section (6.11), have shown that k=10 is the right 
number of folds to get the best estimate of error. Having 10 folds means 90% of full data 
is used for training (and 10% for testing) in each fold test. 
6.11  Data Mining Algorithms 
Classification is ―the task of learning a target function that maps each feature set to one of 
the predefined class labels‖. Data mining approach has been adopted in this research to 
detect malicious programs, to learn from the behaviour of existing malicious and benign 
database by analyzed thousands of malicious and benign programs based on Win API 
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features to identify and classify malware. The objective is to find out the best features and 
build models that can classify a given program into a malware or a benign class. First, 
supervised learning experiments have been applied by using a dataset to train, validate 
and test, an array of classifiers. In order to achieve the goal of developed a detection 
system to detect a zero day malware, robust data mining classifiers have been adopted, 
such as Naive Bayes (NB) Algorithm, k−Nearest Neighbor (kNN) Algorithm, Sequential 
Minimal Optimization (SMO) Algorithm with 4 different kernels; i) SMO - Normalized 
Polynomial Kernel Function, ii) SMO – Polynomial Kernel Function, iii) SMO – PUK, 
and iv) SMO- Radial Basis Function (RBF), Backpropagation Neural Networks 
Algorithm, Logistic Regression, and J48 decision tree. These algorithms are described 
next..   
6.11.1  The Naive Bayes (NB) Algorithm 
The Naive Bayes algorithm (Kuncheva 2006) is one classification method based on 
conditional probabilities that uses a statistical approach to the problem of pattern 
recognition. It is reported that it is the most successful known algorithms for learning to 
classify text documents, and further it is fast and highly scalable for model building and 
scoring. The idea behind a Naive Bayes algorithm is the Bayes‘ Theorem and the 
maximum posteriori hypothesis. Bayes Theorem finds the probability of an event 
occurring given the probability of another event that has occurred already. For instant, for 
a feature vector x with n attributes values             and a class variable   , 
           .  
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Bayesian classifiers can predict class membership    with probabilities   ( |  ) for the 
feature vector x whose distribution depends on the class   . The class    for which 
 (  | ) is called the maximum posteriori probability that feature vector x belongs, can be 
computed from  ( |  ) by Bayes‘ rule: 
 (  | )  
 ( |  )  (  )
 ( )
                                                  (    ) 
It applies ―naïve‖ conditional independence assumptions which states that all n 
features             of the feature vector x are all conditionally independent of one 
another, given  (  ) Naïve Bayes assumption as follows: 
 ( |  )   (            )   ∏  (  |  )
 
 <           (    )   
         
 (  | )  
 (  ) ∏  (  |  )
 
   
 ( )
                                              (    )  
The most probable hypothesis given the training data „Maximum a posteriori‟ 
hypothesis results in the following:  
                (  ) ∏ (  |  )
 
 < 
                  (    ) 
In data mining, Naive Bayes algorithm is easy to implement and is an efficient 
and effective inductive learning algorithm for machine learning. 
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Among data mining methods, Naive Bayes algorithm is easy to implement and is 
an efficient and effective inductive learning algorithm for machine learning. Figure 6.2 
and Table 6.8 provide the overall accuracy rate for malware detection achieved through 
our experiments using Naive Bayes with k cross validations, k= {2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}. 
 
Figure  6.2 Accuracy of NB with k Cross Validations (k=2 to 10) 
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6.11.2  The k−Nearest Neighbor (kNN) Algorithm 
kNN is simple supervised machine learning algorithm that is used for classifying objects 
based on closest training instances in the feature space. It has been employed in many 
applications in data mining, statistical pattern recognition and many others. It has been 
used in many applications in data mining, statistical pattern recognition and many others. 
The object is classified based on a majority vote of its k nearest neighbors /low distance 
to the object. As showed in (section 6.7) there are some measuring techniques that could 
be used to measure distance between the training object and the test object such as Bray-
Curtis, Euclidean, correlation, Canberra, Manhattean, Chebyshev, Dice, Cosine, and 
Hamming distances.  
In our experiments, the K-nearest neighbors are compute as follows with K: 
Table 6.8 Performance of Naive Bayes Fold Cross Validation (k=2 to 10) 
Fold 
TP 
Rate 
FP 
Rate 
Precision Recall 
F-
Measure 
ROC 
Area 
Accuracy 
Time 
Sec. 
2 0.922 0.082 0.926 0.922 0.924 0.938 92.02 0.23 
3 0.912 0.089 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.933 91.19 0.21 
4 0.923 0.077 0.923 0.923 0.923 0.938 92.3 0.29 
5 0.909 0.091 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.933 90.91 0.25 
6 0.917 0.084 0.917 0.917 0.916 0.94 91.65 0.22 
7 0.912 0.089 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.932 91.19 0.23 
8 0.915 0.086 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.938 91.47 0.23 
9 0.913 0.088 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.939 91.28 0.23 
10 0.91 0.09 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.938 91 0.2 
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1. Store all training samples    
 
  in memory. 
2. Determine the parameter K = number of nearest neighbors beforehand. (A good k 
can be selected using cross-validation for example).  
3. Measure the distance between the query-instance (x) and all the training 
samples    
 
. (any distance algorithm can be used to )  such as: 
   (    
 )√∑ ( )    
 
 
 < 
( )                                              (    ) 
4. Find the K-minimum distance between the query-instance (x) and each 
K      
      
        
  . 
5. Get all categories of training data for the sorted value under K.  
6. Find the weighted distance of the query-instance (x) from each of the k nearest 
points as follows: 
    
   (    
 )
∑    (    
 )  < 
                                                     (    ) 
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Figure  6.3 Accuracy of kNN with k Cross Validations (k=2 to 10) 
 
Figure 6.3 provides the overall accuracy rate for malware detection achieved through our 
experiments using K-Nearest Neighbors with k cross validations, k= {2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}. 
Table 6.9 shows the performance of kNN Fold Cross Validation (k=2 to 10) 
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6.11.3  The Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) Algorithm 
Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) is a simple algorithm that can quickly solve the 
SVM QP problem, without any extra matrix storage and without using numerical QP 
optimization. The advantage of SMO is its ability to solve the Lagrange multipliers 
analytically. SMO is a supervised learning algorithm used for classification and 
regression, and it is a fast implementation of Support Vector Machines (SVM).  The basic 
advantage is that it attempts to maximise the margin, for example the distance between 
the classifier and the nearest training datum. SMO  constructs a hyperplane or set of 
hyperplanes in a n-dimensional space, which can be used for classification. Basically, a 
separation can be good when the hyperplane has the largest distance to the nearest 
training data points of any class, since in general the larger the margin the lower the 
generalization error of the classifier. SMO has been selected to classify  malicious and 
Table 6.9 Performance of kNN Fold Cross Validation (k=2 to 10) 
Fold 
TP 
Rate 
FP 
Rate 
Precision Recall 
F-
Measure 
ROC 
Area 
Accuracy 
Time 
Sec. 
2 0.908 0.092 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.933 90.82 0.21 
3 0.94 0.059 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.958 0.94 0.23 
4 0.929 0.071 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.949 0.93 0.21 
5 0.945 0.054 0.946 0.945 0.945 0.963 0.95 0.2 
6 0.942 0.056 0.943 0.942 0.943 0.96 0.94 0.22 
7 0.941 0.058 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.958 94.06 0.2 
8 0.94 0.059 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.96 93.97 0.21 
9 0.942 0.056 0.943 0.942 0.943 0.958 94.25 0.23 
10 0.948 0.051 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.966 94.81 0.2 
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beingn executables because it is competitive with other SVM training methods such as 
Projected Conjugate Gradient "chunking", and in addition it is easier to implement in 
WEKA (Witten & Frank 2010).  
As shown in Figure 6.4, we have employed 4 different kernels; Radial Basis Function 
Kernel (RBF), Polynomial kernel, Normalized Polynomial kernel, and the Pearson VII 
function-based universal kernel (Puk), and the overall accuracy rate for malware 
detection achieved through Normalized Polynomial kernel is the highest for all the k 
cross validations, k={2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}. Tables 6.10, 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13 shows the 
performance of the four different kernel of SMO Fold Cross Validation (k=2 to 10). 
 
 
Figure  6.4 Accuracy of SMO with k Cross Validations (k=2 to 10) 
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Table 6.10 Performance of SMO Normalized Polynomial Kernel Fold Cross Validation (k=2 to 
10) 
 
Fold 
TP 
Rate 
FP 
Rate 
Precision Recall 
F-
Measure 
ROC 
Area 
Accuracy 
Time 
Sec. 
2 0.934 0.063 0.937 0.934 0.934 0.936 93.41 4.46 
3 0.936 0.061 0.939 0.936 0.936 0.938 93.6 4.34 
4 0.938 0.059 0.94 0.938 0.938 0.94 93.78 4.4 
5 0.941 0.056 0.943 0.941 0.941 0.942 94.06 4.47 
6 0.953 0.042 0.953 0.951 0.951 0.952 95.06 4.3 
7 0.968 0.043 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.966 96.81 4.37 
8 0.977 0.051 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.966 97.82 4.33 
9 0.971 0.044 0.968 0.971 0.971 0.996 97.82 4.29 
10 0.986 0.025 0.976 0.986 0.984 0.982 98.3 4.01 
 
Table 6.11 Performance of SMO Polynomial Kernel Fold Cross Validation (k=2 to 10) 
Fold 
TP 
Rate 
FP 
Rate 
Precision Recall 
F-
Measure 
ROC 
Area 
Accuracy 
Time 
Sec. 
2 0.903 0.104 0.908 0.903 0.902 0.899 90.26 1.98 
3 0.924 0.081 0.927 0.924 0.924 0.921 92.39 1.83 
4 0.913 0.092 0.916 0.913 0.912 0.91 91.28 1.81 
5 0.937 0.067 0.939 0.937 0.937 0.935 93.69 1.8 
6 0.929 0.075 0.932 0.929 0.929 0.927 92.95 1.89 
7 0.933 0.07 0.935 0.933 0.933 0.931 93.32 2.07 
8 0.928 0.077 0.93 0.928 0.927 0.925 92.76 1.84 
9 0.929 0.076 0.931 0.929 0.928 0.926 92.86 1.84 
10 0.934 0.069 0.936 0.934 0.934 0.932 93.41 1.8 
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Table 6.12 S Performance of SMO PUK Kernel Fold Cross Validation (k=2 to 10) 
 
Fold 
TP 
Rate 
FP 
Rate 
Precision Recall 
F-
Measure 
ROC 
Area 
Accuracy 
Time 
Sec. 
2 0.903 0.093 0.907 0.903 0.903 0.905 90.26 4.3 
3 0.919 0.077 0.923 0.919 0.919 0.921 91.93 4.1 
4 0.92 0.077 0.922 0.92 0.92 0.922 92.02 4 
5 0.924 0.072 0.927 0.924 0.924 0.926 92.39 3.95 
8 0.927 0.07 0.929 0.927 0.927 0.928 92.67 3.4 
6 0.929 0.068 0.931 0.929 0.929 0.93 92.86 3.71 
7 0.929 0.067 0.932 0.929 0.93 0.931 92.95 3.52 
9 0.931 0.065 0.934 0.931 0.931 0.933 93.14 3.17 
10 0.94 0.064 0.94 0.932 0.932 0.939 94.23 3.1 
 
Table 6.13 Performance of SMO RBF Kernel Fold Cross Validation (k=2 to 10) 
Fold 
TP 
Rate 
FP 
Rate 
Precision Recall 
F-
Measure 
ROC 
Area 
Accuracy 
Time 
Sec. 
2 0.835 0.154 0.855 0.835 0.834 0.84 83.4879 3.05 
3 0.882 0.113 0.886 0.882 0.882 0.884 88.22 2.73 
4 0.891 0.106 0.894 0.891 0.892 0.893 89.15 2.71 
6 0.905 0.094 0.906 0.905 0.905 0.906 90.54 2.98 
9 0.915 0.086 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.914 91.47 2.8 
5 0.916 0.084 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 91.5584 2.8 
7 0.916 0.085 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.915 91.56 2.69 
8 0.923 0.078 0.923 0.923 0.923 0.922 92.30 2.67 
10 0.929 0.073 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.928 92.86 2.6 
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6.11.4  Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) Algorithm 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are biologically inspired form of distributed 
computing usually comprising of a set of nodes (including input, hidden and output) and 
weighted connections between them  (Chen et al. 2005).  Guo and Li define ANNs as a 
topology/architecture formed by organizing nodes into layers and linking the layers of 
neurons (Guo & Li 2008). The nodes are interconnected by weighted connections, and 
the weights are adjusted when data is presented to the network during a training process 
(Dayhoff & DeLeo 2001) 
A number of variations of neural networks are in use today in different 
applications, including in fraud detection. The use of ANNs in fraud detection spans 
almost all major forms of fraud including telecommunications fraud, financial fraud and 
computer intrusion fraud among others (Kou et al. 2004). In fraud detection and anomaly 
detection, ANNs are fundamentally used as classification tools (Chandola et al. 2009). 
Usually, a basic anomaly detection approach using neural networks involves two steps: 
training and testing. First, the network is trained on some part of the data to learn the 
different classes. Then, the remaining portion of the data is used to run the network to test 
accuracy and other performance indicators.  
ANNs provide a non-linear mapping from the input space to the output space so 
can learn from the given cases and generalize the internal patterns of a given data set 
(Guo & Li 2008). Thus, ANNs adapt the connection weights between neurons and 
approximate a mapping function that models the provided training data. Neural networks 
have the ability to learn distinct classes without knowledge of the data distribution 
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(Chandola et al. 2009). However, most classifications rely on accurately labelled data 
which is often not readily available, especially for online banking and credit card fraud 
detection (Chandola et al. 2009). In Credit Card fraud detection, the FALCON system, 
which the developers claim to be used by 65% of the credit systems worldwide, uses a 
Neural network (FICO 2010). Furthermore, VISA, Eurocard and Bank Of America 
(among others) use Neural technology in their Credit Card systems (Aleskerov et al. 
1997). The SAS fraud management system employs an ensemble of neural networks 
called Self Organizing Neural Network Arboretum (SONNA). Lastly, ACI‗s Proactive 
Risk Manager (PRM) also features a neural network in its architecture (IBM 2008).  
The downside to neural networks‘ distribution free generalisation is that they are 
prone to local minima and over-fitting (Bhattacharyya et al. 2011). When the ANN is 
learning, a stopping condition may be declared as the anticipated net training error after a 
training session. This value is often a global minimum relative to the network‘s training 
errors. Sometimes, the ANN stops learning and gets stuck at a local minimum instead of 
the desired global minimum. This situation is most commonly referred to as the local 
minimum problem. Another problem with ANNs is hidden neuron saturation, where  the 
hidden layer inputs are too high or too low such that the hidden layer output is almost 
close to the bounds of the activation function at that layer (Wang, X. G. et al. 2004). The 
other drawback with ANNs is their lack of adaptation to new data trends. At any point, 
ANNs will model only the data they have been trained on.  This means that when a 
statistically different data pattern is introduced, the ANN will need to be re-trained or it 
may not correctly classify the new pattern. Consequently, this dictates that ANNs be 
retrained on a regular basis to keep up with emerging data trends. In online banking, 
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ANNs are retrained after a defined period or after a certain number of examples have 
been collected.  
Recently, classification method using a NN was used for Malware detection. 
Generally, the classification procedure using the NN consisted of three steps, data 
preprocessing, data training, and testing. The data preprocessing was for the feature 
selection. In the data training, the selected features from the data preprocessing step was 
fed into the NN, and Malware and Benign classifier was generated through the NN. For 
the testing, the classifier was used to verify the efficiency of NN. In the experiment, an 
error BP (Back Propagation) algorithm was used. The best-known example of a neural 
network training algorithm, namely back propagation was employed. Back propagation 
algorithm neural network was used because of the large amount of input/output data and 
the overwhelming amount of complexity due to the fuzzy outputs. 
Figure 6.5 provides the overall accuracy rate for malware detection achieved through our 
experiments using Artificial Neural Networks with k cross validations, k= 
{2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}. Table 6.14 shows the performance of ANN Fold Cross Validation 
(k=2 to 10) 
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Figure  6.5 Accuracy of ANN with k Cross Validations (k=2 to 10) 
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Table 6.14 Performance of Artificial Neural Networks Fold Cross Validation (k=2 to 10) 
Fold 
TP 
Rate 
FP 
Rate 
Precision Recall 
F-
Measure 
ROC 
Area 
Accuracy 
Time 
Sec. 
2 0.857 0.248 0.882 0.857 0.847 0.742 65.96 16.26 
3 0.888 0.175 0.904 0.888 0.883 0.8 74.21 15.6 
4 0.827 0.244 0.863 0.827 0.815 0.77 73.38 15.52 
5 0.81 0.198 0.856 0.81 0.803 0.725 60.30 15.46 
6 0.828 0.235 0.865 0.828 0.817 0.773 73.47 15.43 
7 0.836 0.223 0.871 0.836 0.827 0.782 74.40 15.44 
8 0.832 0.213 0.869 0.832 0.823 0.768 70.22 15.43 
9 0.798 0.263 0.848 0.798 0.783 0.738 67.81 16.17 
10 0.864 0.183 0.881 0.864 0.859 0.783 70.87 15.43 
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6.11.5  Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression is a member of the family of methods called generalized linear 
models ("GLM"). The linear function of the predictor variables is calculated, and the 
result of this calculation is run through the link function. In logistic regression, the linear 
result is run through a logistic function, which runs from 0.0 (at negative infinity) and 
rises monotonically to 1.0 (at positive infinity). Along the way, it is 0.5 when the input 
value is exactly zero. Among other desirable properties, it is interesting to note that this 
logistic function only returns values between 0.0 and 1.0. Other GLMs operate similarly, 
but employ different link functions- some of which are also bound by 0.0 - 1.0, and some 
of which are not. 
For building linear logistic regression models, Lotus (Chan & Loh 2004) is a 
logistic regression tree learner for two class problems (Malware and Benign). The 
algorithm constructs logistic regression trees in a top-down way, emphasizes the 
importance of unbiased split variable selection through the use of a modified chi-square 
test, and uses only numeric attributes for constructing logistic models.  
In univariate regression equation, say y = a + b x + e, there is only one 
explanatory (or independent variable) x, while the other components in this relation are 
the response (or dependent variable) y, the coefficients a and b and the error term e. The 
response usually is a continuous random variable, for example Gaussian responses, which 
is the most popular case in regression, whilst in some other cases the response can take 
discreet values. Logistic regression is one example of these cases. The general graph of 
this model is represented by the following plot. 
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The response (or dependent variable) in logistic regression is usually dichotomous 
(i.e. measured at two levels), that is, it can take the value 1 with a probability of 
success p, or the value 0 with probability of failure 1-p. The logistic model in multivariate 
shape can take the following equation: 
      ,  ( ) -     [ 
 ( )
   ( )
 ]
                                                   (    ) 
where the constants            are called coefficients and                are 
the ―multivariate‖ explanatory variables. The detection (MLW) data are coded and 
considered as response variable    while all other features are considered as independent 
or explanatory variables.  
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The logistic regression model is 
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where            is the feature of API function calls, and the risk of malware is 
defined in (6.22) 
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The probability of a file to be a Malware is defined as follows:  
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The goal of logistic regression is to correctly predict the category of outcome for 
individual cases using the most parsimonious model. To achieve this aim, a model is 
created that includes all independent variables (or explanatory variables) that are 
significant (useful) in predicting the response variable. Several different options are 
available during model creation. Variables can be entered into the model in the order 
specified by the researcher or logistic regression can test the fit of the model after each 
coefficient is either added or deleted, called stepwise regression.  In R programming 
software, the command Step() can do this depending on Akaike's Information Criterion 
(AIC).   
Figure 6.6 provides the overall accuracy rate for malware detection achieved through our 
experiments using Logistic Regression with k cross validations, k= {2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}. 
Table 6.15 shows the performance of Logistic Regression Fold Cross Validation (k=2 to 
10). 
 
Figure  6.6 Accuracy of Logistic Regression with k Cross Validations (k=2 to 10) 
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6.11.6  J48 
J48 classifier is a C4.5 decision tree used for classification purposes. In order to 
classify a new item, the classifier first needs to create a decision tree based on the 
attribute values of the available training data. So, whenever it encounters a set of items 
(training set) it identifies the attribute that discriminates the various instances most 
clearly. This feature that is able to tell the most about the data instances for classifying 
them the best is said to have the highest information gain. 
Among the possible values of this feature, if there is any value for which there is 
no ambiguity, that is, when the data instances falling within its category have the same 
value for the target variable, then that branch is terminated and the target value arrived is 
Table 6.15 Performance of Logistic Regression with k Cross Validations (k=2 to 10) 
Fold 
TP 
Rate 
FP 
Rate 
Precision Recall 
F-
Measure 
ROC 
Area 
Accuracy 
Time 
Sec. 
2 0.924 0.076 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.958 92.39 70.53 
3 0.919 0.081 0.919 0.919 0.919 0.963 91.93 70.27 
4 0.93 0.07 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.968 93.04 71.16 
5 0.936 0.064 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.969 93.60 51.79 
6 0.928 0.073 0.928 0.928 0.928 0.969 92.76 50.88 
7 0.922 0.078 0.922 0.922 0.922 0.97 92.21 51.08 
8 0.924 0.076 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.965 92.39 51.21 
9 0.924 0.076 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.968 92.39 50.85 
10 0.93 0.07 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.97 93.04 52.69 
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assigned to it. Figure 6.7 provides the overall accuracy rate for malware detection 
achieved through our experiments using J48 with k cross validations, k= 
{2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10} and Table 6.16 provides the overall accuracy rate for malware 
detection achieved through our experiments using Naive Bayes with k cross validations, 
k= {2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}. 
 
Figure  6.7 Accuracy of J48 with k Cross Validations (k=2 to 10) 
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Table 6.16  Performance of J48 with k Cross Validations (k=2 to 10) 
Fold 
TP 
Rate 
FP 
Rate 
Precision Recall 
F-
Measure 
ROC 
Area 
Accuracy 
Time 
Sec. 
2 0.899 0.1 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.891 89.89 2.02 
3 0.917 0.082 0.918 0.917 0.917 0.919 91.74 1.9 
4 0.924 0.074 0.925 0.924 0.924 0.923 92.39 1.79 
5 0.931 0.067 0.932 0.931 0.931 0.93 93.14 1.86 
6 0.939 0.06 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.935 93.88 1.65 
7 0.935 0.064 0.936 0.935 0.935 0.942 93.51 1.67 
8 0.931 0.068 0.932 0.931 0.931 0.929 93.14 1.64 
9 0.937 0.062 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.946 93.69 1.68 
10 0.93 0.068 0.931 0.93 0.93 0.931 93.69 1.67 
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6.12  Evaluation and Validation Metrics 
Several classification techniques have been used in this research study and for comparing 
the performance of each algorithm, it is important to assess how good a classification 
algorithm is able to correctly predict variables. The proposed method for malware 
detection would be evaluated based on the following standard measures:  
True Positive (TP): Number of correctly identified malicious code,  
False Positive (FP): Number of wrongly identified benign code, when a detector 
identifies a benign file as a malware. 
True Negative (TN): Number of correctly identified benign code. 
False Negative (FN): Number of wrongly identified malicious code, when a detector fails 
to identify the malware because the virus is new and no signature is available yet. 
The efficiency of the proposed method would be evaluated using performance 
measures such as detection rate, false alarm rate and overall accuracy that are defined as 
follows: 
Positive (P): The predicted attribute belong to the right class. 
                                                        (    ) 
Negative (N): The predicted attribute belong to the right class.  
                                                                (    ) 
  
229 
True detection Rate (TP rate): Percentage of correctly identified malicious code.  
         
  
     
  
  
 
                              (    ) 
False alarm Rate (FP rate):  Percentage of wrongly identified benign code, given by: 
         
  
     
  
  
 
                              (    ) 
Overall Accuracy: Percentage of correctly identified code, given by: 
                  
     
           
  
     
   
                 (    ) 
Two other fundamental measures used for classification effectiveness are precision and 
recall.  
The precision: the probability of records classified as positive which are classified 
correctly.  
           
  
     
                                        (    ) 
The recall: Recall in this context is also referred to as the True Positive Rate. It is the 
probability of positive records that have been correctly identified. 
        
  
     
                                              (    ) 
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F-Measure: It is a measure of a test's accuracy by combining recall and precision scores 
into a single measure of performance, usually it is between 0.0 and 1.0, closer to 1 being 
a good score and closer to 0.0 being a poor score. 
     
                
                
                             (    ) 
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve: In a ROC curve the true positive 
rate is plotted in function of the false positive rate (100-Specificity) for different cut-off 
points. Each point on the ROC curve represents a sensitivity/specificity pair 
corresponding to a particular decision threshold. A test with perfect discrimination (no 
overlap in the two distributions) has a ROC curve that passes through the upper left 
corner (100% sensitivity, 100% specificity). Therefore the closer the ROC curve is to the 
upper left corner, the higher the overall accuracy of the test. Usually, ROC area higher 
(closer) to 1 is considered good, and closer to 0.0 is considered poor. 
6.13  Result 
The implementation involves employment of several software such as; WEKA version 
3.6.4 software for performing the classification, and MatLab for feature selection. Table 
6.17 shows the effectiveness of different data mining approaches. We had applied k cross 
validation, with k={2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10} for each of the data mining algorithms, and we 
observed that with k = 10 most of the algorithms provided the best accuracy. By 
comparing the evaluation measures achieved by each of the data mining techniques, we 
observe that SVM - Normalized PolyKernel has performed the best, and NN-
Backpropagation exhibited the worst results. This could be attributed to the fact that and 
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NN-Backpropagation follows a heuristic path and usually converges only to locally 
optimal solutions and can suffer from multiple local minima, while SVM - Normalized 
PolyKernel always finds a unique global minimum. Through our experimental analysis 
we found that SVM-Normalized Polynomial Kernel provided an average of 98.5% true 
positive rate. With 99% true detection rate of malware as malware, the average weight for 
the false alarm rate achieved was about 2% in this case. Overall, SVM-Normalized 
Polynomial Kernel had outperformed all other classification methods in all measures, 
namely, TP Rate, FP Rate, Precision, Recall, F-Measure and ROC Area. 
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Table 6.17 Results Nine Classifiers at  k = 10 
  
TP 
Rate 
FP Rate Precision Recall 
F-
Measure 
ROC Area Class 
J48 
  0.919 0.057 0.947 0.919 0.933 0.931 Malware 
 
0.943 0.081 0.913 0.943 0.928 0.931 Benign 
Weighted Avg. 0.93 0.068 0.931 0.93 0.93 0.931   
KNN  
0.938 0.041 0.962 0.938 0.95 0.966 Malware 
 
0.959 0.062 0.933 0.959 0.946 0.966 Benign 
Weighted Avg. 0.948 0.051 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.966   
NB  
0.913 0.094 0.915 0.913 0.914 0.94 Malware 
 
0.906 0.087 0.904 0.906 0.905 0.936 Benign 
Weighted Avg. 0.91 0.09 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.938   
NN - 
BackPropagation 
 
0.983 0.301 0.82 0.983 0.894 0.744 Malware 
 
0.699 0.017 0.966 0.699 0.811 0.839 Benign 
Weighted Avg. 0.864 0.183 0.881 0.864 0.859 0.783   
Simple Logistic  
0.931 0.07 0.936 0.931 0.934 0.97 Malware 
 
0.93 0.069 0.924 0.93 0.927 0.97 Benign 
Weighted Avg. 0.93 0.07 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.97   
SVM - Normalized 
PolyKernel 
 
0.99 0.018 0.982 0.99 0.986 0.981 Malware 
 
0.981 0.031 0.969 0.981 0.983 0.982 Benign 
Weighted Avg. 0.986 0.025 0.976 0.986 0.984 0.982   
SVM - PolyKernel  
0.966 0.102 0.913 0.966 0.939 0.932 Malware 
 
0.898 0.034 0.96 0.898 0.928 0.932 Benign 
Weighted Avg. 0.934 0.069 0.936 0.934 0.934 0.932   
SVM – Puk  
0.901 0.033 0.968 0.901 0.933 0.934 Malware 
 
0.967 0.099 0.898 0.967 0.931 0.934 Benign 
Weighted Avg. 0.932 0.064 0.935 0.932 0.932 0.934   
SVM- Radial Basis 
Function (RBF) 
 
0.94 0.084 0.925 0.94 0.933 0.928 Malware 
 
0.916 0.06 0.932 0.916 0.924 0.928 Benign 
Weighted Avg. 0.929 0.073 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.928   
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Chapter 7 : Conclusions  
              
“Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain.” 
— The Wizard of Oz 
7.1  Overview 
The final chapter of the dissertation provides an overall summary of this research study 
and briefly describes the proposed techniques, the results achieved, and the conclusions 
arrived at. The first section will be an open discussion on the state-of-the-art of this 
research topic. The next sections and subsections will summarise the various malware 
detection techniques adopted and their contribution to the information security field of 
knowledge. The last section throws some light on possible future research directions, 
along with final thoughts. 
7.2  Discussion  
Malware contains code that is designed to perform illegal activities, to cause damage, and 
to affect the integrity and the functionality of the digital system.  This thesis has proposed 
and evaluated novel techniques to automatically detect hidden and obfuscated malware, 
aiming to address the malware threats by proposing a variety of novel digital forensic and 
data mining techniques. These techniques take a step to fill the lacuna found in literature 
to detect zero-day malware effectively due to the recent obfuscation strategies adopted by 
malware writers.  
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Malware attackers are taking advantage of our increased reliance on digital 
systems. As the number of cybercrime and computer attacks have increased 
exponentially, there is a need for developing standards in evidence collection and 
conducting malware analysis effectively as part of both the incident response and forensic 
analysis processes. The continued growth and diversification of the Internet has resulted 
in the increasing sophistication of tools and methods used to conduct computer system 
attacks and intrusions, these attacks can take in physical or logical places of a computer.  
Among these attacks, zero-day malware forms the biggest threat to information security. 
With more and more use of computers, portable devices and the Internet in everyday life, 
identification of new or unknown malware has become a major challenge in digital 
forensics and computer security. Hence, this research has focused on detecting such 
malware that lie hidden in the physical and logical space of a computer, evading from 
anti-virus scanners. 
7.2.1  State-Of-The-Art 
Cyber criminals are leveraging innovation at a fast pace to target many 
organizations, and security vendors cannot match this pace (Stabek et al. 2010). Effective 
deterrents to cybercrime are not known, available, or accessible to many practitioners, 
many of whom underestimate the scope and severity of the problem (McCombie et al. 
2009; Watters 2009). In our view the key for fast speed in malware growth is the lack of 
understanding of the various types of hidden malware and their capabilities to exploit file 
system vulnerabilities. Security breaches are increasing in frequency and sophistication. 
This thesis presented along all the chapters details have been presented for the 
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abovementioned attacking trend with a view to understand the various behaviour of 
hidden malicious code that could be categorized as distinct malware types. Organizations 
should understand how they are viewed by cyber criminals in terms of attack vectors, 
systems of interest, and process vulnerabilities, so that they can better protect themselves 
from the Zeus generations and other attacks.  
The normalization of different variants of malware to a single normal form could 
be effective, but studies indicate that they do not always lead to convergence. Certain 
heuristic methods also result in high false positives, thereby warranting the need for new 
methods that leverage on the knowledge that could be gained from the anomalies of these 
obfuscated malware.  
7.2.2  Proposed Detection Methods 
This dissertation focuses on the research problem of detection of hidden and obfuscated 
malware, which is generally considered as the first step in the malware defense. With 
proper identification of malware, it is possible to defend against infection. Unfortunately, 
there are multiple reasons why it is unlikely that one identification method will be 
universally effective. Hence, in this dissertation, multiple research problems related to the 
infection strategies of malware authors have been studied in Chapter 1. These strategies 
attempt to bypass the most popular malware detection method, which is based on fixed 
code signatures. In this research, five broadly classified methods that have adopted the 
potential techniques to counter such obfuscated malware strategies have been proposed.  
They are:  
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1. Forensic analysis of the NTFS – to detect hidden malware in NTFS file system slack 
space partitions,  
2. Extract features out of executable binaries automatically to perform statistical 
differentiation of the op-code and API calls frequencies of malware and benign 
programs. 
3. OP-code based detection – to detect anomalies and classify unknown malware based 
on the extended x86 IA-32 binary assembly instructions' frequency statistics, using i) 
Maximum Relevance (MR) filter heuristic, ii) Artificial Neural Net Input Gain 
Measurement Approximation (ANNIGMA), and iii) combination of MR and 
ANNIGMA. 
4. API calls similarity based detection of unknown and obfuscated malware using 
various distance measures of vector models to detect obfuscated malware families. 
5. API call based detection-  to effectively detect and classify  malware using ten robust 
supervised machine learning algorithms on API function call features.   
All the above mentioned methods are fully automated and work on binary executables to 
detect hidden and obfuscated malware effectively as well as efficiently to address the 
zero-day malware problem.  
7.3  Forensic Analysis of the NTFS 
This research investigated the offline NTFS file systems and proposed effective digital 
forensic techniques that could be used to analyse and acquire evidences of hidden 
malware in NTFS disk images.  An innovative methodology was proposed and evaluated 
to effectively detect hidden malware in physical space of a computer. Since malware 
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attackers take advantage of the NTFS weaknesses and the inability of existing Anti-virus 
to check the slack space, a guideline to investigate slack space for identifying known and 
unknown malware forms a significant contribution of the study.  
Recent methods adopted by computer intruders, attackers and malware are to target 
hidden and deleted data so that they could evade from virus scanners and become 
extremely difficult to be identified using existing digital forensic tools.  This work has 
attempted to explore the difficulties involved in digital forensics, especially in conducting 
NTFS disk image analysis and to propose digital forensic analysis procedure or steps to 
identify certain hidden malware effectively, while they reside in the system invisible to 
popular anti-virus scanners. 
Through this empirical study, it is observed that the boot sector of the NTFS file 
system could be used as a vehicle to hide data by computer attackers as there is a 
potential file system weakness.  The knowledge of file systems is important for digital 
forensics, as several techniques to hide data such as slack space and hidden attributes are 
being recently adopted by attackers.  This is a potential NTFS file system weakness to be 
addressed and research in this domain area could lead to effective solution for the open 
problem of detecting new malicious codes that make use of such an obfuscated mode of 
attack.  The results of the experiments conducted in this work show that the existing 
forensic software tools are not competent enough to comprehensively detect all hidden 
data in boot sectors.  
As a first step to address this problem, a three-stage forensic analysis process 
consisting of nine steps is proposed to facilitate the experimental study.  The results 
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gathered by following these proposed steps are reported.  By adopting such a 
comprehensive process, this research could successfully identify all the unknown hidden 
malware in the $Boot file that had previously escaped undetected when existing forensic 
tools were used.  
This pilot study has adopted a few forensic techniques and effective manual 
inspections of the NTFS file image. With these observations an automated tool based on 
the proposed process was developed to facilitate forensic analysis of the NTFS disk 
image in an efficient and comprehensive manner.  Future plan is to extract and 
extrapolate malware signatures effectively as well as intelligently for any existing and 
even new malware that use hidden and obfuscated modes of attack. 
Verification and Validation: The utilities described above to perform the forensic 
investigation steps have built-in MD5 hashing features. In digital forensic analysis, using 
a hashing technique is important to ensure data integrity and to identify which values of 
data have been maliciously changed as well as to explore known data objects.  In 
addition, the ‗Check the Data Integrity‘ step verifies the integrity of data again for test of 
congruence.  Hence, verification and validation method is a simple process of checking 
the presence or absence of data in slack space, which determines the presence or absence 
of hidden malware correctly. 
7.4  OP-Code Based Detection  
Malware that make use of obfuscation of extended x86 IA-32 operation codes (op-codes) 
pose a great challenge for malware detectors as they can easily evade current signature-
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based as well as heuristic-based detection engines. A novel approach has been proposed 
that combines op-code frequency statistics and hybrid wrapper-filter based feature 
selection technique in order to design a malware detector for identifying the anomalies of 
malware infecting the logical space of a computer.  
With evasion techniques such as packers, polymorphism and metamorphism, 
recent malware is able to defeat current signature based detection techniques. In this 
chapter, a novel signature-free method for the detection of such obfuscated malware was 
proposed. Instead of using signature, we have used frequency statistics of op-codes with a 
wrapper-induction algorithm. One of the main contributions of this research is the 
development of a fully-automated algorithm to unpack, de-obfuscate and reverse engineer 
the binary executable without any need for manual inspection of assembly codes, and 
thereby we are able to find the op-code frequency statistics without any manual 
intervention. 
 To compute the frequency statistics for all op-codes each time for each executable 
during the scanning process is a difficult task.  Hence, a novel hybrid wrapper-filter based 
signature-free approach to select the most important op-codes for this malware detection 
task is used. The novelty of our approach is that this integrates knowledge (from the 
intrinsic characteristics of data) obtained by the filter approach into the wrapper approach 
and combines the wrapper‘s heuristic score with the filter‘s ranking score in the wrapper 
stage of the hybrid. The main novelty is that this approach is signature-free and is able 
detect the malware variants that are very hard to defect with signature-based approaches. 
The combined heuristics in the hybrid (Maximum Relevance (MR) and Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN) based wrapper approach, where Artificial Neural Network Input Gain 
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Measurement Approximation (ANNIGMA)) (MR-ANNIGMA) takes the advantages of 
the complementary properties of the both filter and wrapper heuristics helps to guide the 
wrapper to find optimal and compact op-code subsets. Experimental results on real world 
malware and benign datasets show that our frequency statistics based approach achieves 
an accuracy of 97.529% with a very compact set of op-codes. Some limitations of the 
proposed approach could be avoided by applying other wrapper approaches and rule-
generation processes. 
7.5  API Feature Based Detection 
The op-code base detection approach for malware detection exhibited good performance 
in detecting unkown malware.  However, the behaviour patterns could not be studied.  
Hence, the next research step involved extracting behaviour patterns for detecting 
anomalies of such zero-day malware infecting the executables in the logical space of the 
computer. It is a common practice to undergo manual unpacking or static unpacking of 
executables using existing software tools, and to use human expertise in analysing the 
application programming interface calls for malware detection.  However, extracting 
these features from the unpacked executables for reverse obfuscation is time consuming, 
labour intensive, and requires deep understanding of kernel and low-level programming 
such as assembly programming. Thus, security researchers and the anti-virus industry are 
facing a herculean task in extracting payloads hidden within packed executables with 
much human intervention.  
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7.5.1  API Behaviour Analysis  
A statistical analysis of the Windows API calling sequence reflects the behaviour of a 
particular piece of code. In this research project, the API calls from the binary of a 
program are extracted to analyse the most common malware behaviour patterns and to 
classify program executables as malicious or benign. The extracted calls are subjected to 
a statistical test to determine the malware class based on suspicious behaviour. The entire 
static detection process was a fully-automated system and a four-step methodology was 
adopted for developing the system. Experimental tests were conducted using 21942 
samples of malware and arrived at six main categories of suspicious behaviour of API 
call features.  These being i) Search files, ii) Copy/Delete files, iii) Get file information, 
iv) Move Files, v) Read /Write files and vi) Change file attributes.  Among these, API 
calls for Read /Write files were predominantly used by malware as a vehicle to infect the 
program. 
In the research, the behavioural and structural features based on API calls are 
automatically extracted from the binary of a program. The extracted features are 
subjected to a statistical n-gram analysis to classify a program as either malicious or 
benign effectively with the aid of a supervised SVM machine learning technique. In the 
field of analysis the behavious of API finction calls four regions we covered. The first 
and foremost one is, outlining of a methodology to extract behaviour features of API calls 
that relate to various malware behaviour such as i) hooking of the system services, 
ii)  creating or modifying files, iii) getting information from the file for making changes 
about the DLLs loaded by the malware. Second is providing a statistical analysis of the 
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API calls from the programs using n-gram model. The n-gram analyses the similarities 
and the distance of unknown malware with known behaviour so that obfuscated malware 
could be detected efficiently. Third developing a fully-automated tool to unpack, de-
obfuscate and reverse engineer the program codes without any need for manual 
inspection of assembly codes. The last one is, applying SVM machine learning to train 
the classifier for a robust identification of known as well as unknown malware. Our 
experiments have shown the initial experimental result of 96.5% accuracy for unigrams is 
still very promising as a benchmark for improvements in our future research work. 
7.5.2  API Similarity based detection   
The proposed similarity based detection of unknown and obfuscated malware using API 
call features as an effective method in classifying and identifying zero day malware with 
existing malware families. This dissertation has proposed an approach to use frequency of 
occurrence of each Windows Application Programming Interface (API) calls with 
similarity mining analysis to detect new malware based on the similarities of distance 
measures. Different distance measures were implemented and similarity analysis were 
performed by using eight commonly adopted distance measures in vector models, namely  
Cosine, Bray-Curtis, Canberra, Chebyshev, Manhattan, Correlation, Euclidean, and 
Hamming distance similarity measure for Nearest Neighbor (NN). 
The experimental investigations of the similarity analysis on large datasets of recent 
unknown malware and benign executables conclude that malware exhibit much similarity 
of API call features that can be used to classify them into their families effectively, and 
they are very much dissimilar from benign datasets.  Also, the study reveals that there is 
  
243 
no similarity among benign files resulting in accurate identification of all benign files. 
Our fully automated system implementing the proposed approach is fast and effective and 
uses several similarity measures.  
The experimental result of the similarity analysis aided in the malware classification and 
was evaluated using very large real-life malware dataset. The Similarity distance system 
used on our experiment was able to automatically identify all malware variants. We 
showed how to detect as a variant of the original malware. 
In order to provide an accurate result of the we have taken the mean values for 8 different 
similarity measurements applied to the entire dataset, when the threshold for the 
similarity ratio is less than or equal to 0.5. The overall results demonstrate that there is 
low distance between malware variants but not with the benign programs. Also, the 
results showed there is high distance between benign dataset.  
Similarity analysis is very efficient and effective to detect Malware variants from the 
same family or different families of Malware.  Also, the experiments confirm that there is 
no similarity among the benign files, which is logical and true. Another important 
observation is that it is very hard to find similarity between Malware dataset and benign 
dataset, thereby validating that the proposed system is able to clearly distinguish between 
malware and benign datasets. In conclusion, Malware can be classified according to 
similarity and further, similarly test can be applied to detect malware variants. The 
proposed similarity based detection and classification of malware is further improved in 
performance by using feature selection, especially when large datasets require more 
computing memory and time for processing the extracted features. 
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7.5.3  Data Mining of API Call Features  
Countermeasures such as antivirus detectors are unable to detect new malware and are in 
search of employing effective techniques, since the latest new malware adopt 
obfuscations to evade detection. With an exponential growth in unknown malware arising 
from innumerable automated obfuscations, there is a need to establish malware detection 
methods that are robust and efficient. In this thesis, we have proposed and developed a 
machine learning framework using eight different classifiers to detect unknown malware 
and to achieve high accuracy rate. In this work, iterative patterns based on Windows API 
calls have been used and statistical measures have been adopted to further improve the 
classification results. Our experiments conducted on large malware datasets have shown 
very promising results achieving more than 98.5% accuracy rate. 
The main objective of the research reported was to propose and develop a 
machine learning framework to detect and classify unknown malware and to achieve high 
accuracy rate and low false alarm rate. Signature based detection method used by 
countermeasure is not enough to get an acceptable protection against the new malware. 
Malware detection by using machine learning is very much required by anti-virus 
vendors to detect unknown malware along with signature based detection for detecting 
existing malware. Since most Anti-Virus engines manage to have a detection rate of over 
90% (Gavrilut et al. 2009), the detection framework proposed to detect zero-day attack is 
a very significant contribution. In this work, iterative patterns based on Windows API 
calls have been used and statistical measures to further improve the classification results.  
Overall, the salient achievements of the research reported in this chapter are: 
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- The proposed machine learning framework has resulted in high accuracies in 
malware detection. This is attributed to the unique feature selection of API sequences 
and the development of a fully-automated system used for evaluating data mining 
algorithms on large datasets of unknown malware. 
- The proposed system is efficient as it uses filter approaches to be able to successfully 
detect malware with a smaller feature set. The term frequency of reduced API feature 
set using SVM (normalised poly kernel) has performed the best among the nine 
classifiers evaluated in this study. 
- The system is signature-free and does not require knowledge or detailed study about 
the API sequence of execution to classify a malware. 
Code obfuscation techniques can modify the parent code to produce offspring copies 
which have the same functionality but with different signatures to infect the logical space 
of a computer in order to evade the ‗Signature-based‘ detection process easily. Since 
there are many to generate new obfuscated code, new generations of evaluated signatures 
are growing and the level of sophistication of unknown malware is also increasing. 
However, data mining of the offspring copies through pattern recognition can detect the 
obfuscated code. Hence, the in the final step of this research, data mining approach was 
adopted for malware and benign classification.  
Also, a data mining approach within a machine learning framework was proposed 
to detect malicious programs, to learn from the behaviour of existing malicious and 
benign database of very large data sets of obfuscated unknown malware and benign 
programs.  Supervised learning was  performed using a dataset to train, validate and test, 
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an array of classifiers. The robust classifiers adopted were; The Naive Bayes (NB) 
Algorithm, The k−Nearest Neighbor (kNN) Algorithm, The Sequential Minimal 
Optimization (SMO) Algorithm with 4 differents kernels (SMO - Normalized 
PolyKernel, SMO – PolyKernel, SMO – Puk, and SMO- Radial Basis Function (RBF)), 
Backpropagation Neural Networks Algorithm, Logistic Regression, and J48 decision tree. 
Experiments conducted on large malware datasets resulted in 98.5% accuracy rate of 
malware detection.  
7.6  Future Work and Final Thoughts  
As future work, the following are the intended research possibilities: 
NTFS File System versions: The investigations on malware infection in physical space 
described in Chapter 3 has focused on NTFS file system While Windows XP and 
Windows Server 2003 use the same NTFS version, Windows Vista uses the NTFS 3.1, 
and currently there is NTFS 4.0 and NTFS 5.0 released in the market. Therefore, malware 
detection in the physical space of the NTFS file system partition should cater to all the 
NTFS versions.  
Combine Features: Chapters 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 Chapter 6 proposed signature-
free detection based on op-code and API calls, independently and future investigation 
would be to combine the classifiers intelligently. Combining the output of different 
classifiers instead of choosing the best one among them could be investigated in terms of 
detection accuracy and ROC curve. Moreover, the classifiers could be trained on different 
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datasets and to combine the classifiers learned on op-code and API calls efficiently and 
the final class output could be assigned using a voting strategy. 
Time Complexity: Further improvements for real-time implementation of the fully-
automated malware detection systems would include integrating both physical space 
forensic and logical space analysis, and taking into account the space-time complexity of 
the various algorithms implemented in this research work. 
New Methods to Improve Detection: It is imperative to keep employing new techniques 
for studying the new polymorphic and metamorphic malware attacks in order to counter 
them. There are ways that the proposed method could be bypassed such as using lengthy 
loops or using run-time environment parameters in a polymorphic exploit. However, this 
requires the attackers to carefully craft their exploit code. In such a case, it would be 
worth further study of new techniques to detect these polymorphic exploits and the focus 
would be on generalizing the method for less obvious sequences of byte decoding. 
New Approaches to Enhance the Accuracy: In future studies on completely new 
techniques or improving the proposed techniques to enhance the accuracy of static 
analysis would be explored: Static analysis is the basis of the three works proposed in this 
dissertation. In particular, it is the key to successfully characterizing program behaviours 
for metamorphic malware detection. Therefore, it is important to enhance its accuracy 
further to achieve near 100%. Through the investigations conducted in this research 
work, several ideas have been generated to improve the proposed static analysis approach 
that characterizes program behaviours based on system calls. These new ideas could be 
explored further. 
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Combined Static and Dynamic Analysis: Combining localized dynamic analysis with 
static analysis would be another prospective research worth exploring.  Such 
investigations could be used to detect live malware targeting web. Many techniques can 
thwart static analysis such as using self-modifying code or indirect control transfer 
instructions. Making obfuscated system calls is a technique that specifically bypasses the 
static analysis approach. Using dynamic analysis techniques can address these problems. 
For instance, techniques could be designed to ―locally" emulate instruction execution to 
deal with self-contained behaviours such as self-modifying and the obfuscated system 
calls. Static analysis could then be used to develop information to determine a ―local" 
scope for a round of emulated instruction execution. 
Modeling System Calls for Intrusion Detection: Another improvement in the proposed 
approach of API call feature extraction is by incorporating more types of system call 
parameters into pattern generation: This will improve the accuracy of pattern generation 
and similarity analysis. Besides the target address of a system call, the function 
argument(s) of a system call could also be used in pattern generation. The information on 
what function argument(s) a system call is using can possibly be obtained in two ways: 1) 
from system call specifications; 2) from instruction compilation heuristics: a parameter is 
usually passed through specific registers, i.e., eax. 
Characterize the Malicious Behavior of Applications: Another topic of interest would 
be to investigate new approaches that characterize malicious program behaviours beside 
the system call based ones.  For instance, looping structure for processing various control 
and commands in malicious bot binaries is a characteristic behaviour of bot software. 
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Combining Classifiers: In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 different classifiers were discussed and 
compared, the results identified the best was SVM - Normalized Polynomial kernel, 
based on classification accuracy and ROC curves. Future work could combine classifiers 
as combining classifiers have given excellent results in other areas of application. 
Combining the output of different classifiers instead of choosing the best one among 
them could be investigated to achieve better accuracy. Also, in the current research, 
classifiers were trained on the same dataset and future work would experiment on training 
with different datasets. For different datasets, to combine the classifiers learned on op-
code features and API call features would be explored. In the case of training the same 
dataset, several classifiers could be employed to result in a final class output assigned by 
adopting a voting strategy. 
More Classifiers: The machine learning data mining framework proposed in this 
research could include more classification techniques.  Several other classifiers could be 
added to this list including random forest and bagging in future research.  
Time and Space Complexity: The major limitation for real time implementation of such 
a data mining framework in malware detection is the time and space complexity of the 
machine learning and other algorithms involved. The disassembly, parsing and feature 
extraction are time consuming processes and require a lot of memory space as well. In an 
automated framework these processes need to be streamlined for better efficiency. 
Real World Implementation: This work was focused on academic research and the 
implementation of the proposed data mining framework for a real world malware 
detection system that could be used commercially was not discussed.  
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Real World Commercialisation: This work has an academic research focus and hence 
the commercialisation of the proposed malware detection methods and implementation 
has not been discussed here. 
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Abbreviations  
AIC   Information Criterion 
AIS Artificial Immune System  
API Application Programming Interfaces 
ATA/IDE AT Attachment interface  
AV Anti-Virus  
BE  Backward Elimination 
CFG Control Flow Graph 
CFG Control Flow Graph Personal Computer 
CFG  Control Flow Graph 
COFF  Common Object File Format 
COM Command file 
CPL  Control Panel Applets 
CPU Control Processing Unit  
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check 
DLL  Dynamic Link Library 
DOS  Disk Operating System 
EIDIP Enhanced Digital Investigation Process 
FAT  File Allocation Table  
FN False Negative 
FP False Positive 
GLM generalized linear models  
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HMM Hidden Markov Model 
IACIS 
International Association of Computer Investigation 
Specialists 
IAT Import Address Table 
IDA Pro  Interactive Disassembler Pro 
IDIP Integrated Digital Investigation Model 
KB Kilobyte 
kNN  k-Nearest Neighbor 
LMSW   Load Machine Status Word  
MC  Malicious Code 
MFT Master File Table 
MI   Mutual Information  
MPCGEN Mass Code Generator 
MR  Maximum Relevance 
NB Naive Bayes  
NGVCK  Next Generation Virus Creation Kit 
NIJ National Institute of Justice 
NN Neural Network 
NOP No Operation Performed 
NTFS Windows NT File System  
OEP  Original Entry Point 
OS Operating System 
PC  Personal Computer  
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PCA  principle component analysis  
PDF  Portable Document Format 
PDG  Program Dependence Graph  
PE Portable Executable 
PS-MPC Phalcon/Skism Mass Produced Code Generator  
PUI Process Under Inspection 
RAM  Random Access Memory  
RCFL Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory 
ROC   Receiver Operating Characteristic 
SCR  Screensavers 
SCSI Small Computer System Interface  
SDSC San Diego Supercomputer Center  
SMO Sequential Minimal Optimization  
SVM Support Vector Machine 
SWGDE Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence 
TB Terabyte 
TLS  Thread Local Storage 
TN True Negative 
TP True Positive 
VM Virtual Machine 
 
  
  
254 
Bibliography 
Adankon, M. & Cheriet, M. (2011). 'Help-Training for semi-supervised support vector 
machines', Computer Analysis of Images and Patterns - Pattern Recognition, vol. 44, no. 
9, pp. 2220–2230. 
 
Ahmad, A. (2002). 'The Forensic Chain-of-Evidence Model: Improving the Process of 
Evidence Collection in Incident Handling Procedures', The 6th Pacific Asia Conference 
on Information Systems: Citeseer, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
Alazab, M. (2009). 'Effective forensic techniques for static analysis of NTFS file system 
analysis', Annual Research Conference: 7 Nov, Ballarat, VIC, p. 23. 
 
Alazab, M. (2010). 'Static Analysis of Obfuscated Malware', Annual Research 
Conference: University of Ballarat, 14 Nov, Ballarat, VIC, p. 17. 
 
Alazab, M. (2011). 'Static analysis for Anomaly and Similarity based detection', Annual 
Research Conference: University of Ballarat, 4 Nov, Ballarat, VIC, p. 87. 
 
Alazab, M., Layton, R., Venkataraman, S. & Watters, P. (2010). 'Malware Detection 
Based on Structural and Behavioural Features of API calls', The 1st International Cyber 
Resilience Conference: Security Research Centre, Edith Cowan University, Perth, 
Western Australia, pp. 1-10. 
 
Alazab, M., Venkataraman, S. & Watters, P. (2009). 'Effective digital forensic analysis of 
the NTFS disk image', Ubiquitous Computing and Communication Journal, vol. 4, no. 1, 
pp. 551- 558. 
 
Alazab, M., Venkataraman, S. & Watters, P. (2010). 'Towards Understanding Malware 
Behaviour by the Extraction of API Calls', Cybercrime and Trustworthy Computing 
Workshop: IEEE Computer Society, 19-20 July, Ballarat, VIC, pp. 52-59. 
 
Alazab, M., Venkatraman, S. & Watters, P. (2009). 'Digital forensic techniques for static 
analysis of NTFS images', The 4th International Conference on Information Technology: 
IEEE Computer Society, 3- 5 Jun, Amman- Jordan, pp. 1- 9. 
 
Alazab, M., Venkatraman, S., Watters, P. & Alazab, M. (2011). 'Zero-day Malware 
Detection based on Supervised Learning Algorithms of API call Signatures', P. Vamplew, 
A. Stranieri, K.-L. Ong, P. Christen & P. Kennedy (eds), The 9th Australasian Data 
Mining Conference: Australian Computer Society, 1- 2 Dec, Ballarat, VIC, vol. 121. 
 
Alazab, M., Watters, P., Venkatraman, S., Alazab, A. & Alazab, M. (2011). 'Cybercrime: 
Current Trends of Malware Threats', The International Conference in Global Security 
  
255 
Safety and Sustainability / International Conference on e-Democracy: Springer, 
Thessaloniki, Greece, pp. 1- 7. 
 
Aleskerov, E., Freisleben, B. & Rao, B. (1997). 'CARDWATCH: a neural network based 
database mining system for credit card fraud detection', The IEEE/IAFE Computational 
Intelligence for Financial Engineering: IEEE Computer Society, 23-25 Mar, New York, 
USA pp. 220-226. 
 
Alperovitch, D. D., T.; Greve, P.; Kashyap, R.; Marcus, D.; Masiello, S.; Paget, F. & 
Schmugar, C. (2011). 'McAfee Labs - 2011 Threats Predictions', McAfee, Inc. 
 
Alsagoff, S. (2011). 'Manual Removal of Malware – Is It Still Relevant?', International 
Journal of Research and Reviews in Information Security and Privacy, vol. 1, no. 1. 
 
Altunaya, M., Leyfferb, S., Linderothc, J. & Xieb, Z. (2011). 'Optimal response to attacks 
on the open science grid', Computer Networks, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 61-73. 
 
Andrew, M. (2007). 'Defining a Process Model for Forensic Analysis of Digital Devices 
and Storage Media', Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering: IEEE 
Computer Society, 10-12 Apr, Bell Harbor, WA, pp. 16 - 30. 
 
Attaluri, S. (2007). 'Detecting metamorphic viruses using profile Hidden Markov 
Models', Master Degree thesis, San Jose State University. 
 
Attaluri, S. & McGhee, S. (2009). 'Profile hidden Markov models and metamorphic virus 
detection', Journal in Computer Virology, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 151-169. 
 
Aycock, J. (2006). Computer Viruses and Malware, vol. 22, Advances in Information 
Security, Springer. 
 
Bakshi, A., Dixit, V. & Mehta, K. (2010). 'Virus: A Menace for Information Security', 
Global Journal of Enterprise Information System, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 58-70. 
 
Balagani, K. S. & Phoha, V. V. (2010). 'On the Feature Selection Criterion Based on an 
Approximation of Multidimensional Mutual Information', IEEE Transactions on Pattern 
Analysis and Machine Intelligence, vol. 32, no. 7, pp. 1342-1343. 
 
Balakrishnan, A. & Schulze, C. (2005). 'Code Obfuscation Literature Survey', vol. 19, pp. 
1-10. 
 
Ban, T., Ando, R. & Kadobayashi, Y. (2010). 'A Fast Kernel on Hierarchial Tree 
Structures and Its Application to Windows Application Behavior Analysis', in K. Wong, 
B. Mendis & A. Bouzerdoum (eds), Neural Information Processing. Models and 
Applications, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 6444, pp. 267-274. 
 
  
256 
Baryamureeba, V. & Tushabe, F. (2006). 'The Enhanced Digital Investigation Process 
Model', Asian Journal of Information Technology, vol. 5, no. 7, pp. 790-794. 
 
Bhattacharyya, S., Jha, S., Tharakunnel, K. & Westland, J. C. (2011). 'Data mining for 
credit card fraud: A comparative study', Decision Support Systems, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 
602-613. 
 
Bilar, D. (2007). 'Opcodes as predictor for malware', Int. J. Electron. Secur. Digit. 
Forensic, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 156-168. 
 
Birrer, B., Raines, R., Baldwin, R., Oxley, M. & Rogers, S. (2009). 'Using Qualia and 
Hierarchical Models in Malware Detection', Special Issue on Intrusion and Malware 
Detection: Journal of Information Assurance and Security, vol. 4, no. 3. 
 
Bitdefender Antivirus Technology (2010). White paper 'Bitdefender Antivirus 
Technology', Bitdefender Antivirus Technology. Retrieved from 
<http://www.bitdefender.com/files/Main/file/BitDefender_Antivirus_Technology.pdf>. 
 
Blum, A. L. & Langley, P. (1997). 'Selection of relevant features and examples in 
machine learning', Artif. Intell., vol. 97, no. 1-2, pp. 245-271. 
 
Brown, P., deSouza, P., Mercer, R., Pietra, V. & Lai, J. (1992). 'Class-based n-gram 
models of natural language', Computational Linguistics, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 467-479. 
 
Bruschi, D., Martignoni, L. & Monga, M. (2006). 'Detecting Self-mutating Malware 
Using Control-Flow Graph Matching', in R. Büschkes & P. Laskov (eds), Detection of 
Intrusions and Malware &amp; Vulnerability Assessment, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 
vol. 4064, pp. 129-143. 
 
Camastra, F., Ciaramella, A. & Staiano, A. (2011). 'Machine learning and soft computing 
for ICT security: an overview of current trends', Journal of Ambient Intelligence and 
Humanized Computing, pp. 1-13. 
 
Carrie, B. (2003). 'Defining Digital Forensic Examination and Analysis Tools Using 
Abstraction Layer', International Journal of Digital Evidence, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 1-12. 
 
Carrier, B. (2005). File System Forensic Analysis, 1st edn, Addison-Wesley Professional. 
 
The Autopsy Forensic (2010). 'The Autopsy Forensic', version: 2.24. Retrieved from. 
 
The Sleuth Kit (TSK) (2011). 'The Sleuth Kit (TSK)', version: 3.2.2. Retrieved from. 
 
Carrier, B. & Spafford, E. (2003). 'Getting Physical with the Digital Investigation 
Process', International Journal of Digital Evidence, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 1-20. 
 
  
257 
Casey, E. (2004). Digital evidence and computer crime: forensic science, computers and 
the Internet, 2nd edn, Academic Press, London. 
 
Cesare, S. & Xiang, Y. (2010). 'Classification of Malware Using Structured Control 
Flow', The 8th Australasian Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Computing 
Australian Computer Society Inc, Brisbane, Australia, vol. 107, pp. 61-70. 
 
Chan, K. Y. & Loh, W. Y. (2004). 'An Algorithm for Building Accurate and 
Comprehensible Logistic Regression Trees', Journal of Computational and Graphical 
Statistics, vol. 13, no. 4. 
 
Chandola, V., Banerjee, A. & Kumar, V. (2009). 'Anomaly detection: A survey', ACM 
Computing Surveys (CSUR), vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 1-58. 
 
LIBSVM - A Library for Support Vector Machines (2011). 'LIBSVM - A Library for 
Support Vector Machines', version: 3.1. Retrieved from. 
 
Chang, H. & Atallah, M. (2002). 'Protecting Software Code by Guards', in T. Sander 
(ed.), Security and Privacy in Digital Rights Management, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 
vol. 2320, pp. 125-141. 
 
Chen, W.-H., Hsu, S.-H. & Shen, H.-P. (2005). 'Application of SVM and ANN for 
intrusion detection', Computers and Operations Research, vol. 32, no. 10, pp. 2617-2634. 
 
Choi, S., Park, H., Lim, H.-i. & Han, T. (2009). 'A static API birthmark for Windows 
binary executables', Journal of Systems and Software, vol. 82, no. 5, pp. 862-873. 
 
Chouchane, M. R. & Lakhotia, A. (2006). 'Using engine signature to detect metamorphic 
malware', The 4th ACM workshop on Recurring malcode: ACM, Alexandria, Virginia, 
USA, pp. 73-78. 
 
Christodorescu, M. & Jha, S. (2003). 'Static analysis of executables to detect malicious 
patterns', The 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium USENIX Association, 
Washington, DC, vol. 12, pp. 12-12. 
 
Christodorescu, M. & Jha, S. (2004). 'Testing Malware Detectors', ACM SIGSOFT 
Software Engineering Notes, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 34-44. 
 
Christodorescu, M., Jha, S., Seshia, S., Song, D. & Bryant, R. (2005). 'Semantics-Aware 
Malware Detection', The IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy: IEEE Computer 
Society, 8-11 May, Oakland, USA, pp. 1-21. 
 
Cifuentes, C. & Fraboulet, A. (1997). 'Intraprocedural static slicing of binary 
executables', The 13th International Conference on Software Maintenance IEEE 
Computer Society, Oct 1-3, Bari, Italy, pp. 188 - 195. 
 
  
258 
Cifuentes, C. & Gough, K. J. (1995). 'Decompilation of Binary Programs', Software: 
Practice and Experience, vol. 25, no. 7, pp. 811-829. 
 
Cohen, F. (1987). 'Computer viruses:: Theory and experiments', Computers & Security, 
vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 22-35. 
 
Cortes, C. & Vapnik, V. (1995). 'Support-Vector Networks', Machine Learning, vol. 20, 
no. 3, pp. 273-297. 
 
Crescenzo, G. D. & Vakil, F. (2006). 'Cryptographic hashing for virus localization', 
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Recurring malcode: ACM, Alexandria, 
Virginia, USA, pp. 41-48. 
 
Danny, B. (2010). 'Digging up the hacking underground', Infosecurity, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 
14-17. 
 
Daoud, E. A., Jebril, I. & Zaqaibeh, B. (2008). 'Computer Virus Strategies and Detection 
Methods', International Journal of Open Problems in Computer Science and 
Mathematics, vol. 1, no. 2. 
 
Dasgupta, D. (1997). 'Artificial neural networks and artificial immune systems: 
similarities and differences', The IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics- Computational Cybernetics and Simulation: IEEE Computer Society, 12-15 
Oct, Orlando, FL , USA vol. 1, pp. 873-878  
 
Dayhoff, J. & DeLeo, J. (2001). 'Artificial Neural Networks Opening the Black Box', 
Cancer Supplement, vol. 91, no. 8, pp. 1615-1635. 
 
Desai, P. (2010). 'A highly metamorphic virus generator', International Journal of 
Multimedia Intelligence and Security, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 402-427. 
 
Dinaburg, A., Royal, P., Sharif, M. & Lee, W. (2008). 'Ether: malware analysis via 
hardware virtualization extensions', Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on 
Computer and communications security: ACM, Alexandria, Virginia, USA, pp. 51-62. 
 
Do, T. M. T. & Artières, T. (2009). 'Learning mixture models with support vector 
machines for sequence classification and segmentation', Pattern Recognition, vol. 42, no. 
12, pp. 3224-3230. 
  
Egele, M, Scholte, T, Kirda, E & Kruegel, C. (2012). 'A Survey on Automated Dynamic 
Malware Analysis Techniques and Tools', ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 
1-49. 
 
Eilam, E. (2005). Reversing: Secrets of Reverse Engineering, 1st edn, Wiley. 
 
  
259 
Eisner, A. (2003). PSINet Europe Study Reveals Massive Vulnerabilities, theWHIR.com, 
retrieved 3 May 2010. Retrieved from <http://www.thewhir.com/web-hosting-
news/hackers>. 
 
Elaiwat, S., Alazab, A., Venkatraman, S. & Alazab, M. (2010a). 'Applying Genetic 
Algorithm for Optimizing Broadcasting Process in Ad-hoc Network', International 
Journal of Recent Trends in Engineering and Technology, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 68-72. 
 
Elaiwat, S., Alazab, A., Venkatraman, S. & Alazab, M. (2010b). 'GOM: New genetic 
optimizing model for broadcasting tree in MANET', The 2nd International Conference on 
Computer Technology and Development: IEEE Computer Society, 2-4 Nov, Cairo, pp. 
477-481. 
 
Emigh, A. (2006). 'The Crimeware Landscape: Malware, Phishing, Identity Theft and 
Beyond', Journal of Digital Forensic Practice, vol. 1, no. 6. 
 
Farmer, D. & Venema, W. (2005). Forensic discovery, vol. 6, Addison-Wesley 
Professional. 
 
Ferrante, J., Ottenstein, K. J. & Warren, J. D. (1987). 'The program dependence graph 
and its use in optimization', ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 
(TOPLAS), vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 319-349. 
 
Ferrie, P. & Szor, P. (2001). 'Zmist opportunities', Virus Bulletin, pp. 6–7. 
 
FICO (2010). Fraud Predictor with Merchant Profiles FICO, retrieved Junne 22 2010. 
Retrieved from <http://www.fico.com/en/Products/DMApps/Pages/Fraud-Predictor-with-
Merchant-Profiles.aspx>. 
 
Frawley, W., Piatetsky-shapiro, G. & Matheus, C. (1992). 'Knowledge discovery in 
databases: An overview', Al Magazine, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 213–228. 
 
Fukushima, Y., Sakai, A., Hori, Y. & Sakurai, K. (2010). 'A Behavior Based Malware 
Detection Scheme for Avoiding False Positive', The 6th IEEE Workshop on Secure 
Network Protocols: IEEE Computer Society, 5-5 Oct, Kyoto pp. 79 - 84  
 
DD :Unix Command and Image Creation (1970). 'DD :Unix Command and Image 
Creation', version: 2.4.23. Retrieved from 
<http://www.softpanorama.org/Tools/dd.shtml>. 
 
Gavrilut, D., Cimpoes, M., Anton, D. & Ciortuz, L. (2009). 'Malware Detection Using 
Machine Learning', International Multiconference on Computer Science and Information 
Technology: IEEE Computer Society, 12-14 Oct, Mragowo, Poland, pp. 735-741. 
 
General Information Security Statistics (2004). Security Stats. Retrieved from 
<http://www.securitystats.com/infos-ec.html>. 
  
260 
 
Ghosh, S. & Turrini, E. (2010). Cybercrimes: A Multidisciplinary Analysis, Springer 
Verlag. 
 
Govindaraju, A. (2010a). 'Although PHMM can detect malwares which are 
metamorphic', Master Degree thesis, San Jose State University. 
 
Govindaraju, A. (2010b). 'Exhaustive Statistical Analysis for Detection of Metamorphic 
Malware', Master Degree thesis, San Jose State University. 
 
Gu, G., Porras, P., Yegneswaran, V., Fong, M. & Lee, W. (2007). 'BotHunter: detecting 
malware infection through IDS-driven dialog correlation', The 16th USENIX Security 
Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium: USENIX Association, Boston, MA, pp. 1-
16. 
 
Guo, T. & Li, G.-Y. (2008). 'Neural data mining for credit card fraud detection', Machine 
Learning and Cybernetics, International Conference on: IEEE Computer Society, July 
12-15 Kunming vol. 7, pp. 3630-3634. 
 
Hand, D. J., Mannila, H. & Smyth, P. (2001). Principles of data mining, 1st edn, A 
Bradford Book. 
 
DCFLDD: Enhanced version of GNU dd (2006). 'DCFLDD: Enhanced version of GNU 
dd ', version: 1.3.4-1. Retrieved from <http://dcfldd.sourceforge.net/>. 
 
Hearst, M. A., Dumais, S. T., Osman, E., Platt, J. & Scholkopf, B. (1998). 'Support vector 
machines', Intelligent Systems and their Applications, IEEE, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 18-28. 
 
Holz, T., Marechal, S. & Raynal, F. (2006). 'New Threats and Attacks on the World Wide 
Web', IEEE Security and Privacy, IEEE Educational Activities Department, vol. 4, no. 2, 
pp. 72-75. 
 
Hu, Q., Liu, J. & Yu, D. (2008). 'Mixed feature selection based on granulation and 
approximation', Journal Knowledge-Based Systems, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 294-304. 
 
Huda, S., Yearwood, J. & Strainieri, A. (2010). 'Hybrid wrapper-filter approaches for 
input feature selection using Maximum relevance and Artificial Neural Network Input 
Gain Measurement Approximation (ANNIGMA)', Fourth International Conference on 
Network and System Security: IEEE Computer Society, 1-3 Sep, Melbourne, Australia, 
pp. 442-449. 
 
Huebner, E., Bem, D. & Wee, C. K. (2006). 'Data hiding in the NTFS file system', Digital 
Investigation, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 211-226. 
 
  
261 
Hung-Ju, C.-N., Huang, H.-J. & Schuschel, D. (2002). 'The ANNIGMA-wrapper 
approach to fast feature selection for neural nets', IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, 
and Cybernetics, Part B, pp. 207-212. 
 
IBM (2008). 'Improving Payments Fraud Detection and Prevention: ACI Proactive Risk 
Manager with IBM System z10 '. 
 
IDA Pro Disassembler and Debugger (2010). 'IDA Pro Disassembler and Debugger ', 
version: 5.7. Retrieved from <http://www.hex-rays.com/idapro/overview.htm>. 
 
IDAPython : Python Plugin for Interactive Disassembler Pro (2011). 'IDAPython : 
Python Plugin for Interactive Disassembler Pro', version: 1.4.3. Retrieved from 
<http://code.google.com/p/idapython/>. 
 
Intel (2010a). 'Intel ® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manuals : Basic 
Architecture', vol. 1. 
 
Intel (2010b). 'Intel ® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manuals : 
Instruction Set Reference, N-Z', vol. 2B. 
 
Islam, R., Tian, R., Batten, L. & Versteeg, S. (2010). 'Classiﬁcation of Malware Based on 
String and Function Feature Selection', Cybercrime and Trustworthy Computing 
Workshop: IEEE Computer Society, 19-20 July, Ballarat, pp. 9-17. 
 
Jacob, G., Debar, H. & Filiol, E. (2008). 'Behavioral detection of malware: from a survey 
towards an established taxonomy', Journal in Computer Virology, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 251-
266. 
 
Jacob, G., Filiol, E. & Debar, H. (2009). 'Functional polymorphic engines: formalisation, 
implementation and use cases', Journal in Computer Virology, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 247-261. 
 
Jahankhani, H. & Al-Nemrat, A. (2008). 'Global E-Security', in H. Jahankhani, K. Revett 
& D. Palmer-Brown (eds), Global E-Security: Communications in Computer and 
Information Science, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, London, UK, vol. 12, pp. 3-9. 
 
Jahankhani, H. & Al-Nemrat, A. (2010). 'Examination of Cyber-criminal Behaviour', 
International Journal of Information Science and Management, Special Issue, pp. 41 - 48  
 
James, D. (2007). 'Internet Security – the Threats Are Very Real', Educators' eZine. 
 
Järvelin, A., Järvelin, A. & Järvelin, K. (2007). 's-grams: Defining generalized n-grams 
for information retrieval', Information Processing & Management, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 
1005-1019. 
 
John, G., Kohavi, R. & Pfleger, K. (1994). 'Irrelevant Features and the Subset Selection 
Problem', Machine Learning: Proceedings of the Eleventh International, pp. 121-129. 
  
262 
 
Kang, M. G., Poosankam, P. & Yin, H. (2007). 'Renovo: a hidden code extractor for 
packed executables', Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Recurring malcode: 
ACM, Alexandria, Virginia, USA, pp. 46-53. 
 
Karim, M., Walenstein A., Lakhotia A. & Parida L. (2005). 'Malware phylogeny 
generation using permutations of code'. Journal in Computer Virology, vol.1, no.1, 
pp.13–23. 
 
Keizer, G. (2007). Symantec false positive cripples thousands of Chinese PCs, retrieved 3 
March 2010. Retrieved from 
<http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleI
d=9019958&intsrc=hm_list.>. 
 
Khan, A., Wiil, U. K. & Memon, N. (2010). 'Digital Forensics and Crime Investigation: 
Legal Issues in Prosecution at National Level', The 5th IEEE International Workshop on 
Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering: IEEE Computer Society, 20-20 
May, pp. 133-140. 
 
Frhed (2009). 'Frhed', version: 1.7.1. Retrieved from <http://frhed.sourceforge.net/en/>. 
 
Kohavi, R. & John, G. H. (1997). 'Wrappers for feature subset selection', Artificial 
Intelligence - Special issue on relevance, vol. 97, no. 1-2, pp. 273-324. 
 
Kolter, J. Z. & Maloof, M. A. (2006). 'Learning to Detect and Classify Malicious 
Executables in the Wild', Journal of Machine Learning Research, vol. 7, pp. 2721-2744. 
 
Komisarczuk, P. (2010). 'Who Are We Fighting? Dealing with threats is one thing, 
finding them is another', ISNOW: The magazine of the BCS security forum vol. 5, no. 1. 
 
Kong, D., Jhi, Y.-C., Gong, T., Zhu, S., Liu, P. & Xi, H. (2010). 'SAS: Semantics Aware 
Signature Generation for Polymorphic Worm Detection Security and Privacy in 
Communication Networks', in S. Jajodia & J. Zhou (eds), Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 
vol. 50, pp. 1-19. 
 
Konstantinou, E. & Wolthusen, S. (2008). Metamorphic virus: Analysis and detection, 
Royal Holloway, London. 
 
Kou, Y., Lu, C.-T., Sirwongwattana, S. & Huang, Y.-P. (2004). 'Survey of fraud 
detection techniques', The IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and 
Control: IEEE Computer Society, Taipei, Taiwan, vol. 2, pp. 749-754. 
 
Krogh, A. (1998). 'An introduction to hidden Markov models for biological sequences', in 
Computational Methods in Molecular Biology, Elsevier Science, pp. 45-63. 
 
  
263 
Kruegel, C., Robertson, W., Valeur, F. & Vigna, G. (2004). 'Static Disassembly of 
Obfuscated Binaries', The 13th USENIX Security Symposium USENIX magazine, 11- 13 
Aug, San Diego, CA, USA, pp. 255–270. 
 
Kruse, W. & Heiser, J. (2001). Computer Forensics: Incident Response Essentials, 1st 
edn, Addison-Wesley Professional. 
 
Kuncheva, L. I. (2006). 'On the optimality of NaIve Bayes with dependent binary 
features', Pattern Recognition Letters, vol. 27, no. 7, pp. 830-837. 
 
Landwehr, C. E., Bull, A. R., McDermott, J. P. & Choi, W. S. (1994). 'A taxonomy of 
computer program security flaws', ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 
211-254. 
 
Lawton, G. (2002). 'Virus Wars: Fewer Attacks, New Threats', IEEE Computer Society, 
vol. 35, no. 12, pp. 22 - 24. 
 
Layton, R., Brown, S. & Watters, P. (2009). 'Using Differencing to Increase 
Distinctiveness for Phishing Website Clustering', Symposia and Workshops on 
Ubiquitous, Autonomic and Trusted Computing: IEEE Computer Society, Jul 07-09, 
Brisbane, Australia pp. 488-492. 
 
Li, X., Loh, P. & Tan, F. (2011). 'Mechanisms of Polymorphic and Metamorphic 
Viruses', The Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference: IEEE Computer Society, 
12-14 Sep, Athens, pp. 149-154. 
 
Linn, C. & Debray, S. (2003). 'Obfuscation of executable code to improve resistance to 
static disassembly', 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security 
ACM, Oct 27–31, Washington, DC, USA, pp. 290-299. 
 
Lobo, D., Watters, P. & Wu, X. (2010a). 'Identifying Rootkit Infections Using Data 
Mining', The International Conference on  Information Science and Applications: IEEE 
Computer Society, 21-23 April, Seoul, pp. 1 - 7. 
 
Lobo, D., Watters, P. & Wu, X. (2010b). ' RBACS: Rootkit Behavioral Analysis and 
Classification System', The International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data 
Mining: IEEE Computer Society, 9-10 Jan, Ballarat, pp. 75-80. 
 
Lobo, D., Watters, P., Wu, X. & Sun, L. (2010). 'Windows Rootkits: Attacks and 
Countermeasures', Cybercrime and Trustworthy Computing Workshop: IEEE Computer 
Society, 19-20 July, Ballarat, pp. 69-78. 
 
MacNamara, S., Cunningham, P. & Byrne, J. (1998). 'Neural networks for language 
identification: a comparative study', Information Processing & Management, vol. 34, no. 
4, pp. 395-403. 
 
  
264 
Malan, D. J. & Smith, M. D. (2005). 'Host-based detection of worms through peer-to-peer 
cooperation', The ACM workshop on Rapid malcode: ACM, Fairfax, VA, USA, pp. 72-
80. 
 
Manap, S. (2001). Rootkit: Attacker undercover tools, Retrieved from. 
 
Maria, T. A. (2011). 'The Growing Global Threat of Cyber-crime given the Current 
Economic Crisis: A Study regarding Internet Malicious Activities in Romania', Acta 
Universitatis Danubius Economica, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 179-190. 
 
Martignoni, L., Christodorescu, M. & Jha, S. (2007). 'OmniUnpack: Fast, Generic, and 
Safe Unpacking of Malware', The 23rd Annual Computer Security Applications 
Conference: 10-14 Dec, pp. 431-441. 
 
Marx, A. (2004). Antivirus outbreak response testing and impact, AV-test.org, retrieved 
March 15 2010. Retrieved from 
<http://www.virusbtn.com/conference/vb2004/abstracts/amarx.xml>. 
 
McCombie, S., Pieprzyk, J. & Watters, P. (2009). 'Cybercrime Attribution: An Eastern 
European Case Stud', The 7th Australian Digital Forensics Conference: School of 
Computer and Information Science, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia, 
pp. 41-51. 
 
McGraw, G. & Morrisett, G. (2000). 'Attacking Malicious Code: A Report to the Infosec 
Research Council', IEEE Software, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 33-41. 
 
MetaPHOR (2010). W32.Simile, Symantec Enterprise Security,. Retrieved from 
<http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-030617-5423-
99>. 
 
Microsoft Developer Network (2011). Windows API Functions, Microsoft, retrieved 
12/10 2010. Retrieved from <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/>. 
 
Microsoft WinDbg (2010). Microsoft Windows SDK for Windows 7 and .NET 
Framework 4 Microsoft retrieved 5/2 2011. Retrieved from 
<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/hardware/gg463009.aspx>. 
 
Moshchuk, E., Bragin, T., Gribble, S. D. & Levy, H. M. (2006). 'A crawler-based study 
of spyware on the Web ', The 13th Network and Distributed System Security Symposium: 
February, pp. 17-33. 
 
Naiqi, L., Zhongshan, W., Yujie, H. & QinKe (2008). 'Computer Forensics Research and 
Implementation Based on NTFS File System', The International Colloquium on 
Computing, Communication, Control, and Management: IEEE Computer Society, 3-4 
Aug, Guangzhou, pp. 519 - 523. 
 
  
265 
Orr (2006). The Viral Darwinism of W32.Evol An In-depth Analysis of a Metamorphic 
Engine. 
 
Orr (2007). The Molecular Virology of Lexotan32 Metamorphism Illustrated. 
 
Palmer, G. (2001). A Road Map for Digital Forensic Research, Utica, New York. 
 
Park, H., Choi, S., Lim, H.-i. & Han, T. (2008a). 'Detecting code theft via a static 
instruction trace birthmark for Java methods', International Conference on Industrial 
Informatics: IEEE Computer Society, JuL 13-16 Daejeon pp. 551-556. 
 
Park, H., Choi, S., Lim, H.-i. & Han, T. (2008b). 'Detecting Java Theft Based on Static 
API Trace Birthmark', in K. Matsuura & E. Fujisaki (eds), Advances in Information and 
Computer Security, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 5312, pp. 121-135. 
 
Passerini, E., Paleari, R. & Martignoni, L. (2009). 'How Good Are Malware Detectors at 
Remediating Infected Systems?', in U. Flegel & D. Bruschi (eds), Detection of Intrusions 
and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 5587, pp. 
21-37. 
 
Patcha, A. & Park, J.-M. (2007). 'An overview of anomaly detection techniques: Existing 
solutions and latest technological trends', Computer Networks, vol. 51, no. 12, pp. 3448-
3470. 
 
Paul, N. (2008). 'Disk-Level Behavioral Malware Detection', Doctor of Philosophy thesis, 
University of Virginia. 
 
(2009). version: 1.99 R6. Retrieved from <http://www.heaventools.com/overview.htm>. 
 
PEiD (2008). Detect most common packers, cryptors and compilers for PE files, 
peid.info, retrieved 02/06 2010. Retrieved from <http://www.peid.info/>. 
 
Perriot, F. & Ferrie, P. (2004). 'Principles and practise of x-raying', Virus Bulletin 
Conference September, pp. 1- 17. 
 
HexEdit (2010). 'HexEdit', version: 1.03. Retrieved from <http://www.hexedit.com/>. 
 
Preda, M. D., Christodorescu, M., Jha, S. & Debray, S. (2008). 'A Semantics-Based 
Approach to Malware Detection', ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and 
Systems (TOPLAS), vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 1-54. 
 
Purcell, D. & Lang, S.-D. (2008). 'Forensic Artifacts of Microsoft Windows Vista 
System', in C. Yang, H. Chen, M. Chau, K. Chang, S.-D. Lang, P. Chen, R. Hsieh, D. 
Zeng, F.-Y. Wang, K. Carley, W. Mao & J. Zhan (eds), Intelligence and Security 
Informatics, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 5075, pp. 304-319. 
 
  
266 
Rabek, J. C., Khazan, R. I., Lewandowski, S. M. & Cunningham, R. K. (2003). 
'Detection of injected, dynamically generated, and obfuscated malicious code', 
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Rapid malcode: ACM, Washington, DC, 
USA, pp. 76-82. 
 
RCFL (2007). Annual report for fiscal year 2007. 
 
RCFL (2008). Annual report for fiscal year 2008. 
 
Reed, C. (1990-91). 'As quoted in Casey E., 2004. Digital evidence and computer crime: 
forensic science, computers and the internet. 2nd ed. London: Academic press'. 
 
Reed, C. & Angel, J. (2007). Computer Law: The Law and Regulation of Information 
Technology, Oxford University Press, Inc. , New York, NY, USA. 
 
Reith, M., Carr, C. & Gunsch, G. (2002). 'An Examination of Digital Forensic Models', 
International Journal of Digital Evidence, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 1-12. 
 
Richard, G. & Roussev, V. (2006). 'Next-generation digital forensics', Communications of 
the ACM, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 76-80. 
 
Rogers, M. & Seigfried, K. (2004). 'The future of computer forensics: a needs analysis 
survey', Computers & Security, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 12-16. 
 
Royal, P., Halpin, M., Dagon, D., Edmonds, R. & Lee, W. (2006). 'PolyUnpack: 
Automating the Hidden-Code Extraction of Unpack-Executing Malware', The 22nd 
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference: IEEE Computer Society, Dec 26 
Miami Beach, FL, USA pp. 289-300. 
 
RSA (2011). 'The Current State of Cybercrime and What to Expect in 2011', RSA 2011 
cybercrime trends report. 
 
NTFSINFO (2006). 'NTFSINFO', version: 1.0. Retrieved from 
<http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897424>. 
 
Strings (2009). 'Strings', version: 2.41. Retrieved from <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/bb897439>. 
 
Santos, I., Penya, Y. K., Devesa, J. & Bringas, P. (2009). 'N-grams-based file signatures 
for malware detection', pp. 317–320. 
 
Seewald, A. K. & Gansterer, W. N. (2010). 'On the detection and identification of 
botnets', Computers &amp; Security, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 45-58. 
 
  
267 
Shabtai, A., Moskovitch, R., Elovici, Y. & Glezer, C. (2009). 'Detection of malicious 
code by applying machine learning classifiers on static features: A state-of-the-art 
survey', Information Security Technical Report, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 16-29. 
 
Shafiq, M. Z., Khayam, S. A. & Farooq, M. (2008). 'Embedded Malware Detection Using 
Markov &lt;i&gt;n&lt;/i&gt; -Grams', in D. Zamboni (ed.), Detection of Intrusions and 
Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 5137, pp. 88-
107. 
 
Shankarapani, M., Kancherla, K., Ramammoorthy, S., Movva, R. & Mukkamala, S. 
(2010). 'Kernel machines for malware classification and similarity analysis', The 2010 
International Joint Conference on Neural Networks: IEEE Computer Society, Jul 18-23 
Barcelona pp. 1-6. 
 
Sharif, M., Yegneswaran, V., Saidi, H., Porras, P. & Lee, W. (2008). 'Eureka: A 
Framework for Enabling Static Malware Analysis', in S. Jajodia & J. Lopez (eds), 
Computer Security - ESORICS 2008, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 5283, pp. 481-
500. 
 
Shetty, S. (2004). Protocol-level malware scanner, Google Patents, patent, 6772345, US. 
 
Singh, N. (2007). 'Online Frauds in Banks with Phishing', Journal of Internet Banking 
and Commerce, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 1-27  
 
Skoudis, E. & Zeltser, L. (2003). Malware: Fighting Malicious Code, Prentice Hall PTR. 
 
SPAMfighter News (2011). 'Alliance of ZeuS-SpyEye Resulting in the Publication of 
First Toolkit in the Underground Market'. 
 
Stabek, A., Watters, P. & Layton, R. (2010). 'The Seven Scam Types: Mapping the 
Terrain of Cybercrime', Cybercrime and Trustworthy Computing Workshop: IEEE 
Computer Society, 19-20 July, Ballarat, VIC, pp. 41-51. 
 
Stang, D. (2010). Detection Errors and Scanner Performance, retrieved 1 March 2011. 
Retrieved from <http://www.upublish.info/Article/Detection-Errors-and-Scanner-
Performance/343804>. 
 
Staniford, S., Moore, D., Paxson, V. & Weaver, N. (2004). 'The top speed of flash 
worms', The ACM workshop on Rapid malcode ACM, October 29-29, Washington DC, 
USA  
 
Stolfo, S., Wang, K. & Li, W.-j. (2005). Fileprint analysis for malware detection, 
Columbia Univesrity. 
 
Stolfo, S., Wang, K. & Li, W.-J. (2007). 'Towards stealthy malware detection', in 
Malware Detection, vol. 27, pp. 231-249. 
  
268 
 
Sun, L., Versteeg, S., Boztaş, S. & Yann, T. (2010). 'Pattern Recognition Techniques for 
the Classification of Malware Packers', in R. Steinfeld & P. Hawkes (eds), Information 
Security and Privacy, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 6168, pp. 370-390. 
 
Sung, A. H., Xu, J., Chavez, P. & Mukkamala, S. (2004). 'Static analyzer of vicious 
executables (SAVE)', 20th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, : IEEE 
Computer Society, Dec 6-10, Tucson, AZ, USA, pp. 326-334. 
 
SWGDE (2000). 'Proposed Standards for the Exchange of Digital Evidence', Forensic 
Science Communications, Digital Evidence:Standards and Principles, vol. 2, no. 2. 
 
Symantec Enterprise Security (1997). 'Understanding Heuristics: Symantec‘s 
Bloodhound Technolog', Virus Bulletin, vol. XXXIV. 
 
Symantec Enterprise Security (2007). Trojan.Vundo, Symantec Enterprise Security,. 
Retrieved from. 
 
Symantec Enterprise Security (2009a). 'Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report 
Trends for 2008', Symantec  Enterprise Security, vol. XIV. 
 
Symantec Enterprise Security (2009b). Trojan.Vundo.B, Symantec Enterprise Security,. 
Retrieved from <http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-
042810-2611-99>. 
 
Symantec Enterprise Security (2010). 'Symantec Internet Security Threat Report: Trends 
for 2009', Symantec  Enterprise Security, vol. XV. 
 
Symantec Enterprise Security (2011a). 'Symantec Internet Security Threat Report: Trends 
for 2010', Symantec  Enterprise Security, vol. 16. 
 
Symantec Enterprise Security (2011b). Symantec Report on Attack Kits and Malicious 
Websites, Symantec Enterprise Security White paper, Retrieved from. 
 
Szor, P. (2005). The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense, Addison-Wesley 
Professional. 
 
Tamada, H., Okamoto, K., Nakamura, M., Monden, A. & Matsumoto, K.-i. (2006). 
'Dynamic software birthmarks based on API calls', IEICE Transactions on Information 
and Systems, vol. 89, no. 8, pp. 1751-1763. 
 
Tang, K., Zhou, M.-T. & Zuo, Z.-H. (2010). 'An Enhanced Automated Signature 
Generation Algorithm for Polymorphic Malware Detection', Journal of Electronic 
Science and Technology, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 114-121. 
 
Technology, B. A. (2006). White paper, BitDefender Antivirus Retrieved from. 
  
269 
 
Tian, R., Islam, R., Batten, L. & Versteeg, S. (2010). 'Classiﬁcation of Malware Based on 
String and Function Feature Selection', The International Conference on Malicious and 
Unwanted Software (MALWARE), : IEEE Computer Society, 19-20 July, Nancy, 
Lorraine, pp. 23-30. 
 
Townsend, K. (2010). 'Anti-virus: a technology update', Infosecurity, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 28-
31. 
 
TreadwellZhou, S. & Zhou, M. (2009 ). 'A heuristic approach for detection of obfuscated 
malware', Intelligence and Security Informatics ISI09 IEEE International Conference on: 
IEEE Computer Society, June 8-11, Richardson, TX, USA, pp. 291-299. 
 
Trusteer (2009). Measuring the in-the-wild effectiveness of Antivirus against Zeus, New 
York, NY. 
 
Turville, K., Yearwood, J. & Miller, C. (2010). 'Understanding Victims of Identity Theft: 
Preliminary Insights', Cybercrime and Trustworthy Computing Workshop: IEEE 
Computer Society, 19-20 July, Ballarat, VIC, pp. 60 - 68. 
 
Vacca, J. (2005). Computer forensics: computer crime scene investigation, Networking 
Series, Charles River Media; 2 edition. 
 
Varol, C. & Bayrak, C. (2011). 'Estimation of quality of service in spelling correction 
using Kullback-Leibler divergence', Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 38, no. 5, pp. 
6307-6312. 
 
Vassil, R. (2009). 'Hashing and Data Fingerprinting in Digital Forensics', vol. 7, pp. 49-
55. 
 
Vasudevan, A. & Yerraballi, R. (2006). 'Spike: Engineering malware analysis tools using 
unobtrusive binary-instrumentation', The 29th Australasian Computer Science 
Conference: Australian Computer Society, Inc., Hobart, Australia, vol. 48, pp. 311-320. 
 
Venkatraman, S. (2009). 'Autonomic Context-Dependent Architecture for Malware 
Detection', e-Tech 2009, International Conference on e-Technology: International 
Business Academics Consortium, 8-10 Jan, Singapore, pp. 2927-2947. 
 
Venkatraman, S. (2010). 'Self-Learning Framework for Intrusion Detection', The 
International Congress on Computer Applications and Computational Science: 4-6 Dec, 
Singapore, pp. 517-520. 
 
Venkatraman, S. (2011). 'A Framework for ICT Security Policy Management', in E. 
Adomi (ed.), Frameworks for ICT Policy: Government, Social and Legal Issues, IGI 
Global Publishers, Hershey, New York, pp. 1- 14. 
 
  
270 
VX Heavens (2011). VX Heavens Site, retrieved 2/3 2011. Retrieved from 
<http://vx.netlux.org/>. 
 
Wang, C., Pang, J., Zhao, R., Fu, W. & Liu, X. (2009). 'Malware Detection Based on 
Suspicious Behavior Identification', First International Workshop on Education 
Technology and Computer Science: IEEE Computer Society, Mar 07-08, Wuhan, Hubei, 
China, vol. 2, pp. 198-202. 
 
Wang, C., Pang, J., Zhao, R. & Liu, X. (2009). 'Using API Sequence and Bayes 
Algorithm to Detect Suspicious Behavior', The International Conference on 
Communication Software and Networks: IEEE Computer Society, 27-28 Feb, Macau, 
China pp. 544-548. 
 
Wang, H., Bell, D. & Murtagh, F. (1999). 'Axiomatic Approach to Feature Subset 
Selection Based on Relevance', IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine 
Intelligence, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 271-277. 
 
Wang, X. G., Tang, Z., Tamura, H., Ishii, M. & Sun, W. D. (2004). 'An improved 
backpropagation algorithm to avoid the local minima problem', Neurocomputing, vol. 56, 
pp. 455-460. 
 
Watters, P. (2009). 'University incorporated: implications for professional information 
security education', Corporate Governance, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 564 - 572. 
 
Watters, P. & McCombie, S. (2011). 'A methodology for analyzing the credential 
marketplace', Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 32 - 43. 
 
Wing Wong (2006). 'Analysis and detection of metamorphic computer viruses', Master 
Degree thesis, San Jose State University. 
 
Data mining: Practical machine learning tools and techniques (2010). 'Data mining: 
Practical machine learning tools and techniques', version: 3.6.4. Retrieved from 
<http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/>. 
 
Wolf, L. & Shashua, A. (2005). 'Feature Selection for Unsupervised and Supervised 
Inference: The Emergence of Sparsity in a Weight-Based Approach', J. Mach. Learn. 
Res., vol. 6, pp. 1855-1887. 
 
WinHex Hex Editor (2010). 'WinHex Hex Editor', version: 12.8. Retrieved from. 
 
Xiao, J., Liu, B. & Wang, X. (2007). 'Exploiting Word Positional Information in Ngram 
Model for Chinese Text Input Method', Journal of Information and Computing Science, 
vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 215-222. 
 
  
271 
Xu, J., Sung, A., Chavez, P. & Mukkamala, S. (2004). 'Polymorphic malicious executable 
scanner by API sequence analysis', The Fourth International Conference on Hybrid 
Intelligent Systems: 5-8 Dec, vol. 378-383. 
 
Yanfang, Y., Tao, L., Qingshan, J. & Youyu, W. (2010). 'CIMDS: Adapting 
Postprocessing Techniques of Associative Classification for Malware Detection', 
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews, IEEE Transactions 
on, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 298-307. 
 
Yang, L., Karim, R., Ganapathy, V. & Smith, R. (2010). 'Improving NFA-Based 
Signature Matching Using Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams Recent Advances in 
Intrusion Detection', in S. Jha, R. Sommer & C. Kreibich (eds), Springer Berlin / 
Heidelberg, vol. 6307, pp. 58-78. 
 
Yao, D. & Liu, X. (2011). 'Research on the Cyber Terrorist Attacks and its Impacts on 
Information Infrastructure Security', Advanced Materials Research, Computational 
Materials Science, vol. 268 - 270, pp. 2108-2115. 
 
Ye, Y., Wang, D., Li, T. & Ye, D. (2007). 'IMDS: intelligent malware detection system', 
Proceedings of the 13th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery 
and data mining: ACM, San Jose, California, USA, pp. 1043-1047. 
 
You, I. & Yim, K. (2010). 'Malware Obfuscation Techniques: A Brief Survey', 
International Conference on Broadband, Wireless Computing, Communication and 
Applications: IEEE Computer Society, pp. 297-300. 
 
Zhang, F., Qi, D. & Hu, J. (2010). 'Using IRP for malware detection', The 13th 
international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection: Springer-Verlag, 
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, pp. 514-515. 
 
Zhu, Z., Ong, Y.-S. & Dash, M. (2007). 'Wrapper-Filter Feature Selection Algorithm 
Using a Memetic Framework', IEEE transactions on systems man and cybernetics Part B 
Cybernetics, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 70-76. 
 
Zitouni, I. (2007). 'Backoff hierarchical class n-gram language models: effectiveness to 
model unseen events in speech recognition', Computer Speech & Language, vol. 21, no. 
1, pp. 88-104. 
 
 
 
